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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SYMPATHIZERS' MISGIVINGS
MAGINE, if you can, a protracted struggle for civil rights,' the
most far-reaching legal victory in its history seemingly within grasp.
More practiced over the years in lamenting defeats than in celebrating
victories, the movement has begun to experience a shift in the balance
of judicial favor.2 Long ignored by much of mainstream legal
academe, of late the struggle has attracted the attention-more sup-
portive than not-of growing numbers of legal scholars.3 Yet, on the
1. The origins of an organized civil rights movement in support of homosexual
rights date from 1897 with the formation of the Wissenschaftlich-Humanitfires
Komitee in Germany, and, in the United States, from 1924 with the founding of the
short-lived Society for Human Rights. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and
Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1554-56 (1993). It was not until
after World War II, however, that a sustained movement took hold in this country
through such groups as the Mattachine Society and the Society for Individual Rights.
The birth of the modem highly visible gay rights movement is usually associated with
the 1969 "Stonewall Riot," a spontaneous protest that arose following a police raid at
a gay bar in New York City. Id. at 1580; see generally Barry D. Adam, The Rise of a
Gay and Lesbian Movement (1987); John D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communi-
ties: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States 1940-1970 (1983);
Eric Marcus, Making History: The Struggle For Gay and Lesbian Equal Rights, 1945-
1990 (1992).
2. The Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, holding
that a Colorado anti-gay rights referendum violated the Equal Protection Clause, was
undoubtedly the gay rights movement's most important legal victory. For a history of
gay rights litigation in the United States, see Cain, supra note 1. For a discussion and
typology of the major cases comprising the emerging body of gay and lesbian family
law, see Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and
Lesbian Families, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1299 (1997).
3. See Cain, supra note 1, at 1551-52 (discussing the historic scholarly inattention
to gay issues and noting exceptions); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Outsiders-Insiders: The
Academy of the Closet, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 977, 977-85 (1996) (exploring the increas-
ing attention paid to lesbian and gay legal scholarship in recent decades); Lynn D.
Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996
BYU L. Rev. 1, 18-19, 96-101 (criticizing the imbalance of scholarly support for same-
sex marriage versus opposition, with bibliography). Extensive bibliographies and
commentary on the growing body of scholarly literature on gay and lesbian legal is-
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threshold of new legal triumph, some of the movement's most articu-
late advocates voice grave reservations about the prospective win,
favoring an incremental course, albeit to a potentially more radical
end. And highly regarded members of the academy cogently advance
the merits of the momentous legal claim, but simultaneously propose
that courts vindicate the rights at stake through more gradual and cau-
tious means.
The arena, of course, is lesbian and gay rights. The cause celebre,
the same-sex marriage case that is slowly wending its way through the
courts4-and the political processes'-of the State of Hawaii. The
confluence of other circumstances (about which more presently) is by
no means imaginary.
Whether or not Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel ever secure the
marriage license that was denied to them in April 1991, the lawsuit
brought by them and two other same-sex couples against the State of
Hawaii has inexorably thrust the protection of family rights to the
forefront of the gay rights agenda. And the theretofore barely remote
possibility that gay and lesbian family life might actually be organized
around the institution of state-sanctioned marriage is no longer nearly
so remote.
The unexpected 1993 decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii in
Baehr v. Lewin 6 -that denying "same-sex couples access to the mari-
tal status" is a "sex-based classification" and is "presumed to be un-
sues appear in William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, Sexualitv, Gender, and the
Law v-xxx, passim (1997), and William B. Rubenstein, Cases and Materials on Sexual
Orientation and the Law xii-xviii, passin (2d ed. 1997).
4. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion) (vacating dismis-
sal of plaintiffs' complaint alleging unconstitutionality of statutory prohibition of
same-sex marriages and remanding for further proceedings), on remand sub nom.
Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (find-
ing for plaintiffs and holding that statutory prohibition of same-sex marriages was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied). Enforcement of the judgment has been
stayed pending appeal to the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Arthur S. Leonard, Same-Se
Marriage Tops 1996 Lesbian/Gay Legal News as Hawaii Judge Orders State to Issue
Licenses, 1996 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 167, 168.
5. In the spring of 1997, the Hawaii legislature approved legislation to place on
the 1998 general election ballot an amendment to the state constitution which would
permit the legislature to ban same-sex marriages. Act Proposing a Constitutional
Amendment Relating to Marriage, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, H.B. 117. The legislation
was part of a compromise that included adoption of the nation's first statewide do-
mestic partnership law. John Gallagher, Marriage Compromised, Advocate. May 27,
1997, at 71; see also infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. Public opinion polls in
Hawaii have indicated overwhelming public opposition to same-sex marriage. See,
e.g., Bob Sipchen, Same-Sex Marriage Moves to Forefront of Cultural Debate, LA.
Tmes, Apr. 10, 1996, at A5. For discussion of other legislative and administrative
efforts to avert the effects of the Hawaii court decisions, see Thomas F. Coleman, The
Hawaii Legislature Has Compelling Reasons to Adopt a Comprehensive Domestic
Partnership Act, 5 Law & Sexuality 541, 543-44 (1995): Wardle, supra note 3, at 16-17;
Arthur S. Leonard, Domestic Partner & Marriage Notes, 1997 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes
122-23.
6. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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constitutional" unless shown to be "justified by compelling state
interests" 7-gave renewed legitimacy to an issue that had appeared
moribund for most of the preceding two decades. Three years later,
the state's unsuccessful effort to mount a persuasive case of compel-
ling interests was in stark contrast to the cursory acceptance of state
justifications in previous same-sex marriage cases.8 The state had
failed to prove, the Hawaii Circuit Court held, "that the public inter-
est in the well-being of children and families ... would be adversely
affected by same-sex marriage. '
Kenneth Karst had accurately predicted the state's difficulty years
earlier in his classic 1980 essay, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
in which he made one of the earliest scholarly arguments to appear in
the literature in support of legally recognizing same-sex couple rela-
tionships.1" Finding a right of "intimate association" in the confluence
of substantive due process, equal protection, and the First Amend-
ment, Karst asserted that the denial of marriage to homosexuals
,'must be justified by the same sort of heroic state interests that would
be necessary to justify forbidding heterosexual marriage."1" That is "a
7. Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
8. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588,589 (Ky. 1973) ("A license to enter into
a status or a relationship which the parties are incapable of achieving is a nullity.");
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (declaring that marriage is a fun-
damental right only in the context of a "union of man and woman, uniquely involving
the procreation and rearing of children within a family"); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (finding that the prohibition of same-sex marriage is
justified by the "public interest in affording a favorable environment for the growth of
children").
9. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996).
10. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624
(1980). Limited commentary regarding same-sex marriage appeared in the legal liter-
ature in the 1970s. See, e.g., Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J. 799, 874-78
(1979) (discussing the judicial refusal to recognize same-sex marriage); John Rogg
Schmidt, Homosexuality and Validity of Matrimony: A Study in Homo-Psychosexual
Inversion, 19 Cath. Law. 84 (1973) (arguing that marriage is inherently heterosexual);
Note. The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L.J. 573 (1973) (arguing that the
denial of marriage licenses to homosexuals violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Note. Homosexuals' Right to Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution,
128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 193 (1979) (same).
11. Karst, supra note 10, at 685. Karst's essay sought to synthesize and provide
further content to the body of law regarding marriage, procreation, and family rela-
tionships flowing from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). His prediction
that "the current revival of substantive due process ... is here to stay," id. at 665,
predated the Supreme Court's refusal in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to
extend the Griswold line of cases to preclude state sodomy laws. Nevertheless, the
direction of modern equal protection law taken in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996), was foretold by Karst's emphasis on the significance of state-imposed stigma
in the denial of homosexual rights. "[S]tigma," he wrote, "is the one 'status harm'
that is most clearly forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment's principle of equal citi-
zenship .... " Karst, supra note 10, at 686 (footnotes omitted). He dismissed as
"makeweight" and "a mechanical view of the issue [that] is unhelpful" the argument
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burden government will have a hard time meeting," Karst surmised,
because "governmental restrictions on homosexuals are very largely
the product of folklore and fantasy rather than evidence of real risk of
harm."'
1 2
Supportive of gay relationships though he was, Karst fell short of
claiming constitutional protection for fully equal same-sex marital
rights. "[T]he freedom of intimate association," he declared, "de-
mands some important justification for the state's offering the marital
status to heterosexuals and denying any comparable status to homo-
sexuals."' 3 Thus, Karst foresaw the possibility of an alternative "for-
malized legal status" that affords same-sex couples "the same
opportunity as heterosexual couples to make the public self-identify-
ing statements implicit in marriage," and that "recognize[s] their sta-
tus as an acceptable one in society rather than one deserving of
stigma."' 4 Bowing to the realities of "majoritarian morality,"' 5 how-
ever, Karst speculated that even remedies short of same-sex marriage
"may take a while to arrive," though "arrive they surely will."' 6
Far more robust defenses of same-sex marriage have appeared in
the rapidly-expanding legal literature of gay and lesbian rights since
Karst's tepid endorsement. To mention only a few, William Es-
kridge's excellent book, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, examines
the constitutional vulnerability of same-sex marriage prohibitions
from a variety of doctrinal perspectives,"7 as does Mark Strasser's fine
new volume, Legally Wed.'" Nan Hunter introduces a feminist per-
spective, discussing marriage as a socially constructed institution
whose rigid gender structure could be dismantled by means of same-
sex unions.' 9 Andrew Koppelman makes a compelling case that same-
that denial of same-sex marriage presents a problem of sex discrimination. Id. at 683-
84.
12. Karst, supra note 10, at 684-85.
13. Id. at 684.
14. 1&
15. Id- at 691.
16. Id at 686. Acknowledging the "influence [of] conventional morality over the
Supreme Court's management of its institutional role," id. at 692, Karst conceded that
his essay had reached "conclusions that no one can realistically expect courts to adopt
in the near future," id. at 666. "A judge faced with [a homosexual rights] question...
may be excused for feeling a momentary enthusiasm for 'the passive virtues,"' Karst
sympathized, citing Alexander Bickel's famous encomium to judicial discretion in re-
viewing politically sensitive social issues. Id. at 691 (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 111-98 (1962)).
17. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Lib-
erty to Civilized Commitment 123-82 (1996).
18. Mark Strasser, Legally Wed: Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution (1997).
19. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I Law &
Sexuality 9 (1991); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Dis-
courses on Life and Law 27 (1987) ("[Ilt might do something amazing to the entire
institution of marriage to recognize the unity of two 'persons' between whom no supe-
riority or inferiority could be presumed on the basis of gender."). But see Nancy D.
Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage
19981 1703
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sex marriage restrictions are a form of sex discrimination,20 a rationale
that was developed in only the most simplistic terms by the Hawaii
court in Baehr.2
However well reasoned these and other scholarly endorsements of
same-sex marriage," many of Karst's reservations are still much in
evidence in today's mainstream scholarly commentary. Ever the eco-
nomic pragmatist, Judge Richard Posner questions the utility of state
regulation of gay relationships in his provocative book, Sex and Rea-
son, in which he advocates the repeal of sodomy laws.3 By the same
logic, he acknowledges, the burden of proof should be on those who
would limit same-sex marriage. "[T]he costs seem slight," he says, and
"[tlhe benefits of such marriage"-including raising "homosexuals'
self-esteem" and contributing "to the stability of homosexual relation-
Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 Va. L. Rev.
1535, 1536 (1993) (arguing that efforts to obtain the right to marry for homosexuals
"betrays the promise of ... lesbian and gay liberation").
20. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994). Koppelman first made the argu-
ment in a law journal note published in 1988, Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Misce-
genation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 Yale L.J. 145 (1988), at
about the same time that Sylvia Law developed a similar theory, Sylvia A. Law, Ho-
mosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187. Variations on
the same theme have since been argued and expanded upon by a number of others.
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 17, at 153-72 (arguing that prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage discriminates against gay men and lesbians); Marc A. Fajer, Can 71vo Real Men
Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 631-50 (1992) (arguing that discrim-
ination against lesbians and gay men is gender discrimination); Hunter, supra note 19,
at 13-19 (same); see also infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
21. The court found that "on its face and ... as applied, [the marriage statute]
denies same-sex couples access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and
benefits.., on the basis of the applicants' sex." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw.
1993) (Levinson, J., plurality opinion). The dissenting opinion's assertion that the
statute "applies equally to both sexes" because "[a] male cannot obtain a license to
marry another male, and a female cannot obtain a license to marry another female,"
id. at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting), was summarily dismissed by the plurality, id. at 67-68.
22. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage
and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 447 (1996)
(examining how current law affecting marital relationships would apply to same-sex
couples); Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Aban-
doning Scriptural, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35
How. L.J. 173 (1992) (arguing that the rationale for prohibitions against same-sex
marriage should be abandoned and that such prohibition should be subject to strict
scrutiny analysis); Richard D. Mohr, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 215 (1995) (advocating the legalization of gay marriage based on
the nature and meaning of marriage itself); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form
or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501
(1997) (analyzing the prohibition against same-sex marriage and concluding that there
is no valid justification for the prohibition); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold:
Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique,
21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 567 (1994-95) (addressing gay and lesbian opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage).
23. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 309 (1992).
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ships"-"may outweigh the costs." 24 Nevertheless, he worries that le-
galization would be to declare that "homosexual marriage is a
desirable, even a noble, condition in which to live."'  This is "a false
picture of the reality of homosexuals' lives," he declares, and it "is not
what most people in this society believe." 6 For Posner, the societal
heckler's veto is enough to tip the balance.2 7 "[S]ince the public hos-
tility to homosexuals in this country is too widespread to make homo-
sexual marriage a feasible proposal," he says, "the focus should be
shifted to an intermediate solution," perhaps modeled on Denmark's
"registered partnership" or Sweden's "homosexual cohabitation,"
which is "in effect a form contract that homosexuals can use to create
a simulacrum of marriage. '
No mainstream scholar has gone as far as Cass Sunstein in embrac-
ing the constitutional imperatives of same-sex marriage while declin-
ing to endorse judicial vindication of the right. As early as 1988,
Sunstein had argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be con-
strued to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. T
By 1994, he was elaborating the doctrinal basis for that conclusion as
applied to the ban on same-sex marriage. Agreeing with Karst,'u Sun-
stein characterizes state justifications for the ban as "crude" and
"weak."'" Apparently disagreeing with Posner,32 he dismisses as
24. Id. at 311, 313.
25. Id. at 312.
26. Id. Because "marriage is a status rich in entitlements," he is also troubled that
incidents of marriage "designed with heterosexual marriage in mind, more specifically
heterosexual marriages resulting in children" are unlikely to be a perfect fit for same-
sex marriage. Id. at 313. But see infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
27. In a 1997 review of William Eskridge's book. The Case for Same-Sea Marriage,
Posner concedes that "[t]he argument that Eskridge mounts in favor of [legislative]
reform [permitting people of the same sex to marry] is... a powerful one, and it
would not trouble me if a state were persuaded by it and adopted such a law." Rich-
ard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And if so, Who Should De-
cide?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1578 (1997). Nevertheless, he finds "unconvincing" the
argument that "courts in the name of the Constitution should force acceptance of
same-sex marriage on all the states at once." Id. at 1579. Although acknowledging the
logic of Eskridge's constitutional arguments, Posner says "it is a mistake to suppose
that legal reasoning alone can underwrite so profound a change in public policy"; and
that judicially-mandated same-sex marriage would entail "a tightrope act that without
a net constituted by some support in public opinion is too perilous for the courts to
attempt." Id. at 1585.
28. Posner, supra note 23, at 313. The Scandinavian statutory models for regis-
tered domestic partnerships are discussed infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
29. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution.- A Note on tie Rela-
tionship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1178-79
(1988) (cautioning that Bowers v. Hardwick should be read only as a due process
decision, not foreclosing challenges against sexual orientation discrimination
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause, particularly as applied to military service
and government employment).
30. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Honosexualit), and the Constitution, 70 Ind. LJ. 1, 6 (1994)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Homosexuality]. "The ban on same-sex marriages is not easy to
support .... Perhaps [it] could be justified as a means of restricting the benefits of
1998] 1705
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"fragile" the contention that the granting of marriage licenses by the
state would falsely "'advertise' that same-sex relations can be happy,
healthy, and successful. 33
Sunstein concedes that the present Court is unlikely to expand
"strict scrutiny" to encompass discrimination against homosexuals,
and that "almost any argument" traditionally has been sufficient to
pass muster under a "rationality" standard of review.34 However, he
claims there is a more "interesting and powerful argument" involving
Equal Protection-namely, that discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a form of gender discrimination.3 5 Elaborating on a the-
ory first articulated by Andrew Koppelman and Sylvia Law,36 Sun-
stein argues that the social taboo and accompanying legal ban on
same-sex marriage can be seen as part of a system of sex-role stere-
otyping and gender hierarchy which is "as deeply connected with male
supremacy as the prohibition on racial intermarriage is connected with
White Supremacy. '37 Thus, he contends, the Supreme Court's invali-
dation of antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia,3 8 "is a relevant
or perhaps even decisive precedent for the view that the prohibition
on same-sex relations is impermissible sex discrimination. 39
Sunstein's powerful endorsement of the case for same-sex marriage
is severely undermined by his unexpected conclusion that, even if its
marriage to relations that involve children. As stated, this justification is quite crude
to say the least." Id.
32. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
33. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 6.
34. Id. at 6, 9. The latter observation predates the Court's decision in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), invalidating Colorado's ban on sexual orientation antidis-
crimination laws, purportedly using rational basis review. Commenting on the state
of the law after Romer, Sunstein calls rationality review "a kind of magical trump card
.I. to invalidate badly motivated laws." Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995
Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 61 (1996) [herein-
after Sunstein, Undecided]. And the "heart of the matter," he adds "must be that, at
least for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, it is no longer legitimate to discrim-
inate against homosexuals as a class simply because the state wants to discourage
homosexuality or homosexual behavior." Id. at 62.
35. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 1.
36. See supra note 20.
37. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 16, 20-21. "[T]he social oppro-
brium against male homosexuality," Sunstein argues "comes largely from the per-
ceived unnaturalness of male passivity in sex," and "opposition to male
homosexuality stems largely from the desire to stigmatize male sexual passivity." Id.
at 22. "[T]he ban on lesbian relations," he says "appears to stem from quite different
concerns. Part of the purpose of such bans may be to ensure that women are sexually
available to men"; and "[alnother part of the concern may be the fact that lesbianism
also complicates gender differences by creating a sexually active role for women." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
38. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
39. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 20. Sunstein describes his analysis
as "speculative and brisk," and says that it would take "far more support" to "pro-
vide[ ] the full defense that would be needed to translate this argument into constitu-
tional law." Id. at 23.
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prohibition violates the Equal Protection Clause, "courts should be
cautious and selective in vindicating that principle."4 Even more
forcefully than Karst or Posner, Sunstein grounds his reticence in the
perceived public hostility to same-sex marriage. If the Supreme Court
accepted his "quite adventurous" argument any time soon, he fears,
"it might cause a constitutional crisis, a weakening of the legitimacy of
the Court, an intensifying of homophobia, a constitutional amend-
ment overturning the Court's decision, and much more."'" Compar-
ing gay rights to abortion rights, he cautions that the "precipitous
vindication" of the privacy principle in Roe v. Wade42 "prematurely
committed the nation to a principle toward which it was in any case
steadily moving," but with a range of "harmful consequences. 4 3 For
Sunstein, the lesson here is that "judicial minimalism"-to use his re-
cently coined phrase'-is called for when "the Court is dealing with
an issue of high complexity about which many people feel deeply and
on which the nation is in flux (moral or otherwise)."4 5 As applied to
the constitutional attack on the same-sex marriage ban, the Court
should not embrace it, he says, "because of the need for prudence in
asserting even a correct principle against a democratic process that is
not ready for it."'
What is important here is not whether reservations of the kind ex-
pressed by Sunstein, Posner, and Karst are well taken on the merits.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id. at 26.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 25. Such consequences included,
according to Sunstein, "the creation of the Moral Majority, the death of the Equal
Rights Amendment, the galvanizing of general opposition to the women's movement,
... and the general transformation of the political landscape in a way deeply damag-
ing to women's interests." Id. In this regard, Sunstein agrees with then-Judge Gins-
burg's controversial appraisal of the Roe decision as having been a "[hjeavy-handed
judicial intervention" that "provoked, not resolved, conflict" by "ventur[ing] too far
in the change it ordered." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonon*y and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375, 376, 385-86 (1985); see also
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
175-201 (1991) (discussing the impact of Roe v. Wade on women's rights). But see
Wolfson, supra note 22, at 592-94 (arguing that complacency and the organizational
collapse of the women's rights movement were responsible for setbacks in the after-
math of Roe).
44. Sunstein, Undecided, supra note 34, at 7.
45. Id. at 8. According to Sunstein:
When a democracy is in moral flux, courts may not have the best or the final
answers.... Courts do best by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather
than preclusive, and that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are partici-
pants in the system of democratic deliberation. It is both inevitable and
proper that the lasting solutions to the great questions of political morality
will come from democratic politics, not the judiciary.
Id. at 101.
46. Id. at 97; see also Posner, supra note 27, at 1585-87 (arguing that "'public opin-
ion is not irrelevant to the task of deciding whether a constitutional right exists").
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Others have amply critiqued those questions.47 More remarkable for
present purposes is the ease with which the doubters assume that com-
promising the principle at stake entails no significant costs, that the
harm in being denied access to marriage is of modest consequence to
gay and lesbian families.
The "homosexual couple have each other's society," Karst observes,
"including whatever sort of sexual intimacy they want; they care for
each other, and they are committed to each other, in the degree they
choose."48 What is chiefly lacking in this benign view is "the dignity of
identification as... equal citizens," a void that apparently can be fil-
led short of marriage by a "legal status that recognizes their union and
commitment."49 The stakes are even less compelling in Posner's vi-
sion of gay and lesbian family life. "[I]t would be misleading to sug-
gest that homosexual marriages are likely to be as stable or rewarding
as heterosexual marriages," he grandly divines, and permitting same-
sex unions "would place government in the dishonest position of
propagating a false picture of [this] reality."5 It is thus relatively easy
for him to conclude that "a simulacrum of marriage" would be enough
to "give homosexuals most of what they want."51
Sunstein allows that "[a] relatively radical attack on the prohibition
of same-sex marriages might come many years down the road, when
the basic principle has been vindicated in many other less controver-
sial contexts."5" And in the meantime? "[F]ar better for the Court to
start cautiously and to proceed incrementally,"53 he says, although gay
and lesbian family needs might be addressed here and there by "ex-
47. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Sexual Economist and Legal Regulation of the
Sexual Orientations, in Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and Nature 192
(David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) [hereinafter Sex, Preference,
and Family] (critiquing Posner's broader economic theory of homosexual regulation);
Marc A. Fajer, With All Deliberate Speed? A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 70 Ind. L.J.
39 (1994) (responding to Sunstein's advocacy of caution and restraint in gay rights
decisions); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 45-48,
94 (1996) (critiquing Sunstein's incremental approach); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal
Agenda, 102 Yale L.J. 333, 346-47, 352-65 (1992) (book review) (criticizing Posner's
cost-benefit analysis of same-sex marriage and questioning his characterization of gay
couples).
48. Karst, supra note 10, at 683.
49. Id. at 683-84.
50. Posner, supra note 23, at 312. "The greatest inherent ... disadvantage of ho-
mosexuality is the impact on family life in a culture of companionate marriage," Pos-
ner opines. Id. at 305. "A pair of men is inherently less likely to form a companionate
marriage-type relationship than a man and a woman," he says, but "[s]ince there is
less sexual strain in a lesbian union, the prospects for stable lesbian marriages are
better." Id. at 305-06.
51. Id. at 313.
52. Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 31, at 27.
53. Id. at 26.
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periments in constitutional law at the state level."'  Unlike Karst and
Posner, Sunstein proposes no specially-crafted substitute for marriage,
though he charts the way for one. "Constitutional law is not only for
the courts," he contends; "elected officials should have a degree of
interpretive independence" to "fill the institutional gap created by the
courts' inferior factfinding ability and policymaking competence," and
"[i]n the area of same-sex marriages, this would be a good way to
proceed."55 Courts should act "in the most egregious cases"6 to pro-
tect gays and lesbians against "discrimination by political majori-
ties,"57 Sunstein says. But it is clear that he foresees no such need as
likely to arise from a legislative solution to the marriage dilemma-
even one crafted by the very elected officials whose likely revulsion at
any judicial decision favorable to same-sex marriage would, he
predicts, create a constitutional crisis.58
Lest these scholars' doubts seem too mean-spirited, it should be
remembered that some of the most strident attacks on the legalization
of same-sex marriage have come from committed gay rights advo-
cates. "[T]he desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an
attempt to mimic the worst of mainstream society," writes Nancy Poli-
koff, "an effort to fit into an inherently problematic institution that
betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical
feminism."59 "I do not want to be known as 'Mrs. Attached-To-Some-
54. Id. at 25 n.85. "An advantage of a federal system," Sunstein says, is that it
permits "experiments" such as the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr.
Id
55. Sunstein, Undecided, supra note 34, at 98-99. Sunstein acknowledges the con-
nection between his views on judicial restraint and those of Alexander Bickel, see
Bickel, supra note 16, but observes that for Bickel "the Court was the basic repository
of principle" in government, while "[m]y argument finds its foundations in the aspira-
tion to deliberative democracy, with an insistence that the principal vehicle is the
legislature." Sunstein, Undecided, supra note 34, at 8 n.8.
56. "It would be far better for courts to proceed slowly and incrementally....
[T]hey should build on 'rationality review' in the most egregious cases .... If discrimi-
nation against homosexuals is eventually to be seen ... to be inconsistent with consti-
tutional principles, it will be the result of an extended process of deliberation, in
which courts play an occasionally catalytic but far from decisive role." Sunstein, Ho-
mosexuality, supra note 31, at 27-28.
57. "The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect disadvantaged
groups ... against the effects of past and present discrimination by political majori-
ties.... The clause does not safeguard traditions, it protects against traditions, how-
ever long-standing and deeply rooted." Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1174. [Tlhe Equal
Protection Clause is a natural route for constitutional protection against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation .... Id. at 1163; see also Sunstein, Undecided,
supra note 34, at 67-69 (discussing the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to
discrimination against homosexuals in light of Romer v. Evans).
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
59. Polikoff, supra note 19, at 1536. Polikoff has been both a leading advocate and
the preeminent scholarly voice in behalf of parental rights for lesbian mothers. See
Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
Geo. LJ. 459 (1990) (analyzing legal strategies to redress the recurring problems of
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body-Else,"' proclaims Paula Ettelbrick.61 "[M]arriage will not liber-
ate us as lesbians and gay men. In fact, it will constrain us, make us
more invisible, [and] force our assimilation into the mainstream
.... "61 Nor is the skeptics' only concern about identification with
what is seen as an historically-flawed institution. Marriage is also per-
ceived as a model that is too narrow to accommodate an adequate
range of gay and lesbian family relationships, 6 that compels an unnec-
essary linkage between sexual intimacy and economic dependency,63
and whose availability to same-sex couples would further marginalize
those choosing not to marry.' Demands for marriage reinforce its
lesbian mothers) [hereinafter Polikoff, Two Mothers]; Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I My
Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 443
(1996) (reflecting on the author's experiences representing lesbian and gay activists).
60. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation, Out/Look,
Fall 1989, at 9, 14, reprinted in Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 721-22 [hereinafter Ettel-
brick, Since When].
61. Id. Ettelbrick's essay, written while she was legal director of the Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, helped revive the same-sex marriage debate,
paired with an essay by Tom Stoddard, then Lambda's executive director, which was
highly supportive of gay marriage. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek
the Right to Marry, Out/Look, Fall 1989, at 9, reprinted in Rubenstein, supra note 3, at
716. Ettelbrick has since published a lengthier and more nuanced analysis of the pros
and cons of same-sex marriage and the alternatives she advocates for protecting les-
bian and gay family rights. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Les-
bian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 107 (1996) [hereinafter Ettelbrick,
Wedlock Alert].
62. "[G]ay families are not structured through hierarchically ordered categories of
relationship .... Rather than being organized through marriage and childrearing,
most chosen families are characterized by fluid boundaries, eclectic composition, and
relatively little symbolic differentiation between erotic and nonerotic ties." Kath Wes-
ton, Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship 206 (1991).
If the laws change tomorrow and lesbians and gay men were allowed to
marry, where would we find the incentive to continue the progressive move-
ment we have started that is pushing for societal and legal recognition of all
kinds of family relationships? ... To recognize the family relationship of the
lesbian couple and two gay men who are jointly sharing childrearing respon-
sibilities? To get the law to acknowledge that we may have more than one
relationship worthy of legal protection?
Ettelbrick, Since When, supra note 60, at 17.
63. We know, as gays and lesbians, that love is not always erotic and that
what is erotic is not always love, and that the two of these in turn can be
separate issues from questions of support and companionship. Yet these
links are precisely what a two-person, monogamous model of marriage im-
poses .... Marriage" tangles questions of eros and love and economic de-
pendency in a way that leaves us with little vocabulary for any relationship in
which these are not present in heavy doses.
Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 505, 530
(1994); see also Lisa Duggan, The Marriage Juggernaut, Gay Community News, Win-
ter-Spring 1996, at 5, quoted in Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 133 n.81.
64. "If gay men and lesbians were given the right to marry.., a replication would
occur of the discriminatory two-tier system already existing among married and un-
married straight couples; legalized gay marriage, then, would make gays who don't
marry outlaws among outlaws." Frank Browning, The Culture of Desire: Paradox
and Perversity in Gay Lives Today 153 (1993); see also Ettelbrick, Since When, supra
note 60, at 16.
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institutional primacy, it is argued, thereby undermining other legal
strategies for securing same-sex family rights."5
And what might be those strategies? Litigation to secure family
benefits,66 for one, as by "gradually, but steadily, challeng[ing] the
government and private industry" to treat equally all those "who
share in the burden of caring for each other, whether married or
not."'67 Acknowledging that "courts have been slow in interpreting
family terms according to function,"' the advocates concede that this
approach requires settling for "the gradual accumulation of a series of
small gains."69 But there is more to the strategy, and that is to em-
brace as an alternative to marriage the concept of "domestic partners"
now enshrined in many local laws and employer fringe benefit pro-
grams.70 "Domestic partnership has had a powerful social impact,"
Paula Ettelbrick insists, by "rais[ing] the visibility of non-marital rela-
tionships" and "creat[ing] an identifiable third social category of
family."71
If all of this sounds vaguely reminiscent of Sunstein's call for gradu-
alism72 or Posner's "simulacrum of marriage,"" it should be acknowl-
edged that the objective here is far more radical. What is sought by
Ettelbrick and other marriage critics is a complete dismantling of soci-
ety's reliance on marital unions as the central organizing principle
around which families are formed. "The norm in this society should
be recognizing families in the way that they are self-defined," says Et-
65. "Advocating lesbian and gay marriage will detract from, even contradict, ef-
forts to unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic health care and
other necessities available to all." Polikoff, supra note 19, at 1549; see also Christen-
sen, supra note 2, at 1414-16 (discussing the tensions between advocacy for same-sex
marriage and gay family claims based on other theories); Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert,
supra note 61, at 122 (same).
66. Enforcement of private cohabitation and parenting agreements, reliance on
local antidiscrimination laws, and construing statutory entitlements as extending to
functional "families," "parents," and "spouses," are all parts of the benefits-by-litiga-
tion strategy. Elsewhere, I have examined the range of alternative approaches taken
by the courts and commentators to the legal ordering of gay and lesbian family life,
suggesting a conceptual framework for this emerging body of family law. See Chris-
tensen, supra note 2.
67. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 139; see also Nitya Duclos, Some
Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 Law & Sexuality 31, 59 (1991)
(describing "litigation for specific benefits" as providing "legal acknowledgment of
same-sex relationships in [a] more gradual way").
68. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 142.
69. Duclos, supra note 67, at 60.
70. See infra notes 214-22, 334 and accompanying text.
71. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 144.
72. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
1998] 1711
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
telbrick.74 And the state should have "no authority to sanction, to
reward, or even to approve one set of family relations over another."7
The present task is not to inquire whether this non-marital vision of
gay and lesbian family life should dissuade those in the community
who favor same-sex marriage. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to
examine the skeptics' premise: that uncoupling gay and lesbian family
life from marriage is likely to be far more effective than wedded union
in redressing a broader array of the familial concerns of gay people. It
is also to explore whether the complementary assumptions of the
scholarly critics are firmly grounded: that no egregious harm will
come from the gradualist approach, and that a status in lieu of mar-
riage will reasonably meet the needs of same-sex couples.
And so the question, if not marriage, what? It is the marriage-cen-
tered nuclear family that traditionally has served as the bastion for
securing American family values. To what extent can the legitimate
family values of gay people be protected by means other than mar-
riage? If gay and lesbian family life is to be centered on some new
status, how must it be shaped to resolve the recurring family problems
confronted in America by same-sex couples and their children?
Part II begins the examination of these questions by probing the
family values that historically have been deemed worthy of societal
protection in America, discussing the stereotype of gays and lesbians
as antithetical to family, as well as the self-identification by many gay
people with core family values. Parts III and IV explore the prospects
for securing these values in gay and lesbian family life without state-
sanctioned marriage. Part III examines the support of companionate
cohabitation, both through the provision of benefits and by the secur-
ity that comes from commitment. The nurturing of children is the sub-
ject of part IV, which discusses the use and abuse of the autonomy
principle in creating and extinguishing parental rights. Part V consists
of some concluding reflections on family values and marriage
simulacrums.
II. AMERICAN FAMILY VALUES
The dominant model of the American family-both as a matter of
emotive symbolism and legal paradigm-has always been the mar-
riage-centered nuclear family, comprised of husband and wife living
together in the same household with their immediate offspring. Yet in
the history of western civilization this is a relatively youthful model.
The idea of nuclear family as values repository is a social construct of
even more recent vintage.
74. Browning, supra note 64, at 154 (quoting Paula Ettelbrick during presentation
opposing gay marriage, Chicago, Ill., Oct. 1989).
75. Id; see also Ruthann Robson, Lesbian Out(Law): Survival Under the Rule of
Law 124-27 (1992) (concluding that lesbians should not embrace the law's rule of
marriage and rejecting marriage as a state institution).
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A. Historic Family Models
1. The Evolving Nuclear Family
Family historian Edward Shorter says the American family was
"born modern," by which he means that the nuclear family had al-
ready displaced its forebears as the predominant model by the time of
the American revolution.76 Most histories of the western family, be-ginning with Philippe Aries' classic, Centuries of Childhood, place the
origins of the modern family as an idealized social institution in about
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.7 According to Aries, the only
family concept known to the Middle Ages was the lineal kinship line,
extending to the "ties of blood without regard to the emotions engen-
dered by cohabitation and intimacy.""8 It was not until well into the
sixteenth century that "a value was attributed to the family" in which
it became "the social cell" that is the forerunner of the modern
family.7
9
Although historians differ sharply about some aspects of the fam-
ily's development in the intervening centuries, there is widespread
agreement as to its general contours.' The characteristic European
model of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was of the family
bound primarily by ties of extended kinship. In Lawrence Stone's in-
fluential history of the family, the form is denominated the "Open
Lineage Family," its most striking features being "its permeability by
outside influences, and its members' sense of loyalty to ancestors and
to living kin."'"
Marriage was less an intimate association than an arranged means
of tying together kinship groups for economic advantage (among the
upper classes) or an economic necessity for partnership and division
of labor (among peasants and laborers). The household in which the
married couple lived was characterized by its lack of well-defined
boundaries and the absence of physical privacy. Indeed, neither pri-
vacy nor individual autonomy were regarded as desirable ideals within
the family. It was a highly authoritarian and patriarchal society in
76. Edward Shorter, The Making of the Modem Family 22-44, 241-51 (1975).
"North American society sprang full-blown modem from the head of Zeus . . . ." Id.
at 24. "The American family was probably 'born modem' because the colonial set-
tlers seem to have seized privacy and intimacy for themselves as soon as they stepped
off the boat." Id at 242.
77. Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life 339-
64 (1962).
78. Id. at 356.
79. Id.
80. See Jan E. Dizard & Howard Gadlin, The Minimal Family 227 n.13 (1990); Lee
E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1135, 1138-39. But
see Ferdinand Mount, The Subversive Family (1992) (arguing that the nuclear family
is a historic natural phenomenon and that virtually all modern family historians are
wrong about its evolutionary development).
81. Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800 at 4
(1977) (comparing different domestic arrangements).
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which the interests of the group-whether kin, village, or state-took
priority over those of the family's nuclear sub-units. As a result, rela-
tions among its nuclear members were not much closer (and often less
so) than with neighbors and other kin.'
If spouses were not especially bonded to one another by strong af-
fective ties, relationships between parents and children were no less
detached. Channeling the potentially disruptive force of sexual desire
into propagating the race and legitimating offspring was an important
practical function of the traditional family. But mortality rates were
high, and most children of all classes left the parental home at an early
age. 3 In Aries' account of family history, it is the stark absence of
any real parentally-nurtured "transition between the world of children
and that of adults" that most distinguishes the ancient from the mod-
em family.' "[C]hildren were mixed with adults as soon as they were
considered capable of doing without their mothers," he writes. "They
immediately went straight into the great community of men .. 85
In sum, the traditional family was "an open-ended, low-keyed,
unemotional, authoritarian institution."86 So far as its individual
members were concerned, it "was neither very durable, nor ... very
demanding."8 " The transition from this model to the modem nuclear
family form was gradual and uneven, extending over a period of more
than two centuries.8" Although the traditional form was to endure
well into the nineteenth century in some places, the ascendancy of
living patterns organized around the nuclear family was starting to be-
come secure by the late eighteenth century.
Stone calls the new form the "Closed Domesticated Nuclear Fam-
ily," its predominant attribute the "intensified affective bonding of the
nuclear core at the expense of neighbors and kin." 89 Marriage was
82. See id. at 4-7; see also Shorter, supra note 76, at 22-39 (discussing households
during the 1700s and 1800s).
83. See Stone, supra note 81, at 6.
84. Aries, supra note 77, at 411-12.
85. Id. at 411.
86. Stone, supra note 81, at 7.
87. Id. The traditional family model has sometimes been described primarily in
terms of its multi-generational extended family living arrangements. See, e.g., Ger-
maine Greer, The Female Eunuch 219-21 (1971); Alvin Toffier, The Third Wave 44-45
(1980). While the large, stem-family clan household was common in parts of Eu-
rope-more typical in the southeast than in the northwest, and more in rural than in
urban areas-at many times and places the conjugal nuclear family was the
predominate living unit in terms of numbers. See Shorter, supra note 76, at 23-39; P.
Laslett & Richard Wall, Household and Family in Past Time 40-62 (1972). Even when
that was so, however, the average person was more likely to be socialized in an ex-
tended than in a nuclear family. Stone notes, for example, that the typical "European
family expanded and contracted like a concertina, moving from the extended stem
family to the nuclear and back again, as it passed through various stages." Stone,
supra note 81, at 24.
88. See Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 12; Shorter, supra note 76, at 20-21.
89. Stone, supra note 81, at 7-8. "The key definition of the nuclear family," ac-
cording to Stone, "is that the ties that bind its members together are stronger than
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becoming more a matter of personal choice than of parental arrange-
ment. 0 The care and nurturing of children was of more pronounced
importance, the child having "won a place beside his parents to which
he could not lay claim at a time when it was customary to entrust him
to strangers." 91
A growing desire for privacy was reflected in the physical arrange-
ments of households. Associated with the family, for the first time,
were a sense of individual autonomy, the right to personal freedom in
the pursuit of happiness, and a weakening of the identification of sex-
ual pleasure with sin and guilt. As emotional attachments intensified
within the nuclear family, it began to hold the rest of society at a
greater distance.92
Although many of these characteristics of the nuclear family were
transported to America from the earliest days, the colonial period also
retained vestiges of the traditional form. The predominant living ar-
rangement was the single nuclear family household; the extended kin-
ship family was never a dominant form.93 If not structurally
traditional, however, the colonial family's functional place in society
had much in common with its traditional forebears. The household
was authoritarian and patriarchal, a reflection of the community at
large. The family was the central economic unit of society; family for-
mation was strongly encouraged and solitary living forbidden in the
interests of the larger social order; and a homogenous population fa-
cilitated community responsibility for enforcing conventional moral
standards. 94
These throwbacks to tradition did not prove long-lasting, however,
as the nuclear family became the increasingly dominant model in
nineteenth century America. It was a dominance that coincided with
rapid population growth, the dispersion of settlements, and the emer-
gence of cities. Increased mobility and the growth of commerce
meant that families were no longer essential units of production. A
market economy, offering a means of exchanging goods and services
independent of kinship, was able to support a middle class.' 5 Addi-
tionally, the capacity for increased independence among the middle
those which bind any one member to outsiders, whether relatives, friends, associates
or patrons." Id. at 26.
90. See Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 13; Shorter, supra note 76, at 17.
91. Aries, supra note 77, at 403.
92. See id. at 398-99; Shorter, supra note 76, at 3-21; Stone, supra note 81, at 4-9.
93. See Carl N. Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the
Revolution to the Present 5 (1980); Shorter, supra note 76, at 30-31; Teitelbaum, supra
note 80, at 1138-39.
94. See Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. Fla. L Rev. 583, 590-93
(1987).
95. See Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 15-21.
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class helped weaken the interlocking control that community, church,
and kin had exerted over nuclear family relationships.96
As in Europe, the pace of family change was accelerated by chang-
ing work patterns. If a rural agricultural economy necessarily cen-
tered on the family as a unit of production, so too did the early
industrial period. Entire families were hired to work in factories, the
male head of household became in effect the foreman of his wife and
children.97 The abandonment of this practice in favor of the employ-
ment of individual laborers also changed the patterns of family life.
As men sold their labor in exchange for wage, women assumed
greater responsibility for child-rearing and maintenance of the home
as a locus of refuge.98 The demanding and competitive world of work
became a place from which refuge was seen as necessary; and the nu-
clear family became "the private domain, the only place where a per-
son could legitimately escape the inquisitive stare of industrial
society." 99
2. Nuclear Family as Values Repository
What then were the essential attributes of this inherited and
evolved model of the nuclear family which was to stake such an im-
portant claim in shaping family law and policy? It is clear that the
answer lies far less in the structure of its living arrangements than in
the functions it came to serve.100 At least three functional characteris-
tics were to identify the nuclear family as a bastion of domestic soli-
darity separating it from the rest of the world. And it is these
characteristics, more than any other, that possess the strongest histori-
cal claims to defining American family values.
The first of these involves the nuclear family as the locus of "com-
panionate cohabitation."'' If marriage in the traditional family was a
96. See id. at 22-23; Law, supra note 94, at 598.
97. See Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 14.
98. See Law, supra note 20, at 200.
99. Aries, supra note 77, at 33; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 80, at 1140-41 (not-
ing the changes in the internal relationships and the external functions of families by
the beginning of the nineteenth century).
100. See Shorter, supra note 76, at 205-27. According to Shorter: "The nuclear
family is a state of mind rather than a particular kind of structure or set of household
arrangements. It has little to do with whether the generations live together or... with
kinship diagrams." Id. at 205. Shorter goes on to argue that:
What really distinguishes the nuclear family ... is a special sense of solidar-
ity that separates the domestic unit from the surrounding community. Its
members feel that they have much more in common with one another than
they do with anyone else on the outside-that they enjoy a privileged emo-
tional climate they must protect from outside intrusion.
Id.
101. "Companionate marriage" is the descriptive phrase adopted by Shorter, who
calls it the "hallmark of contemporary family life, the husband and wife being friends
rather than superordinate and subordinate, sharing tasks and affection." Id. at 227.
The usage was popularized by the writings of family sociologist Ernest W. Burgess
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matter of convenience, parentally-arranged and controlled, it was to
become very much a matter of personal choice and romantic attach-
ment in the nuclear family. Parental mate selection emphasized the
quality of the "family stock" and the advantages of alliance to the
larger family system. It was emotional ties that bound the nuclear
couple, beginning with personal attraction and compatibility as
preludes to marriage. The belief that love and affection would con-
tinue to deepen after marriage fostered the expectation of more egali-
tarian patterns of living; husbands and wives were idealized as
"companions, lovers, and partners in an emotional enterprise."' 1°2
Though procreation continued to be important to the nuclear com-
panionate couple, it was by no means indispensable. Sexual satisfac-
tion came to be seen as legitimately valuable in its own right, apart
from reproduction. 3 Contraception was more widely practiced as
nuclear couples began to make family size a matter of choice."° Mar-
ital formalities became less critical to the commencement of the con-
jugal relationship, as premarital sex was more tacitly condoned and
the incidence of premarital pregnancy sharply increased.105 Common
law marriages received widespread recognition, and formal conditions
for legal marriage diminished in importance.1 0 6
The second defining characteristic of the nuclear family relates to
the place of children in it, to the terms of their relationship with par-
ents. Like their mothers, children in the evolving American family
had a declining economic value as they withdrew from the world of
work. And the return of the child to the home became a significant
element of everyday life. Society attached greater importance to the
nurturing of children; parents became increasingly concerned about
education, training, and the social development of their offspring.'17
Unlike the ancient household, the nuclear family recognized that "the
child was not ready for life, and that he had to be subjected to a spe-
cial treatment, a sort of quarantine, before he was allowed to join the
adults."'0o
about both "companionate marriage" and the "companionate family." Ernest W.
Burgess & Harvey J. Locke, The Family: From Institution to Companionship 651
(1953). Jan E. Dizard and Howard Gadlin also speak of "companionate marriage,"
but they emphasize that the concept is more accurately one of "companionate cohabi-
tation," because solemnization by marriage often has been of limited importance in
creating the functional nuclear family. Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 13, 139-42.
102. Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 13; cf Law, supra note 94, at 598-99 (noting
the increase of premarital and extramarital sex); Stone, supra note 81, at 656-57 (stat-
ing that the glorification of the sexual aspects of love in the post-1800s increased the
occurrence of adultery among the higher aristocracy).
103. See Shorter, supra note 76, at 20, 245-50; Stone, supra note 81, at 657.
104. See Law, supra note 94, at 599.
105. See id. at 598; Shorter, supra note 76, at 80-98.
106. See Teitelbaum, supra note 80, at 1158.
107. See id. at 1142-43; Law, supra note 94, at 602-03.
108. Aries, supra note 77, at 412.
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As the family became more than an institution for the transmission
of life, property, and names, emotional bonds between parents and
children became as much an attribute of nuclear family life as the ties
between spouses.10 9 Perhaps more so, even. If romantic sentiments
were unable to survive unchanged from jarring marital reality, the
parent-child relationship was to become the most durable indicia of
nuclear family life.110
The third and final distinguishing characteristic of the nuclear fam-
ily involves its claim to autonomous privacy. As the parent-child con-
jugal unit became increasingly resistant to extended family demands,
the home itself became more private, closed off from prying kin and
neighbors. Community controls over various aspects of family life be-
came less tolerable, acquiescence in public surveillance of family mo-
rality less common."'
The association between privacy and the nuclear family came to
have two related aspects. The first was that the "family's awareness of
itself as a precious emotional unit" meant that it demanded isolation
from outside intrusion." 2 The second was that domestic privacy took
on an objective meaning; the family not only experienced itself as pri-
vate, it became private as a societally recognized bastion of
autonomy."13
It was these three attributes, then-companionate cohabitation, pa-
rental nurturing, and autonomous privacy-that were to be associated
with the nuclear family as the dominant American family model. His-
torically, it was the attributes, and not the model, that were value
laden. The stability of the companionate couple and the sustenance of
parental nurturing were to become the quintessential American "fam-
ily values." As a necessary corollary, in aid and protection of the val-
ues, came recognition of the family as an autonomous bastion of
privacy. Although the nuclear family was merely the perceived repos-
itory of these valued characteristics, eventually it came to be viewed
by many as though it represented a value in its own right.
B. Gay and Lesbian Family Values
Homophobia, it has been said, is "the last respectable prejudice of
the century.""' 4 Unwritten cultural rules that have long forbidden the
public expression of other biases often seem inapplicable to stereo-
types and epithets aimed at gays and lesbians. Nowhere is this phe-
109. See id. at 365-69, 403-12; Stone, supra note 81, at 22.
110. See Shorter, supra note 76, at 206.
111. See id. at 17, 44-53, 227-28; Stone, supra note 81, at 8.
112. Shorter, supra note 76, at 227.
113. See Teitelbaum, supra note 80, at 1144.
114. Peter J. Gomes, Homophobic? Re-Read Your Bible, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1992, at A19. Gomes is an American Baptist minister and professor of Christian
morals at Harvard University.
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nomenon more in evidence than in the gap that separates perception
and reality in the case of gay and lesbian family values.
1. Perceived Models and Values
The American family has long been a venerated icon, defense
against perceived threats to its vitality a staple in public discourse. If
the 1990s has been especially rancorous in this regard, the decade is
also notable for the heightened prominence of a formerly marginal
villain: the gay menace to "traditional family values." Although often
reviled by social conservatives as antithetical to the family, gays and
lesbians had seldom before the 1990s figured prominently as an issue
in mainstream national politics.' 5
In a memorable address launching the "family values" theme early
in the 1992 presidential campaign, then Vice President Dan Quayle
decried the "breakdown of family structure" in America." 6 But his
first direct target wasn't gay people; rather it was television character
"Murphy Brown," a single professional woman "mocking the impor-
tance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it just another
lifestyle choice.""' 7 As single mothers and their defenders rallied to
the cause of the fictional Ms. Brown, however, the focus of Quayle's
attack shifted. His real disagreement, the vice president said, was with
"the cultural elite" who "seem to think the family is an arbitrary ar-
rangement of people who decide to live under the same roof... and
that parents need not be married or even of opposite sexes."118
115. See John Gallagher & Chris Bull, Perfect Enemies: The Religious Right, the
Gay Movement, and the Politics of the 1990s (1996) (exploring the simultaneous rise
in political prominence of the religious right and the heightened visibility of gay is-
sues); see also Bruce Bawer, A Place at the Table: The Gay Individual in American
Society 53-56 (1993) (discussing Anita Bryant's "Save Our Children" crusade in the
late 1970s); D'Emilio, Sexual Politics, supra note 1, at 40-53, 129-48 (discussing the
vilification of gays and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s).
116. Jerry Roberts, Quayle Blames Riots on Decline of Family Vahtes, San Francisco
Chron., May 20, 1992, at Al (quoting Quayle speech to the Commonwealth Club of
San Francisco).
117. 1d. Although the speech itself did not address gay and lesbian families, Quayle
did broach the subject in a related interview:
What one does in the privacy of one's home is their business and as a con-
servative, I'll keep the government out of their home and out of their private
lives.... [But] I will argue with those that want to take the point that homo-
sexual activity is a preferred lifestyle. In my opinion, it is not. The preferred
lifestyle is marriage, heterosexual activity and raising children and having a
family.
Jerry Roberts, GOP Jury Still Out on Impact of "Murphy Brown" Speech, San Fran-
cisco Chron., May 23, 1992, at A4.
118. Elaine Herscher, Family Values Rhetoric-Gays Under Fire in Presidential
Race, San Francisco Chron., Jun. 26, 1992, at A5 (quoting Quayle's speech before the
Southern Baptist Convention, Indianapolis, Ind.). Although "family values" was
largely abandoned as a campaign theme after the divisive Republican National Con-
vention in August, Quayle returned briefly to the subject late in the campaign. At-
tending a fundamentalist church service in Savannah, Georgia, on October 25, the
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Other family defenders were more pointed in their indictments.
Evangelist Pat Robertson denounced homosexual rights as part of "a
radical plan to destroy the traditional family.""' 9 And presidential
candidate Patrick J. Buchanan declared that family rights for homo-
sexuals should not be "tolerate[d] in a nation that we still call God's
country.' °2 0  Proclaiming a "religious war . . . for the soul of
America," he promised to do battle with "the amoral idea that gay
and lesbian couples should have the same standing in law as married
men and women.'' 1  President Bush, though far less virulent in his
rhetoric, announced that he too could not "accept as normal lifestyle
people of the same sex being parents"' 22 or marrying one another. 2 3
To help vouchsafe such threats to family values, the Republican party
platform opposed these as well as other rights for gays and lesbians.12 4
Even Democrats-whose platform pledged to "ensure that no
Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of rights on the basis
of... sexual orientation"'-were unprepared to venture far into the
domain of gay and lesbian family rights. Candidate Clinton explained
that he had merely advocated "the absence of discrimination in em-
ployment" and that "status alone should not be enough to kick some-
one out of the military."'2 6 Insisting that he did not advocate
recognition of homosexual marriages, Clinton castigated his critics for
"these bogus issues that they keep bringing up. ' 127
vice president listened to a sermon condemning homosexuality as "satanic." At a
rally following the service, Quayle praised the sermon's "very positive message," and
promised that he would "continue to talk about traditional values .... I don't care
what they say, I'll never, ever back down." John F. Harris, Quayle Revisits "Family
Values" Theme, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1992, at A10.
119. Steve Daley, At this GOP Convention, Hate, Not Compassion, Was the Coin of
the Realm, Chi. Trib., Aug. 23, 1992, § 4 (Perspective), at 4 (quoting Robertson's re-
marks during Republican party convention).
120. Excerpts from Other Addresses to the Republican National Convention, 52
Facts on File 609 (1992) (containing excerpts from Buchanan's address to the Repub-
lican National Convention).
121. Id.
122. Deb Price, Give 'Em Rights, George, Just Like Truman and Goldwater Did,
Gannett News Service, Aug. 20, 1992, available in 1992 WL 9387899 (quoting Bush's
statement).
123. Bawer, supra note 115, at 103 (quoting a campaign interview of Bush by televi-
sion reporter Stone Phillips).
124. The platform declared the party's opposition to the recognition of same-sex
marriages, to allowing gays and lesbians to adopt children, to extending federal civil
rights laws to prohibit sexual orientation-based discrimination, and to lifting the ban
on gays in the military. See Anne Willette, Gay Issue a Tight Wire for GOP, Gannett
News Service, Aug. 19, 1992.
125. Richard Whitmire, State of American Family at Heart of Campaign Debate,
Gannett News Service, Aug. 20, 1992, available in 1992 WL 9387925 (quoting the
Democratic party platform).
126. Jeffery Schmalz, A Delicate Balance: The Gay Vote, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1992,
available in 1992 WL 9387925 at Al (quoting Clinton's remarks during a television
interview).
127. Id.
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The great family values crusade of 1992 was to recede from promi-
nence as the campaign progressed, a victim of its own excesses. Too
strident and moralizing in tone, it was a theme with too many targets
that offended too broad a segment of the population.'" Anti-gay
rhetoric did not return to national prominence until well after the
election, and then in a context only tangentially related to family
rights-President Clinton's ill-fated attempt to deliver on his promise
to permit gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military.12 9
As to family values, Clinton was eventually to sound many of the
same themes as his campaign critics, 130 and he had long since dis-
tanced himself from public support for most gay and lesbian rights
issues by the time he sought reelection in 1996.'' As that campaign
began, Pat Buchanan was again proclaiming that "the gay lifestyle is
morally wrong and personally ruinous,"' 3 2 and all Republican presi-
dential hopefuls were endorsing the National Campaign to Protect the
Sanctity of Marriage, a movement formed to oppose the legalization
128. Conservative theorist and former chief Quayle aide William Kristol conceded
that the family values issue was handled with "clumsiness" in the 1992 campaign and
made to sound "like harsh moralizing or just empty feel-good." However, he pre-
dicted that "the public policies we pursue regarding homosexuality [and] the family"
would reemerge in future campaigns. Robin Toner, A Conservative Cheerfully Argues
that 'Family Values' Has a Future, N.Y. Times, Jun. 27, 1993, § 4 ('Week in Review), at
7; see also Gallagher & Bull, supra note 115, at 63-96 (providing an in-depth report
regarding gay issues in the 1992 campaign).
129. See Gallagher & Bull, supra note 115, at 125-60 (providing a detailed account
of 1993 gays in the military controversy); see also Richard L Berke, Clinton in Cross-
fire, N.Y. Tunes, July 20, 1993, at A16 (discussing Clinton's "compromise" on homo-
sexuals in the military); Margaret Carlson, Then There Was Nunn, Tune, July 26, 1993,
at 40 (discussing the White House's "admitted defeat" with the military ban on gays in
the armed forces).
130. "I thought there were a lot of good things in that speech," Clinton was eventu-
ally to say of Quayle's famous address. "I think he got too cute with 'Murphy Brown,'
but it is certainly true that this country would be better off if our babies were born
into two-parent families." Paul Bedard, Clinton: Quayle Was Right on Families, Wash.
Tunes, Dec. 4, 1993, at Al. Quayle welcomed the President as a convert. "Now that
Clinton has entered the fray, discussing moral issues and values in public," wrote the
former vice president, "the opportunity for rational discussion of family breakdown
improves." Dan Quayle, Editorial, Murphy Brown Revisited, Wash. Post, Dec. 12,
1993, at C7.
131. See Gallagher & Bull, supra note 115, at 229-64 (discussing gay issues in 1996
campaign); see also Ann Devroy, White House Debates Gay Rights Role, Wash. Post,
Jun. 8, 1995, at A6 (noting that Clinton has shied away from gay issues after suffering
significant political harm from his position regarding gays in the military); Todd S.
Purdum, White House Is Avoiding Gay Marriage as an Issue, N.Y. Tunes, May 16,
1996, at B9 (same). But see Stephen A. Holmes, Clinton Backs Bill Protect Homosex-
uals From Job Bias, N.Y. Tunes, Oct. 20, 1995, at Al.
132. Cathleen Decker, Buchanan Tours L.A., Acts the Part of "Happy Warrior,"
L.A. Times, June 28,1995, at A7 (quoting Buchanan's comments during a radio call-in
show). "[America of the 1950s] ... was a good country," said Buchanan, because
"there was voluntary prayer in schools, abortion was outlawed and homosexuality was
frowned upon." Id
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of same-sex marriage.133 Gay rights was never to resonate as a cam-
paign issue in the way it had four years earlier, however, as Clinton
effectively co-opted the opposition's argument by announcing early in
the campaign that he was willing to sign legislation denying federal
recognition to same-sex marriages. 13
4
Amidst much rhetoric that traditional marriage would be
"demeaned or trivialized by same-sex unions"135-even that their rec-
ognition "may eventually be the final blow to the American fam-
ily"13 6-the Defense of Marriage Act was adopted overwhelmingly by
Congress 137 and signed into law by the president six weeks before the
election.138 Although of dubious constitutionality in the eyes of its
critics, 139 the act purports to authorize states to disregard same-sex
marriages legalized in other states,14 and to define marriage for all
133. See Richard L. Berke, With the Field Now Scrambled, Iowans Prepare to Vote,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1996, § 1, at 26.
134. See Melissa Healy, Clinton Signals He'd Sign Anti-Gay Marriage Bill, L.A.
Times, May 23, 1996, at A15; see also Nancy Gibbs, The Rough Politics of Virtue,
Time. June 3, 1996, at 22 (describing the candidates' attempts to "out moralize" each
other and noting Clinton's assertion that he would sign a federal bill saying that states
will not be required to honor same-sex marriages performed in another state).
135. Exchange in House on Marriage Bill, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1996, at A18 (quot-
ing from the remarks of Representative Henry J. Hyde, Republican of Illinois, chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee).
136. Melissa Healy, GOP Lawmakers Offer Bill to Restrict Gay Marriages, L.A.
Times, May 9, 1996, at A22 (quoting Representative Steve Largent, Republican of
Oklahoma, one of the bill's sponsors).
137. The bill was adopted in the House by a vote of 342 to 67, Cheryl Wetzstein,
House Vote Backs Traditional Wedlock, Wash. Times, July 13, 1996, at Al, and in the
Senate by an 85 to 14 margin, Melissa Healy, Senate OKs Bill Against Same-Sex Mar-
riages, L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
138. See David Willman, Clinton Signs Marriage Act, Lauds GOP on Health Bill,
L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1996, at A22. Clinton signed the act without public fanfare in
the middle of the night. Id.
139. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 18, at 127-58 (arguing that the Defense of Mar-
riage Act is contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Clause and therefore, unconstitu-
tional); Sunstein, Undecided, supra note 34, at 97 n.492 (indicating that Congress's
Defense of Marriage Act may be an unconstitutional form of impermissible selectiv-
ity); Christopher J. Hayes, Note, Married Filing Jointly: Federal Recognition of Same-
Sex Marriages Under the Internal Revenue Code, 47 Hastings L.J. 1593, 1623-25 (1996)
(discussing the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act); Laurence H. Tribe,
Toward a Less Perfect Union, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1996, § 4 (Week in Review), at 11
(contending that Congress does not have the power to create categorical exceptions
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
140. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1997)). Even before the act was adopted, issues
of full faith and credit and choice of laws related to same-sex marriage were beginning
to receive significant attention. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism
and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745,
786-95 (1995); Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Conflict of Laws Rules and the Interstate
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. Ill. L. Rev. 911, 915-23; Thomas M.
Keane, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recogni-
tion of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 499, 501-08 (1995); Curt Pham, Let's Get
Married in Hawaii: A Story of Conflicting Laws, Same-Sex Couples, and Marriage, 30
Fam. L.Q. 727 (1996).
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federal law purposes as "only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.' '1 41
Not surprisingly, the adoption of the act was condemned by gay ac-
tivists as "one more sad example of the complete breakdown of polit-
ical leadership in America."' 42 If so, it was failed leadership dutifully
reflective of the public will. Opinion polls consistently report that
about six in ten Americans oppose the legalization of same-sex mar-
riage. 143 Although recent polls reveal close division-and even major-
ity support-for some gay rights issues, responses tend to be strongly
negative on almost all questions regarding gay and lesbian family
rights.144
At least in this regard, gay people are not demonized in isolation.
Almost any deviation from the nuclear family form tends to be viewed
as a threat to family values. The form having displaced the values in
symbolic significance, even the act of embracing accepted values in
141. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1996)). Even if the act withstands constitutional scru-
tiny, there are many unanswered questions as to its scope. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note
139, at 1630-33 (discussing problems of interpretation likely to arise under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code). Nevertheless, it is clear that the new law is far-reaching. The
General Accounting Office has identified some 1049 statutory provisions (under
which marital status affects some entitlement, right, or obligation) as potentially sub-
ject to the act's provisions. U.S. General Accounting Office, The Defense of Marriage
Act, Report No. GAO/OCG 97-16 (1997), available in 1997 WL 67783.
142. Willman, supra note 137 (quoting Matthew Coles, director of the ACLU Les-
bian and Gay Rights Project).
143. See, e.g., Princeton Survey Research Associates, Newsweek Poll, June 21, 1997,
available in Public Opinion Online (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research), DI-
ALOG, File No. 468 [hereinafter Newsweek Poll] (35% support, 56% oppose, legally
sanctioned gay marriage); Princeton Survey Research Associates, People and the
Press: American Churches, Politics Poll, June 25, 1996, available in Public Opinion
Online (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research), DIALOG, File No. 468 (27%
favor, 65% oppose, allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally).
144. A recent Newsweek poll, for example, found 84% supporting equal employ-
ment opportunities for gays, 80% in favor of equal housing rights, and 62% for inheri-
tance rights; by contrast, only 40% believed gays should be able to adopt children,
and only 35% supported same-sex marriage. Newsweek Poll, supra note 143; see also
Princeton Survey Research Associates, State of the Union Mother's Day Poll, May 9,
1997, available in Public Opinion Online (Roper Center for Public Opinion Re-
search), DIALOG, File No. 468 (56% think it is a "bad thing" for society that more
gay and lesbian couples are raising children); William A. Henry, III, Pride and Preju-
dice, Tune, June 27, 1994, at 54-59 (64% against legalizing gay marriages; 53% think
relationships between consenting gay adults morally wrong; but 62% favor equal
rights laws to protect gays from employment discrimination); Joseph P. Shapiro,
Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. News & World Report, July 5, 1993 at 42-48 (65%
support "equal rights" for gays; 60% oppose gay "legal partnerships"; 70% oppose
allowing gays to adopt); How the Public Views Gay Issues, N.Y. Tunes, Mar. 5, 1993,
at A14 tbl. (78% say homosexuals should have equal employment rights; 43% favor
permitting gays in the military; 55% say homosexual relations between consenting
adults are morally wrong); Job Rights for Homosexuals Backed in Poll, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 7, 1992, § 1, at 10 (78% favor equal job opportunities for homosexuals; less than
one-third approve of legally-sanctioned gay marriages; 32% support gay-lesbian
adoptions; 45% consider gay rights a "threat to the American family and its values").
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nontraditional living arrangements is regarded as an assault on the
fragile institution of the family. 145 It should not be surprising, then,
that the highly-visible quest of gays and lesbians to solemnize relation-
ships through same-sex marriage has drawn so much opprobrium.
And for those whose legal analysis of the issue is tempered by a
healthy dose of realpolitik, it is understandable why judicial avoidance
might be predicted, or backlash feared.' 46
2. Real Models and Values
There was a time when it was fashionable in some gay circles to
conform to stereotype by eschewing the very idea of family. Dennis
Altman wrote approvingly that the liberated 1970s homosexual "rep-
resents the most clear-cut rejection of the nuclear family that ex-
ists."'1 47 Lesbian author E.M. Ettore agreed, writing in 1980 that
lesbian identity, by its very terms, denies the primacy of family.
1 48
Recently, it has become more common for nonconformists to embrace
the concept of family, but to redefine it. "[T]hrough the persistent
exploration of love and lust and nurturing, gay people have helped to
open up the territory of family meanings," argues gay commentator
Frank Browning, "provid[ing] vital models for the remaking of all
families, straight and gay.' 49
145. See Dizard & Gadlin, supra note 80, at 9, 181-92 (discussing family breakdown
and competing conceptions of individualism); Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Depen-
dency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2181, 2181-86, 2192-98
(1995) (exploring the continuing dominance of the traditional family model and so-
called welfare reform as "a reactionary plan to discipline women who do not conform
to the roles they are assigned within the traditional scheme of the family").
146. Cass Sunstein's concern-analogizing to Roe v. Wade-that the public back-
lash from a Supreme Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage could lead to a con-
stitutional crisis, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text, may be buttressed by a
comparison of public attitudes about abortion at the time of Roe and those prevailing
today regarding same-sex marriage. In contrast to only about one-third of the public
favoring the legalization of gay marriage, see supra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text, opinion polls from the early 1970s generally show a closely divided public, but
with more support than opposition for abortion rights. See, e.g., Louis Harris and
Associates, Harris Survey, Apr. 19, 1973 available in Public Opinion Online (Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research), DIALOG, File No. 468 (52% favor, 41% op-
pose, legalization of abortions); Gallup Organization, Gallup Poll, Aug. 25, 1972,
available in Public Opinion Online (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research), DI-
ALOG, File No. 468 (64% agree, 31% disagree, that abortion decision should be
made solely by a woman and her physician); Jack Rosenthal, Survey Finds 50% Back
Liberalization of Abortion Policy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at Al (50% favor abor-
tion legalization); see also Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 183-84 (describing pre-Roe
support for abortion reform from influential opinion groups); Robert J. Blendon et
al., The Public and the Controversy Over Abortion, 270 JAMA 2871 (1993) (summa-
rizing poll data on abortion from 1970s through early 1990s).
147. Dennis Altman, Coming Out in the Seventies 47 (1979).
148. E.M. Ettore, Lesbians, Women and Society 20 (1980), quoted in Weston, supra
note 64, at 198, 240.
149. Browning, supra note 64, at 157. "Precisely because homosexuals have resided
outside the law, they have invented family forms that respond to late 20th-century
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In her study of lesbian and gay kinship, Families We Choose, anthro-
pologist Kath Weston describes the "chosen families" of gay people as
"thoroughly individualistic affairs" with "[flluid boundaries and varied
membership."'' 0 She insists that such families are not merely what
anthropologists call "fictive kin"-relationships perceived to be "like"
family, or "just as real" as family.151 Instead, they reject the underly-
ing premise that biological and marital relationships are the most au-
thentic kinship ties. 5 2 Thus, the self-defined families of gay people
may be comprised of cohabiting partners, perhaps with children. But
they may also cross household lines and encompass multiple connec-
tions with overlapping memberships."5 3 A lesbian couple and the gay
man with whom they share child-raising responsibilities may consider
themselves a family,5 as may elderly partners living together for
companionship and economic convenience.' 5  Former lovers'6 and
close-knit friendship circles15 7 may be considered family, though not
just "any friend" will do. 58 "[F]amily members are people who are
needs," Browning claims, and he worries that "[b]y rushing to embrace the standard
marriage contract, we could stifle one of the richest and most creative laboratories of
family experience." Frank Browning, Why Marry?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1996, at A23.
150. Weston, supra note 62, at 109.
151. Id. at 105-06.
Commentators who dispute the legitimacy of gay families typically set up a
hierarchical relationship in which biogenetic ties constitute a primary do-
main upon which "fictive kin" relations are metaphorically predicated.
Within this secondary domain, relationships are said to be "like" family, that
is, similar to and probably imitative of the relations presumed to actually
comprise kinship.... Theoretically I have adopted a very different approach
by treating gay kinship ideologies as historical transformations rather than
derivatives of other sorts of kinship relations.
Id at 106.
152. See id. at 35, 106-07.
153. See id at 107-16. "Fluid boundaries and varied membership meant no neatly
replicable units, no defined cycles of expansion and contraction, no patterns of disper-
sal.... In the language of significant others, significance rested in the eye of the
beholder." Id at 109. "People often presented gay families as a foray into uncharted
territory, where the lack of cultural guideposts to mark the journey engendered fear
and exhilaration." Id. at 110.
154. See Ettelbrick, Since When, supra note 60, at 17.
155. See id.; see also Raymond M. Berger, Gay and Gray: The Older Homosexual
Man 129-31, 193-94 (1982).
156. See Weston, supra note 62, at 111-12; see also Carol S. Becker, Unbroken Ties:
Lesbian Ex-Lovers 195-210 (1988).
157. See Weston, supra note 62, at 109.
158. "[Glay families differed from [friendship] networks to the extent that they
quite consciously incorporated symbolic demonstrations of love, shared history, mate-
rial or emotional assistance, and other signs of enduring solidarity." Id.; see also
Browning, supra note 64, at 156-57:
By stealing sex away from the restrictive laws of marriage ... gay men have
shown how lust contributes to the bonds of friendship. By devaluing the
taboo of sex among friends, they may have begun to shine more light on the
complex and various ways intimacy can be arranged in emerging gay fami-
lies.... [T]heir determination to find a new sort of family may well provide
vital models for the remaking of all families, straight and gay.
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'there for you,"' says Weston, "people you can count on emotionally
and materially. '"159
To opponents of same-sex marriage such as Paula Ettelbrick, these
"self-defined families" are as legitimately entitled to societal recogni-
tion and legal protections as any other family.'6 0 Given the choice,
however, there is considerable evidence that the vast majority of gay
people would opt for the marriage-centered family model.' 6' Seven in
ten lesbians and six in ten gay men responding in recent national
surveys said they would want to marry same-sex partners if it were
legal to do so.' 62 Most were already in extended monogamous rela-
tionships, and many had exchanged rings or participated in commit-
ment ceremonies.' 63 In still another national poll, ninety-two percent
of gays and lesbians said they approved of "two people of the same
sex living together as a married couple."'"
Living together as married, yes. But does marriage have the same
meaning-entailing commitment to the same values-for gay people
as for their heterosexual counterparts? Not surprisingly, there is no
single or simple answer. Witness, for example, the findings of studies
regarding relationships among gay men and women.
Alan P. Bell and Martin S. Weinberg, in their classic study of homo-
sexuality for the National Institute of Mental Health,' 65 reported that
159. Weston, supra note 62, at 113; see also Warren J. Blumenfeld & Diane Ray-
mond, Looking at Gay and Lesbian Life 371-72 (1988) (describing various patterns of
gay and lesbian "created" families).
160. See Browning, supra note 64, at 154-55 (quoting Ettelbrick presentation op-
posing gay marriage, Chicago, Ill., Oct. 1989).
161. See Gallagher & Bull, supra note 115, at 203, 212-16 (discussing discontinuity
between views of gay activist leadership and gay-lesbian community at large regarding
importance of same-sex marriage).
162. The Advocate, the leading gay and lesbian newsmagazine, polled its national
readership on sexuality and relationship issues in two separate surveys in 1994 and
1995. The first survey was limited to gay men; 59% said they would marry if they
could; an additional 26% said they might do so. Janet Lever, The 1994 Advocate Sur-
vey of Sexuality and Relationships: The Men, Advocate, Aug. 23, 1994, at 17, 24 [here-
inafter Advocate Men Survey]. In the second survey, limited to women, 70% said they
would want to marry a woman if it were legal. Janet Lever, The 1995 Advocate Survey
of Sexuality and Relationships: The Women, Advocate, Aug. 22, 1995, at 23, 27 [here-
inafter Advocate Women Survey]. In a more recent Advocate poll (of self-selected
telephone and internet respondents to published questions), 81% said they would def-
initely want to marry their same-sex partners if gay marriage is legalized. The Advo-
cate Polls, Advocate, Jan. 21, 1997, at 20.
163. Eighty-seven percent of women and 52% of men said they were in monoga-
mous relationships; participation in commitment ceremonies or the exchange of rings
was reported by 46% of women and 30% of men. Advocate Women Survey, supra
note 162, at 29. The duration of relationships exceeded ten years for 14% of women
and 26% of men. Id. at 27; Advocate Men Survey, supra note 162, at 24.
164. Larry D. Hatfield, New Poll: How U.S. Views Gays, San Francisco Examiner,
June 6, 1989, at A19, A21, quoted in Chambers, supra note 22, at 450 n.7 (providing a
random national sampling of respondents self-identifying as gay or lesbian).
165. Alan P. Bell & Martin S. Weinberg, Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity
Among Men and Women 14 (1978) (reporting their study of the "development and
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fifty-two percent of gay men and seventy-two percent of lesbians were
involved in same-sex "steady relationships," and that ninety-three per-
cent of both genders had been so involved at some time in their
lives'6-about the same as the proportion of heterosexuals who de-
cide to marry.'67 Such relationships are "very meaningful event[s]" in
the lives of most gay people, according to Bell and Weinberg, and are
"apt to involve an emotional exchange and commitment similar to the
kinds that heterosexuals experience."'" In most respects, homosex-
ual couples were said to "hardly differ[ ] at all" from married men and
women; indeed, the former often appeared "as well adjusted as the
latter."'1 69
One respect in which many gay males, though not lesbians, may
differ from heterosexuals is in the exclusivity of their relationships.
Eighty-two percent of the gay men in one major study 70 reported
having had one or more sexual partners outside the relationship, as
compared to only approximately twenty-eight percent of lesbians,
thirty-two percent of unmarried cohabiting heterosexuals, and twenty-
four percent of husbands and wives.' 11 Other significant differences
have been reported between the partnering practices of lesbians and
adult management of homosexuality," commissioned by the National Institute of
Mental Health, and conducted by the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana
University).
166. See id at 312, 318 tbl.7. The median duration of current relationships was one
to three years; 35% were of four or more years duration. Id. at 320 tbl.7. Other stud-
ies have reported comparable findings. See id. at 81-84, 86, 89, 97 (citing numerous
previous studies: approximately 50% of gay men and 70%-80% of lesbians are in
relationships lasting from 3-10 years in duration); see also Blumenfeld & Raymond,
supra note 159, at 374 (60% of lesbians and 40% of gay men are in long-term relation-
ships); David P. McWhirter & Andrew M. Mattison, The Male Couple: How Rela-
tionships Develop 149 (1984) (estimating that there are 2.5 million gay male couples
in the United States); Letitia Anne Peplau, Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in Homo-
sexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy (John C. Gonsiorek & James D.
Weinrich eds., 1991) (75% of lesbians are currently in steady relationships).
167. According to the Census Bureau, only four percent of U.S. men and eight
percent of women age 65 and over have never married. Bureau of the Census, U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 478, Marital Status
and Living Arrangements: March 1993, at viii tbl. C (1994).
168. Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 102.
169. Id. at 218-19, 230-31; see also Blumenfeld & Raymond, supra note 159, at 373-
74 (finding that homosexual and heterosexual couples are indistinguishable in stan-
dardized tests of marital adjustment); McWhirter & Mattison, supra note 166, at 286
(stating that gay males form couples that are as stable and dependable as traditional
nuclear families); Weston, supra note 62, at 140 (finding that commitment in gay-
lesbian relationships is consistent with that in heterosexual marriage).
170. Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, American Couples 273 (1983) (reporting
the results of their comparative study of homosexual couples and married and unmar-
ried heterosexual couples that was conducted at the University of Washington under
sponsorship of the National Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation).
171. Id at 273 fig.47; see also Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 138 (finding that
monogamous relationships are "difficult to achieve" for gay men, and that more lesbi-
ans than gay men are involved in "quasi marriage marked by a relatively high degree
of sexual fidelity"); McWhirter & Mattison, supra note 166, at 5, 252 (stating that
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gay men. More than a third of the males in the Bell and Weinberg
study claimed to have had more than five hundred sexual partners in
their lives; a majority of females had fewer than ten. 7 2 While the
sexual partners of lesbians rarely are women they do not know, it was
relatively common-at least until recent years-for gay men to have
sex with virtual strangers. 173
There is evidence that sexual promiscuity has decreased and that
monogamy has become more common among gay men since the ad-
vent of the AIDS crisis. 174 In any event, gender may well be a more
significant factor in shaping such practices than sexual orientation.
According to Bell and Weinberg, many of the differences between the
sexual practices of gays and lesbians in their study were attributable to
"the greater tendency of males in general to separate sex from affec-
tion ... and to view fidelity as an undesirable restriction upon their
freedom and independence. ' 175 In a similar vein, Blumstein and
Schwartz found coupled male heterosexuals "more like gay men than
they are like wives or female cohabitors," and coupled lesbians more
like heterosexual women than gay men. 176 Their study concluded that
"women, in general, are the keepers of fidelity," and that "[m]en...
are less confined to the emotional side of sex, and are more likely to
seek sexual variety.' 1 77
sexual exclusivity is infrequent among gay couples, but high expectations of emotional
fidelity are common).
172. Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 85, 93, 308 tbl.7.
173. See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 295, 585-86. "We call the capac-
ity to enjoy such experiences the 'trick mentality'... [which] is more than a state of
mind. It is a social institution within the gay male world. It takes place in designated
areas . . . [and] has unwritten rules that every person entering these places under-
stands." Id. at 295; see also Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 85, 93, 101.
174. See Blumenfeld & Raymond, supra note 159, at 376-77; Eskridge, supra note
17, at 73-74; Weston, supra note 62, at 141-42; Raymond M. Berger, Men Together:
Understanding the Gay Couple, 19 J. Homosexuality 34-35, 43-45 (1990); cf. Bawer,
supra note 115, at 173-75 (discussing the decline of promiscuity in some, though by no
means all, elements of the gay male subculture); Bettina Boxall, Young Gays Stray
from Safe Sex New Data Shows, L.A. Times, Sept. 3, 1995, at Al (citing surveys re-
vealing higher levels of unsafe sex among fifteen to twenty-two-year-olds than among
older gay males).
175. Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 101. "Frequently, what is ego-syntonic for
the female is ego-alien for the male, and nowhere is this better illustrated than in the
way they conduct their sexual lives." Id.; see also McWhirter & Mattison, supra note
166, at 128-30.
176. Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 303; see also Charles Silverstein,
Man to Man: Gay Couples in America 328-29 (1981) (asserting that male homosexu-
ality is predominantly a phenomenon of masculinity, lesbianism is predominantly a
phenomenon of femininity, and that straight men and gay men have similar attitudes
toward sexual behavior).
177. Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 302. Despite their common gender,
heterosexual men are more monogamous than gay men, according to Blumstein and
Schwartz, because "men who have female partners are attuned to the female prefer-
ences for monogamy" and "adjust to this restriction by designing their sex life. .. to
accommodate" this expectation. Id.
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Regardless of differences in sexual practices, a significant portion of
both lesbians and gay men subscribe to the traditional family value of
stable companionate cohabitation. For three-fifths of the women and
nearly half of the men in the Bell and Weinberg study, a permanent
living arrangement with a homosexual partner was either "very impor-
tant" or "the most important thing in life." '178 Three-fourths of the
women in another study of lesbian relationships had made a "formal
commitment" to one another-either by express agreement, exchange
of rings, or a symbolic ceremony in lieu of marriage-in order to sup-
port a structure of mutual "interdependence." 179 Even among gay
male couples who are not monogamous, there are high expectations of
"relationship fidelity"-involving "emotional commitment" and "mu-
tual emotional dependability."'8
Kath Weston describes the "combination of emotional with physical
unity" in committed gay and lesbian couples as "consistent with twen-
tieth-century ideologies of companionate marriage."""1 For gay peo-
ple to call a relationship "committed," she writes, signals "not only a
mutual intention for it to endure, but often a claim to kinship as
well."'" Weston says it is "received anthropological isdom" that
"human procreation... [is] kinship's ultimate referent.""s This view
is challenged, she observes, by lesbians and gay men with "non-
procreative sexual identities" who "lay claim to family ties of their
own without necessary recourse to marriage, childbearing, or
childrearing."'
While Weston is no doubt correct that procreation is irrelevant to
most gay couples, it should not be supposed that there is no place in
lesbian and gay families for the traditional value of parental nurturing.
There always have been children from previous heterosexual unions
who are raised by their lesbian mothers, and less often by their gay
fathers, either alone or with homosexual partners.'" What has
178. Bell & Weinberg, supra note 165, at 322 tbl.7. Fourteen percent of lesbians
and twenty percent of gay men said such an arrangement was "not important at all";
the balance said it was either "somewhat important" or "nice, but not important." Id.
179. Susan E. Johnson, Staying Power. Long Term Lesbian Couples 61, 67-63
(1990). Even when partnerships end, many lesbians "continue to pursue the long-
term relationship ideal" in a "kind of serial monogamy." Sasha Gregory Lewis, Sun-
day's Women: A Report on Lesbian Life Today 79 (1979). Although some "radical
lesbian[s]" have argued that "monogamy is just one of many relics of heterosexism
that has to be abandoned," there have been few changes in the monogamous lifestyles
of most lesbians. Id at 170-71, 187.
180. McWhirter & Mattison, supra note 166, at 252, 285.
181. Weston, supra note 62, at 140.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 33.
184. Id. at 35 (footnote omitted).
185. In one study of lesbian relationships, at least one partner in twenty-eight per-
cent of the couples had children from prior heterosexual relationships. See Johnson,
supra note 179, at 266 tbl.6.4. Thirty percent of these couples were "significantly in-
volved" in raising the children. See id. at 266 tbl.6A, 268. In the balance, the children
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changed in the past two decades is the extent to which gay people are
pursuing parenting on their own and with one another. Two-thirds of
the lesbians and gay men in one survey said they would like to have
children if circumstances permitted and they could overcome financial
or legal obstacles.' 86
For those who decide to take the step, a wide range of options-
including adoption, foster care, surrogate parenting, artificial insemi-
nation, and temporary heterosexual liaisons-helps facilitate the goal.
Although hard numbers are elusive, estimates as to the number of
children being raised by lesbian and gay parents in the United States
range from one and one-half million to as many as ten million.'" 7
What is clear is that there has been a veritable "lesbian baby boom" in
recent years,8 8 and that gay male parenting, while still much less com-
mon, also is on the rise.189
either remained with their fathers or were already raised prior to the beginning of the
lesbian relationship. See id. at 266 tbl.6.4, 267-68; see also Frederick W. Bozett &
Marvin B. Sussman, Homosexuality and Family Relations 155-57 (1990) (discussing
parenting by gay men).
186. Weston, supra note 62, at 165-66; see also Johnson, supra note 179, at 265, 266
tbl.6.4 (40% of the lesbian couples in study had children; 30% of these couples bore
or adopted children during their relationship); Lewis, supra note 179, at 124 (34% of
lesbians surveyed would like to adopt children).
187. See, e.g., Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and
the Nostalgia Trap 182-83 (1992) (noting that there are approximately two million gay
mothers and fathers and that 10,000 children are borne by lesbians through artificial
insemination); Rosalie C. Davies, Representing the Lesbian Mother, Fain. Advoc.,
Winter 1979, at 21 (1.5 million lesbian mothers live with their children); Elena Marie
DiLapi, Lesbian Mothers and the Motherhood Hierarchy, 18 J. Homosexuality 101,
104 (1989) (1.5 million children live with lesbian mothers); Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian
Mothers: Psychological Assumptions in Family Law, 44 Am. Psychol. 941 (1989) (be-
tween 1.5 and 5 million households with children are headed by lesbians); Catherine
Rand et al. Psychological Health and Factors the Court Seeks to Control in Lesbian
Mother Custody Trials, 8 J. Homosexuality 27, 27 (1982) (10% of women in the
United States are lesbians and 15-20% of that group are mothers); ABA Annual Meet-
ing Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513
(1987) (there are 4 million homosexual parents with 8 to 10 million children); Leslie
Dreyfous, 'Divorced' Lesbians and Gays Challenging Legal Definition of a Parent,
L.A. Times, Apr. 28, 1991, at A39 (1.5 to 4 million children are raised by gay or
lesbian couples and 10,000 are conceived via donor insemination).
188. See Weston, supra note 62, at 165-80 (discussing "the lesbian mother as icon";
books, conferences, and support groups on "lesbians having babies"; and reconcilia-
tion of "nonprocreative lesbian identity with [the] procreative practice" of insemina-
tion); see also Ellen Lewin, Lesbian Mothers: Accounts of Gender in American
Culture 15-16 (1993) (discussing "procreation stories" of lesbian motherhood); Cheri
Pies, Considering Parenthood (1988) (discussing the decisions involved in becoming a
lesbian mother); Jean Latz Griffen, The Gay Baby Boom, Chi. Trib., Sept. 3, 1992, at
1; Sue Anne Pressley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples, the Nursery Becomes the
New Frontier, Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1992, at Al (describing gay parenthood in the
1990s).
189. See Bozett & Sussman, supra note 185, at 155-57; Eric Marcus, The Male
Couple's Guide 113 (1992); April Martin, The Lesbian and Gay Parenting Handbook
9 (1993); More Gay Men Hearing the Call of Fatherhood, Boston Globe, Sept. 28,
1992; see also Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families Through Surro-
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The popularization and eased accessibility of artificial insemina-
tion' 90 has contributed significantly to the increase in lesbian parent-
ing.191 By eliminating the need for subterfuge or heterosexual
involvement, it is a technique that is said to permit biological mother-
ing without compromising lesbian identity.19  While many women
prefer anonymous insemination, it is not uncommon for the sperm do-
nor to be a gay man or someone else known to the prospective
mother. 93 In either case, the donor's role is almost always limited
both before and after birth-a "separation of personhood and
parenthood from the male's physiological contribution to procrea-
tion."'194 Although it is still a minority of lesbians (and fewer still gay
men) who actually become parents,195 more gay people than ever
before are embracing the notion "that children complete or legitimate
a family."'
196
How then do the real family models and family values of gay people
compare with their perceived stereotypes? Occasionally in complete
tandem, the evidence would suggest; sometimes at polar odds. More
often somewhere between, encompassing forms and values as diverse
as the mosaic that comprises all family life in late twentieth century
America. What is clear, though, is that gay men and women in sub-
stantial numbers do subscribe to the core family values of companion-
ate cohabitation and the nurturing of children, and that the families
they form are as requiring of societal support for their autonomous
privacy as any other American families. If state-sanctioned marriage
is not to be the linchpin around which such families are organized, the
Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 Am. U. J. Gender & L
183, 189-92. "Unlike lesbians, gay men do not adopt traditional gender roles by be-
coming parents. They do not take on the traditional role of a father, rather they
become the primary caretaker of the child, thereby assuming the role of the 'mother'
.... [and] reject[ing] the stereotypical lifestyle of gay men." Id. at 192.
190. Artificial insemination by donor (AID) is the term most commonly used to
describe insemination with the sperm of a donor other than the woman's husband.
Many lesbians prefer terms such as "alternative insemination ... to avoid invoking
'natural' as a contrasting category," Weston, supra note 62, at 171, "donor insemina-
tion," Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 187 n.9., or "assisted conception," Phyllis
Burke, Family Values: A Lesbian Mother's Fight for Her Son at xi (1993).
191. See Weston, supra note 62, at 168-80; Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 189-
90; Daniel Wider & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The Demedicalization of
Artificial Insemination, 69 Milbank Q. 5, 6 (1991).
192. Weston, supra note 62, at 167-70.
193. See id. at 170, 175-78.
194. Id at 171. Most gay men and lesbians in one study of gay families "did not
consider a sperm donor to be intrinsically a parent, much less a partner, in relation-
ship to a child conceived through alternative insemination;.., his semen tended to be
spoken of simply as a catalyst that facilitates conception." Id. at 189.
195. See Johnson, supra note 179, at 265-66 (60% of lesbian couples in the study
had no children; most were in agreement about not wanting them); McWhirter &
Mattison, supra note 166, at 194, 241-42 (92% of men in gay male study had no chil-
dren; of 8% who did, only two fathers had their children living with them at the time
of the study).
196. Weston, supra note 62, at 175.
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questions persist as to the prospects for legally securing their family
values.
III. SUPPORT OF COMPANIONATE COHABITATION
Whatever sentimental preference it might harbor for the traditional
nuclear family, American society, by-and-large, no longer openly con-
demns nor imposes sanctions for cohabitation outside the confines of
legal wedlock. Buffeted by social change, marriage has been reviled
as an instrument of sexual repression" and dismissed as a "wither-
ing" institution.198 Seldom is it lionized as it once was by the Supreme
Court as a social relation "without which there would be neither civili-
zation nor progress."'199 Yet it is also an institution with remarkable
staying power, one that most Americans will enter into at some time
in their lives."0°
Even when some aspect of unmarried cohabitation is legitimated,
there can be a grudging quality to the reform. In Marvin v. Marvin, 01
the highly influential decision validating agreements on the distribu-
tion of property accumulated during nonmarital relationships, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he mores of society
have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabitation that we
cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that
have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many."2" "Lest we
be misunderstood," however, the court took judicial notice that "[t]he
joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially
197. See, e.g., Mich~le Barrett & Mary McIntosh, The Anti-Social Family (1982);
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 154-88 (1988); Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian
and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1
Law & Sexuality 63, 69-71 (1991).
198. See Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Mar-
riage, 62 Va. L. Rev. 663 (1976). Glendon's reference is to the "withering" of many of
the legal consequences of marriage. Nevertheless, she acknowledges that modern
family law "remains marriage-centered in many ways," albeit more reflective of the
"close, companionate, aspect of... marriage." Mary Ann Glendon, The Transforma-
tion of Family Law 292-93 (1989); see also Stephen J. Morse, Family Law in Transi-
tion: From Traditional Families to Individual Liberty, in Changing Images of The
Family 319 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979) (examining the changing
aspects of the American family in the law); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family
Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443.
199. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (holding that marital obligations
cannot be "modified, restricted, or enlarged" by private agreement).
200. See Bureau of the Census, supra note 167, at viii tbl.C (reporting that only four
percent of U.S. men and eight percent of women age 65 and over have never mar-
ried). In spite of these statistics, Census Bureau figures make clear that marriage
today is far less dominant than in earlier times. The proportion of unmarried adults
increased from 28% of the population in 1970 to 39% in 1993. Id. at vi tbl.A. And for
those who do marry, it is no longer the major transition into adulthood; between 1955
and 1993, the median age for marriage rose from 20.2 to 24.5 for women, and from
22.6 to 26.5 for men. Id. at vii tbl.B.
201. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
202. Id. at 122.
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productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in
the course of a lifetime.""z 3 Not only productive and fulfilling, the
court went on to say, but also to remain legally privileged, the com-
prehensive protections of the community property laws still to be re-
served exclusively for marital spouses.2°4
The bundle of tangible rights and obligations floving from marriage
is, without question, an important issue for those who are denied ac-
cess to the legal status.20 s For most of its gay and lesbian proponents,
however, it is the symbolism of marriage-recognized everywhere as
"the single most significant communal ceremony of belonging,2 0 6 that
is identified as uppermost.20 7 In either case, it is clear that its conse-
quences are not easily replicable by a mere simulacrum of marriage.
A. Seeking Benefits: Tokens and Symbols
1. The Tangible Tokens of Domestic Partnership
David Chambers has comprehensively examined whether the large
and durable number of "significant distinctions resting on marital sta-
tus" in American law would, if applied to same-sex couples, comprise
"a just response by the state to the circumstances of persons who live
together in enduring, emotionally based attachments."2 s Chambers
identifies three categories of legal consequences that attach to mar-
riage: (1) those recognizing "affective or emotional bonds"; 21 (2)
203. Ia
204. See id at 110, 120-21.
205. It was the critical issue for the Supreme Court of Hawaii in the Baehr decision,
which held that refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry "deprives them of access
to a multiplicity of rights and benefits that are contingent upon that status." Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,59 (Haw. 1993) (Levinson, J., plurality opinion). The court identi-
fied what it saw as some of "the most salient marital rights and benefits," including
tax advantages, community property rights, rights of inheritance, support, child cus-
tody, exemption of real property from attachment, and the right to bring wrongful
death actions. Id.
206. Chambers, supra note 22, at 450. "In a law-drenched country such as ours,
permission for same-sex couples to marry under the law would signify the acceptance
of lesbians and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly than any other nondiscrim-
ination laws that might be adopted." Id.
207. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 17, at 8-13 (claiming that by contributing to "the
integration of gay lives and the larger culture," same-sex marriage would both "civi-
lize" gays and "civilize" America); Hunter, supra note 19, at 12-19 (suggesting that
legalizing lesbian and gay marriage could "destabilize the gendered definition of mar-
riage for everyone"); Stoddard, supra note 61, at 12-13 (arguing that same-sex mar-
riage is "the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of people who are not
gay to full equality for gay people"); Wolfson, supra note 22, at 580-81 (stating that
the Hawaii court's decision in Baehr moves gay people from "second-class status" to
"full and equal citizenship").
208. Chambers, supra note 22, at 448.
209. Id. at 453-54. Chambers sees legal rules of this kind as "facilitators of the
affective aspects of couples' relationships." Id. at 454. These include laws granting
decisionmaking powers when a spouse becomes incompetent to act, intestate succes-
sion laws, immigration preferences, family medical leave rights, testimonial privileges
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those involving marriage as an environment for the raising of chil-
dren;21° and (3) those relating to economic arrangements between
partners.21' The conclusion of his analysis is that all three groups of
legal rules "would, as a whole, fit the needs of long-term gay male and
lesbian couples.1 212 Indeed, Chambers says some of the laws affecting
marriage "are better suited to the life situations of same-sex couples
than they are to those of the opposite-sex couples for whom they were
devised.
2 13
Because most of marriage's legal consequences are the product of
statutory invention, it ought to be a relatively simple matter to repli-
cate them in an alternative legal status devised for same-sex couples-
if, that is, the political will existed to do so. The problem for simula-
crum advocates, of course, is that there is no such will. The much-
heralded advent of local domestic partnership laws, for example, is
mostly about modest symbolic gestures accompanied by few if any
tangible benefits. Since the first such law was adopted in Berkeley,
California in 1984,214 many other municipalities, including such cities
as Seattle, 215 Minneapolis, 21 6 San Francisco,2"7 New York,2 18 At-
in civil and criminal proceedings, and compensation for loss of consortium. Id. at 454-
59.
210. Id. at 453, 461. In three contexts, Chambers points out, gay and lesbian
couples who are or want to be parents are not accorded the same "specially favored"
treatment that the law extends to similarly-situated married couples: (1) the acquisi-
tion of "stepparent rights" (including adoption, visitation, and custody) by the spouse
of a legal parent, id. at 463-65; (2) parental rights for both spouses with respect to
children conceived by artificial insemination or, in some cases, born to surrogate
mothers, id. at 465-69; and (3) the opportunity to become nonbiological parents by
adoption or foster care placement, id. at 469-70.
211. Id. at 453, 470. The most common means of differentiating married persons is
by legal rules treating "the married couple as an economic unit," Chambers says, in-
cluding: (1) laws regulating the couple's relationship with the state (taxation of in-
come, gifts, and estates; social security, health care, and welfare benefits), id. at 472-
76; (2) laws regulating the spouses' relationship with each other (distribution of mari-
tal property at divorce, alimony, spousal forced shares, and intestate succession), id. at
476-84; and (3) laws regulating the couple's relationship with third persons (employee
benefits, wrongful death actions, obligations for "necessaries" and spousal debts), id.
at 484-85.
212. Id. at 447.
213. Id. at 448. The most significant examples, according to Chambers, are the de-
fault rules for imposed sharing in the event of divorce. Noting the freedom that mari-
tal partners have to contract for different outcomes, he opines that same-sex couples
who do not otherwise agree "will be hurt less frequently" than their opposite-sex
counterparts "when the law's promise of sharing fails to produce economic parity
between the partners." Id. at 481-83.
214. Berkeley, Cal., Policy Establishing Domestic Partnership Registration (Dec.
1984), excerpts reprinted and summarized in Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish,
Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership
Ordinances, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1164, 1188, 1192-95 (1992).
215. Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 114648 (Aug. 18, 1989), Ordinance 116761 (July 1,
1993), Ordinance 117244 (Aug. 5, 1994) (codified in part at Seattle Mun. Code,
§§ 4.30.010-.020 (1994)).
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lanta,219 Los Angeles,' and Chicago,"2 have followed suit, either by
legislative enactment or executive action. 222
Although differing in some particulars, most of these laws conform
to a similar pattern. A domestic partnership is formed by the filing of
a declaration that each registrant is the other's sole domestic partner
and that they are responsible for each other's welfare.3 Cohabita-
tion is a common prerequisite,' 4 as is a declaration of intention to
continue in the relationship indefinitely.225 The latter requirement is
216. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances §§ 142.10-.70 (1991). For a discus-
sion of related legal challenges, see infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
217. San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code ch. 62, §§ 1-6 (1991), reprinted in Ruben-
stein, supra note 3, at 762.
218. New York, N.Y., Mayor's Executive Order Nos. 48-49 (Jan. 7, 1993).
219. Atlanta, Ga., Ordinance 93-0-0776 (June 1993); Ordinance 93-0-1057 (Aug.
1993). See discussion of legal challenges infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
220. Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 93-2225 (Nov. 23, 1993) (codified in part at Los
Angeles Admin. Code § 4.307.3 (1994)).
221. Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 2-152-072 (1997).
222. The history of domestic partner laws is described, and many of the ordinances
discussed, in Rubenstein, supra note 3, at 765-66 (who estimates that "more than two
dozen municipalities" have adopted such laws); Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 3, at
791-94; Vada Berger, Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DePaul L Rev. 417 (1991);
David L. Chambers, Tales of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic
Partnerships in San Francisco and New York, 2 Law & Sexuality 181 (1992); Bowman
& Cornish, supra note 214, at 1186-1203; Robert L Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership
Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and
Others), 51 Ohio St. LJ. 1067 (1990); Edward J. Juel, Note, Non-Traditional Family
Values: Providing Quasi-Marital Rights to Same-Sex Couples, 13 B.C. Third World
LJ. 317 (1993).
223. See, e.g., Ithaca, N.Y., Code § 215-21(G) (1994) (requiring a "relationship of
mutual support, caring and commitment" and "responsib[ility] for each other's wel-
fare" before finding that a domestic partnership exists); Minneapolis, Minn., Code of
Ordinances § 142.20(a)(5) (1991) (defining domestic partners as two adults who,
among other things, are "jointly responsible to each other for the necessities of life");
San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code ch. 62 § 2(a) (1991) (requiring "joint[] respon-
sib[ility] for basic living expenses incurred during the Domestic Partnership"); West
Hollywood, Cal., Mun. Code § 6900(c) (1996) ("A domestic partnership shall exist ...
if... [t]he persons share the common necessities of life."). It is not clear whether (or
to what extent) these obligations are legally enforceable. See infra notes 304-05 and
accompanying text.
224. See e.g., Cambridge, Mass., Code ch. 2.119.020(D)(2)-(7) (1992) (requiring do-
mestic partners to "reside together" and "consider themselves to be a family");
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.23(2)(aa)(6) (1990) (finding a domestic partner-
ship to exist when the couple "occup[ies the] same dwelling unit" and maintains a
relationship of "distinct domestic character"); New York, N.Y., Mayor's Executive
Order No. 48 § 2 (Jan. 7, 1993) ("Domestic partners are two people who live together
and have been living together on a continuous basis."); San Francisco, Cal., Admin.
Code ch. 62, § 2(b) (1991) ("Two people may live together even if one or both have
additional living quarters.").
225. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Affidavit of Domestic Partnership, Nov. 15, 1986,
quoted in Bowman & Cornish, supra note 214, at 1192 ("[Parties must intend to re-
main each other's domestic partner indefinitely."); Ithaca, N.Y., Code § 215-21(F)
(1994) (requiring a declaration of intent to continue the relationship "for the indefi-
nite future"); Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.23(2)(aa)(6)-(7) (1990) (defining
the relationship as "permanent" in character and not merely "temporary, social," or
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not to be taken too seriously, however, as virtually all ordinances pro-
vide for termination of the partnership by the simple declaration of
either party.22 6 Thereafter, each is free to file a new partnership, usu-
ally after a waiting period of about six months duration. 27
And in return for satisfying these requirements, what do the part-
ners receive by way of benefit? For the most part, little more than the
satisfaction that a registry is being maintained as symbolic recognition
of their union by the governing authority of the locale in which they
reside or work.22 1 In some-though by no means all-municipalities,
the domestic partners of city employees may be eligible for fringe ben-
efits, although not necessarily on the same terms as married work-
ers.229 For other citizens, the tangible benefits are limited to such
"commercial"); cf Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 142.20(6) (1991) ("Do-
mestic partners are two adults who are committed to one another to the same extent
as married persons are to each other.").
226. See, e.g., Sacramento, Cal., City Code, § 82.04(a) (1992) (providing that a do-
mestic partnership terminates when partners no longer reside together or when one
sends written notice of termination to the other); Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 117244,
§ 3 (codified in part at Seattle Mun. Code § 4.30.030 (1994)) (providing that a domes-
tic partnership terminates on death of one partner or 90 days after filing notice of
termination); Takoma Park, Md., Domestic Partnership Registry, Admin. Procedure
No. 93-01, § 07 (Nov. 8, 1993) (authorizing voluntary termination by one or both part-
ners); West Hollywood, Cal., Mun. Code § 6901(c) (1996) (permitting either partner
to terminate upon notice to city clerk and other partner).
227. See, e.g., Cambridge, Mass., Code ch. 2.119.030(E) (1992) (requiring a six
month waiting period unless the previous relationship was ended by the death of the
other partner); Laguna Beach, Cal., Mun. Code ch. 1.12.020(c) (prohibiting a new
domestic partnership within six months after the termination of the previous one);
Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.23(2)(aa)(3) (1990) (requiring six months to have
elapsed since the termination of a previous marriage or domestic partnership).
228. See, e.g., Cambridge, Mass., Code § 2.119.010 (1992) (declaring that the pur-
pose of the ordinance is to acknowledge a segment of the city's population whose
family relationships lack "recognition and validation" and to "attest[ ] to their status"
as domestic partners); Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances §§ 142.10, 142.40
(1990) (recognizing "expanded concept of familial relationships," and limiting registry
to partners who reside in the city, or one of whom is a city employee); New York,
N.Y.. Mayor's Executive Order No. 48, preamble (Jan. 7, 1993) ("provid[ing] a means
of recognizing persons with committed and sharing relationships" and limiting regis-
try to residents or employees of city).
Although residency requirements are common, some cities' registries are open to
non-residents. See, e.g., Berkeley, Cal., Policy Establishing Domestic Partnership Re-
gistration, quoted in Bowman & Cornish, supra note 214, at 1188 n.119; Laguna
Beach, Cal., Mun. Code § 1.12.010(a); Laguna Beach "Partnership" Law for the Un-
married OKd, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1992, at A16 (noting that the mayor invites
couples from outside the city to register).
229. See, e.g., Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 2-152-072 (1997) (permitting domestic
partners to receive the same benefits, including health coverage, as spouses of city
employees); Los Angeles, Cal. Admin. Code § 4.307.3 (1994) (extending health and
dental care benefits to domestic partners of non-unionized employees); New York,
N.Y., Mayor's Executive Order No. 49 (Jan. 7, 1993) (permitting child care leave
when a domestic partner becomes a parent and bereavement leave upon the death of
a domestic partner); Takoma Park, Md., City Code § 8B-175 (1993) (extending health
insurance benefits on same basis as married employees).
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matters as access to the school records of partners' children and part-
ner visitation at city hospitals and places of incarceration.2"-
In fairness to the local legislators who have pioneered this remarka-
ble movement to afford some measure of societal recognition to gay
and lesbian relationships, it should be said that the limited nature of
the benefits conferred often results from dictates at higher levels of
political authority. Even before the Defense of Marriage Act was
adopted in 1996,"' the federal government was notably inhospitable
to the support of nonmarital cohabitation. For example, when health
insurance is provided for the domestic partners of employees (either
governmental or private), the tax consequences are less favorable
than in the case of benefits for the families of married employees.
Under the Internal Revenue Code, employer contributions for the
health and accident insurance coverage of employees and their depen-
dents are excluded from gross income.- The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has consistently taken the position that this exclusion is
inapplicable to an employee's domestic partner and his or her depen-
dents, and that the value of the employer's contribution is fully taxa-
ble income to the employee.33
Federal preemption poses still another obstacle. In Seattle, for ex-
ample, the city initially ruled that domestic partner health care bene-
fits must be provided by all public and private employers in the city.-'
Some domestic partner ordinances are only for the purpose of providing benefits to
city employees and provide no system for partnership registration by non-employees.
See, e.g., Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 2-152-072 (1997); Los Angeles, Cal. Admin. Code
§ 4.307.3 (1994); Benefits for Unmarried Partners OKd by Council, LA. Times, Nov.
24, 1993, at B2.
230. See, eg., Cambridge, Mass., Code § 2.119.060 (1992) (giving access to school
records and children in school as well as visitation rights at health care and correc-
tional facilities); Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 3.23(5)(a) (1990) (extending the
right to purchase "family" memberships at places of public amusement or accommo-
dation); Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 142.70 (1990) (extending the right
to visit partners in health care facilities); West Hollywood, Cal., Mun. Code §§ 696-
6907 (Supp. 1996) (permitting visitation at health care facilities and city jails).
231. Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp.
1997), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1996)); see supra notes 137-41 and accompanying
text.
232. I.R.C. §§ 106, 152 (1997).
233. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-03-011 (Oct. 18, 1995); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-42-012 (July 20,
1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (May 7, 1992); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Dec. 6, 1990);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990); see also Hayes, supra note 139 (exploring
extensively the tax consequences of same-sex marriage); Linda M. Laarman, Em-
ployer Health Coverage for Domestic Parmers-Identifying the Issues, 18 Employee
Rel. LJ. 567, 571-77 (1993) (discussing tax problems and other regulatory issues);
William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1, 5-12 (1995) (discussing these and related tax problems involving
domestic partner benefits).
234. The Seattle Human Rights Department determined that the denial of em-
ployee benefits by public or private employers would violate the city's Fair Employ-
ment Practices Ordinance. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 214, at 1194 n.152;
Eblin, supra note 222, at 1073-74.
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Following a city attorney's legal opinion that benefit rules for private
employers could only be imposed at the federal level, the domestic
partner ordinance was limited to benefits provided for city employ-
ees.235 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 36
preempts most state and local laws relating to employee benefit
plans.2 37 Although there is no definitive judicial construction of the
scope of ERISA preemption as applied to domestic partner laws, the
federal law has served as a damper on more broadly-based employer
regulation.3 s
In an effort to avoid the ERISA problem, the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors relied on its governmental contracting authority to pro-
hibit agreements between the city and any contractor "that discrimi-
nate[s] in the provision of benefits between employees with domestic
partners and employees with spouses. '  In a similar vein, the Sacra-
mento domestic partner ordinance requires that city contractors must
offer family-related leaves of absence to unmarried employees on the
same basis that they provide family leave to married workers. z40
Legal challenges to the more controversial San Francisco ordinance
allege that it is preempted by ERISA.241
235. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 114648 (Aug. 18, 1989); see Bowman & Cornish,
supra note 214, at 1194 n.152; Eblin, supra note 222, at 1074.
236. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
237. The ERISA preemption clause applies broadly to "any and all State laws inso-
far as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a) (1994). Although there is a provision exempting from preemption state
laws "which regulate[ ] insurance," 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), the preemption clause
has been very broadly construed by the Supreme Court. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983), the Court held that a state law prohibiting discrimination in
sick-leave plans based on pregnancy was preempted. The breadth of the ERISA pre-
emption was narrowed considerably in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995), but it is still applica-
ble to most substantive coverage requirements having more than "indirect" economic
effect.
238. See Berger, supra note 222, at 441-43 (discussing ERISA and local domestic
partner laws); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 214, at 1203 (same); Laurie F. Hasen-
camp, Note, ERISA and Preemption of State Fair Employment Laws, 59 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 583, 586-89 (1986) (arguing for a narrowly construed preemption); Walter E.
Schuler, Note, The ERISA Pre-Emption Narrows: Analysis of New York State Con-
ference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and its
Impact on State Regulation of Health Care, 40 St. Louis U. L.J. 783 (1996) (discussing
preemption in light of the Travelers decision).
239. San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code §§ 12B.1-.2, 12C.1-.2 (1996).
240. Sacramento, Cal., City Code § 82.07(a) (1992). The Sacramento ordinance
also purports to require all employers in the city to provide family leave to domestic
partners, id. § 82.07(b), and to construe the term "family" in all real estate agreements
entered into in the city as including domestic partners, id. § 82.06.
241. See Reynolds Holding, S.F. Partners Law Under Fire Again, S.F. Chron., June
18, 1997, at A14; Steven Kolodny et. al, Domestic Partnership & Marriage Notes, 1997
Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 100.
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It is at the state rather than the federal level, however, that the do-
mestic partner option is most inhibited. The primary reason the local
ordinances are pale marital substitutes is that most of the legal inci-
dents of marriage historically have been considered matters of exclu-
sive state concern. Indeed, domestic partner initiatives in two cities,
Atlanta and Minneapolis, have succumbed to determinations that they
exceeded state grants of municipal authority. In City of Atlanta v. Mc-
Kinney,42 the Georgia Supreme Court upheld Atlanta's domestic
partner registry, but ruled that the city's attempt to provide employee
benefits to domestic partners violated the state's municipal home rule
laws. 243 And in Lilly v. City of Minneapolis,2 " that city's health insur-
ance program for its employees' domestic partners was held to invade
a domain of exclusively stateide concern.245
2. Failed Political Will in the Statehouses
The failure of political will to provide a viable alternative to mar-
riage for same-sex couples is nowhere more apparent than in the state
capitols of the nation. It was not until 1997-more than a decade after
the domestic partner movement began at the local level-that the first
state law was enacted to confer a status and significant marital bene-
fits on unmarried couples 4.2 1 And that, in Hawaii, after a long and
rancorous political struggle, even wvith the extraordinary leverage that
the law's passage might help avert the same-sex marriages that the
state's highest court was on the brink of ordering. 47 When it did pre-
vail, however, the nation's first such law was impressive for the array
of benefits it purported to confer.
The new status, styled a "reciprocal beneficiary relationship," is
open to all Hawaii "couples composed of two individuals who are le-
gally prohibited from marrying under state law."' 248 Underscoring that
242. 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995).
243. Id. at 520-21. The court also affirmed the legality of Atlanta's sexual orienta-
tion antidiscrimination law. Id. at 521. A subsequent effort by the city to recraft its
employee benefit rule (defining dependency in terms of reliance for financial support
rather than on domestic partner status alone) received the court's approval. City of
Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997).
244. 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 1995).
245. ld. at 113.
246. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383 (H.B.
118) (West). In 1994, Vermont became the first state to extend health care coverage
to the domestic partners of state employees (by collective bargaining agreement initi-
ated by the state commissioner of personnel). See Vermont Workers Win Health Bene-
fits for Partners, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1994, at A13. New York followed suit, at least
for some state employees, later that same year. Partnership & Marriage Updates, 1994
Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 114.
247. See Bettina Boxall, A New Era Set to Begin in Benefits for Gay Couples, L.A.
Times, July 7, 1997, at A3; Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Approves Benefits Package for Gay
Couples, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1997, at A3; Gallagher, supra note 5, at 71.
248. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383 § l(1)-(5)
(H.B. 118) (West). The only additional requirements are that both parties are at least
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the status is not meant to confer special symbolic recognition on gay
relationships, the law specifies that it is as open to "a widowed mother
and her unmarried son" as to "two individuals who are of the same
gender."24 9 Those who file declarations as reciprocal beneficiaries are
afforded many of the benefits familiar from the local domestic partner
ordinances-including an official registryy ° hospital visitation
rights," and public employee benefits. The latter are far more exten-
sive, however, encompassing not only health care and bereavement
leave,252 but also participation as beneficiaries in the public employee
retirement system and survivor benefits upon the death of an
employee. 3
For reciprocal beneficiaries who are not on the public payroll, the
most significant new benefits are the right to elective shares in the
decedents' estates of their partners, 4 to workers' compensation sur-
vivor benefits, 5 and to damages in wrongful death actions." 6 By its
terms, the law also requires most private employers to offer the
equivalent of "family coverage" health benefits for employees' recip-
rocal beneficiaries and their children," 7 although the legality of this
requirement has been challenged on federal ERISA preemption
eighteen years of age and that neither is married nor party to another reciprocal bene-
ficiary relationship. Id. § 1(4).
249. Id. § 1(2). Although acknowledging that "there are many individuals who
have significant personal, emotional, and economic relationships with another individ-
ual yet are prohibited ... from marrying," the law specifically "finds that the people
of Hawaii choose to preserve the tradition of marriage as a unique social institution
based upon the committed union of one man and one woman." Id. The breadth of
the legislation's coverage led Hawaii Governor Ben Cayetano (who supported the
extension of benefits to same-sex couples) to allow it to become law without his signa-
ture. See Arthur S. Leonard, Hawaii Becomes First State to Extend Benefits to Domes-
tic Partners Through Legislative Enactment, 1997 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 100.
250. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples § 1(5)(b).
251. Id. § 3. The right also extends to making the same health care decisions as the
spouse of a hospitalized patient. Id. In addition, reciprocal beneficiaries may consent
to post-mortems and make anatomical gifts, id. §§ 42-43, 62, and they are entitled to
participate in their partners' mental commitment proceedings, id. § 48.
252. Id. §§ 2, 22, 24.
253. Id. §§ 24-33, 44.
254. Id. §§ 11-15.
255. Id. §§ 53-55.
256. Id. § 18.
257. The state's Insurance Code is amended to require that "reciprocal beneficiary
family coverage" be made available in all policies of accident and sickness insurance
issued in the state "to the extent that family coverage ... is currently available to
individuals who are not reciprocal beneficiaries." Id. § 4 (to be codified at Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 431.10A). Unlike most other states, the option of family coverage is nearly
universal for employees in Hawaii, in large part because the state's Prepaid Health
Care Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1 to -51 (1993), mandates access to health coverage
in most situations for the employees of private employers, as well as for their depen-
dents, Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-7, -11 to -13, -21; see also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 87-4 (1996)
(requiring family coverage for public employees).
1740 [Vol. 66
"SIMULACRUM OF MARRIAGE"
grounds." 8 Other benefits range from domestic abuse and victims'
rights protections,259 to disaster loans," ° to prison furloughs.2"
Extensive though this array of entitlements may be, the Hawaii leg-
islation is equally notable for the marital benefits it does not extend to
same-sex couples and their children. Following the Hawaii Supreme
Court's Baehr decision,262 the state legislature established a commis-
sion to explore whether some form of domestic partnership law might
be enacted to avert a final judicial decision legalizing same-sex mar-
riage 63 The commission eventually recommended that the legisla-
ture itself should approve same-sex marriage, but it also proposed as
an alternative the adoption of a "Universal Comprehensive Domestic
Partnership" act.2 4 Unlike the law ultimately enacted by the legisla-
ture, the commission's proposed bill would have provided in clear and
simple terms that domestic partners "shall have the same rights and
obligations under the law that are conferred on spouses in a marriage
relationship." '265
258. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text. In addition to the general ex-
emption from preemption for state laws regulating insurance, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(b)(2)(A), ERISA specifically exempts the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care plan
from its preemption clause, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A). However, the latter exemp-
tion-the only waiver Congress has seen fit to provide for any state's health care
plan-is narrowly written, and there are serious doubts as to whether extending the
plan's protections to reciprocal beneficiaries can withstand legal challenge on pre-
emption grounds. See Susan Essoyan, Hawaii's Domestic-Partner Law a Bust; Ambi-
guity Blamed, L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1997, at A5 (discussing :egal challenges to the
Hawaii legislation); Leonard, supra note 249 (same); Schuler, supra note 238, at 785-
803 (discussing Hawaii waiver and general ERISA problems regarding regulation of
health care); see generally Jolee Ann Hancock, Diseased Federalism: State Health
Care Laws Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 Cumb. L. Rev. 383 (1994-95) (discuss-
ing the "disastrous effect of ERISA preemption on state health care reform efforts");
Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health
Care Reform, 19 Am. J.L. & Med. 121 (1993) (analyzing the federal barriers to the
ability of states to regulate the health care market).
259. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples §§ 64-67, 70-71.
260. 1d. §§ 37-38.
261. ld. § 51. Additional benefits include family leave for child birth or adoption,
id. § 57; access to auto and life insurance, id. §§ 58-59: homestead rights and the right
to create real estate tenancies, id. §§ 10, 36; and the use of university housing and
other facilities, id. § 40.
262. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion).
263. 1995 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 5; 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 271. The commission
had to withstand litigation challenging its legality in order to carry out its legislative
mandate. See Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996); see also Wardle, supra note 3,
at 16 (describing the controversy surrounding the establishment and functioning of
the commission).
264. State of Hawaii, Report of the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the
Law 39-41, 139-44 (1995); see Coleman, supra note 5, 571-77 (supporting the commis-
sion's domestic partner alternative; appending copy of draft legislation prepared for
the commission by the author, a longtime advocate for gay family rights): Wardle,
supra note 3, at 16-17 (lamenting the "pressure on the political branches" to accom-
modate same-sex marriage advocates by enacting domestic partner laws).
265. State of Hawaii, supra note 264, at 142 (Appendix D-1, Uniform Comprehen-
sive Domestic Partnership Act § 6). The same recommended provision would have
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Missing from the list of benefits and burdens for Hawaii's reciprocal
beneficiaries are some of the most fundamental of those identified in
David Chambers' study of the legal consequences of marriage. 66 In
the category of legal rules treating the couple as an economic unit,267
the taxation of income, gifts, and estates is entirely omitted.268 Signifi-
cantly, there is no provision for financial support or distribution of
property in the event a relationship ends-rules which Chambers be-
lieves would "serve gay and lesbian couples who choose to marry bet-
ter than they serve opposite-sex married couples today.21 69 And
perhaps the law's most serious failing-in terms of redressing legal
problems actually encountered by large numbers of lesbian and gay
families-is that it provides none of the favored treatment that the
law affords for married couples who are or want to become parents.270
If these shortcomings cast a pale on the Hawaii legislation as a na-
tional model for the protection of gay and lesbian family rights,2 71
elsewhere the state legislative landscape is almost completely barren.
In 1994, the California legislature adopted a statewide domestic part-
required that "[a] 'domestic partner' shall be included in any definition or use of the
terms 'spouse,' 'family,' 'immediate family,' or 'dependent' as those terms are used
throughout the law." Id.; see also Coleman, supra note 5, at 572-73 (proposing that the
term "domestic partner" should have the same meaning as spouse in "statutory law,
decisional law, or administrative regulations of the State... or any political subdivi-
sion thereof").
266. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 452-85, discussed supra notes 208-13 and ac-
companying text.
267. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 470-85, discussed supra note 211.
268. Discussing both the pros and cons of treating couples as a single economic unit
for tax purposes, Chambers acknowledges that many same-sex couples would be fi-
nancially disadvantaged by the so-called "marriage penalties" in the current tax laws.
Id. at 472-76. In this regard he speculates that a lower proportion of married gays and
lesbians than of heterosexual couples would correspond to the premise underlying
joint taxation, viz., "that married couples actually share in the control of resources
and expenditures." Id. at 475. But cf Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the
Federal Tax Laws, 1 Law & Sexuality 97 (1991) (arguing that, on balance, the tax
consequences of marriage would be advantageous to gay and lesbian couples); Hayes,
supra note 139 (contending that the financial benefits of marriage far outweigh the
cost of the marriage penalty for most taxpayers). See also Adam Chase, Tax Planning
for Same-Sex Couples, 72 Deny. U. L. Rev. 359 (1995) (discussing contracts and tax
planning to achieve advantages parallel to the tax code treatment of married couples);
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1994) (pro-
viding analysis and proposals for tax reform).
269. Chambers, supra note 22, at 483; see supra note 213 and accompanying text.
270. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 461-70, discussed supra note 210. Also not
included in the law are guardianship and conservator rights, id. at 455, civil and crimi-
nal testimonial privileges, id. at 459, and obligations for necessaries and spousal debts,
id. 484-85.
271. During the first five months after the law became effective, fewer than 300
couples registered as reciprocal beneficiaries, a tiny fraction of the 20,000 to 30,000
people the state health department had estimated might sign up. Ambiguities in the
statute and legal challenges to the law's private employer mandates, see supra note
258, as well as increased fees for public employee health care, have been cited as
reasons for the paucity of registrants. See Essoyan, supra note 258.
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ner bill that would have provided little more than a public registry and
hospital visitation rights.2' Even this modest initiative was vetoed by
the governor on the ground that it was unnecessary and would be a
"foot in the door" for same-sex marriage. 73
Bills have been introduced in a number of other state legislatures,
sometimes with innovative provisions, but typically prescribing no
more in benefits (and often less) than the local domestic partner ordi-
nances.274 In sweeping language reminiscent of the act proposed by
the special commission in Hawaii,2 75 a bill introduced in the New York
legislature every year since 1990 would make it "an unlawful discrimi-
natory practice for any state or local agency" to "us[e] marital status
as a factor in any decision, policy or practice unless it uses domestic
partnership in the same way."276 Like almost all of these legislative
initiatives, however, this one never has had any serious prospect of
being enacted, nor is it likely to at any time soon.
272. A.B. 2810, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994). The bill also authorized the ap-
pointment of domestic partners as conservators on the same basis as spouses and
added domestic partners to a checklist of potential beneficiaries on a state-approved
standard will form. 1d; see Carl Ingram, Senate OKs Bill on Rights for Unwed
Couples, L.A. Times, Aug. 24, 1994, at A21; Paula L. Ettelbrick, Other Domestic Part-
nership Updates, 1994 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 80-81.
273. Daniel M. Weintraub & Bettina Boxall, Ballot Fallout Expected from Wilson's
Veto, L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1994, at A3; see also Arthur S. Leonard, Partnership &
Marriage Updates: Wilson Vetoes California Bill, 1994 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 114
(discussing the governor's explanation for his veto).
274. See, e.g., S.B. 161, 61st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997) (providing for
domestic partner inheritance under intestacy laws on the same basis as spouses; ap-
pointment as guardians); H.B. 694, 188th Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Del. 1996) (provid-
ing for hospital and prison visits; medical decisions; guardianships); S.B. 647, 1994
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1994) (validating private domestic partnership contracts); H.B. 1143,
90th Gen. Assem., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (permitting domestic partners to act
as surrogate health decision-makers); S.B. 1731, 181st Gen. Ct., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 1997) (extending aid to families of the disabled and chronically ill); H.B. 2885,
69th Leg. Assem., 1997 Sess. (Or. 1997) (requiring health and life insurers to offer
domestic partner coverage to the same extent as spousal coverage); H.B. 90, 64th
Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997) (permitting domestic partners to make health care decisions
and serve as executors).
An anti-domestic partner bill was introduced in the Washington state legislature.
H.B. 2076, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997) (prohibiting the use of state funds
for domestic partner benefits; requiring state contractors not to offer benefits to their
employees' domestic partners).
275. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
276. S.B. 3305, 220th Annual Leg. Sess., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1997). As
originally proposed, the prohibition would not have applied "to matters of taxation,
inheritance, or adoption or eligibility for public assistance benefits." S.B. 6722, 213th
Annual Leg., 1989-90 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 1990). Although the scope of the bill was
broadened considerably when this limitation was abandoned in later years, other lim-
iting language makes it unclear what would be the full effect of the legislation. See
Bowman & Cornish, supra note 214, at 1191 n.134; Franz S. Leichter & William F.
Passannante, Letter to the Editor, To Free Nonmarried Couples from Legal Limbo,
N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 27, 1989, at A22.
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3. The Scandinavian Prototype
If there is to be a model alternative to marriage drawn from actual
legislative precedent, it is going to have to come from abroad, perhaps
a Scandinavian country as suggested by Judge Posner in his "simula-
crum of marriage" proposal. 77 Sweden became the first nation to es-
tablish a special status for same-sex couples in 1987 when it authorized
cohabiting homosexuals to register their relationships, thereby con-
senting to equally shared property rights.2 "' In 1989, Denmark
adopted a more extensive Registered Partnership Act, 79 which was to
become the prototype for comparable laws enacted in the next five
years by both Norway and Sweden. 8
277. Posner, supra note 28, at 313, discussed supra note 28 and accompanying text.
278. See Ake Saldeen, Sweden: More Rights for Children and Homosexuals, 27 J.
Fam. L. 295, 296-97 (1988-89). Equal distribution of property upon dissolution of the
relationship (comparable to the community property system in parts of the United
States) was the principal consequence of the 1987 Swedish law. See id. at 297. Judge
Posner prefers this limited Swedish model to the more extensive registered partner-
ship approach adopted later by Scandinavian countries because, he says, it "assumes,
realistically I think, that a homosexual relationship, even when meant to last, is more
like heterosexual cohabitation than like heterosexual marriage." Posner, supra note
23, at 314.
279. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act], Act No. 372
(1989) (Den.); see generally Henning Bech, Report from a Rotten State: "Marriage"
and "Homosexuality" in Denmark, in Modem Homosexualities 135 (Ken Plummer
ed., 1992) (describing the Danish law governing unmarried partners); Linda Nielsen,
Family Rights and the "Registered Partnership" in Denmark, 4 Int'l J.L. & Fain. 297
(1990) (discussing the background of Denmark's Registered Partnership regime, the
extent of its application, and its future implications); Marianne Hojgaard Pedersen,
Denmark- Homosexual Marriages and New Rules Regarding Separation and Divorce,
30 J. Fain. L. 289 (1991-92) (same); Jorge Martin, Note, English Polygamy Law and
the Danish Registered Partnership Act: A Case for the Consistent Treatment of Foreign
Polygamous Marriages and Danish Same-Sex Marriages in England, 27 Cornell Int'l
L.J. 419, 430-38 (1994) (discussing the act and offering justifications for same-sex mar-
riage laws).
280. Act on Registered Partnership for Homosexual Couples, Act No. 40 (1993)
(Nor.); Law Regarding Registered Partnership (1994) (Swed.). In 1996, Iceland
adopted a registered partner law based largely on the Danish model. Law on Regis-
tered Cohabitation, No. 87/1996; see David Th6r Bj6rgvinsson, General Principles and
Recent Developments in Icelandic Family Law, in International Society of Family Law,
International Survey of Family Law 215, 217, 225-26 (Andrew Bainham ed., 1997);
Iceland Gives Gay Marriages Legal Stamp, Reuters World Service, June 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Other nations have extended some
benefits to same-sex couples (judicially or administratively, if not by legislative act),
but none has yet gone further than the Danish model. See generally Eric Heinze,
Sexual Orientation: A Human Right 106-10 (1995) (discussing the policies of Nor-
way, Sweden, and the Netherlands); Wardle, supra note 3, at 7-8 (discussing, in addi-
tion to Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, the policies of Finland and Belgium);
James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 Has-
tings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 96-99 (1994) (providing information on the policies of
Sweden, Norway, Czech Republic, France, and Canada); Rex Wockner, Same-Sex
Marriage, Nordic-Style, Advocate, Feb. 4, 1997, at 26 (discussing the policies of the
Netherlands, Iceland, and Hungary).
"SIMULACRUM OF MARRIAGE"
Extending far more fights and obligations than any U.S. domestic
partner law, the Danish act provides that, with a few exceptions, "the
registration of a partnership shall have the same legal effects as the
contracting of a marriage." 1 By this means, virtually all of the eco-
nomic (and many noneconomic) consequences of marriage-including
marital property and inheritance rights, mutual maintenance duties,
alimony, joint taxation, and the prohibition of bigamy-are made ap-
plicable to registered same-sex couples3 s  The exceptions, though
small in number, nevertheless make clear that registered partnership
is a lesser status. Symbolically, the unions are not recognizable, as is
marriage, under the terms of international treaties;213 they also may
not be solemnized in the Danish state church. ' And practically, the
legal protections are greatly diminished by the denial to same-sex
couples of such parental rights as joint adoption, child custody, and
access to artificial insemination.385
There can be no doubt that, wherever adopted and by whatever
name, domestic partnership laws have brought some measure of civic
legitimation to same-sex relationships where before there was none.
And in substantial numbers of particular cases, they have supported
gay and lesbian family life by the provision of needed tangible bene-
fits. What is equally clear, however, is that even the most beneficent
of these enactments is second-class as compared to the laws support-
ing marriage. Only if companionate cohabitation among gays and les-
bians is deemed less worthy of state support can domestic partner laws
fairly be seen as reasonable substitutes for marriage.
B. Accepting Burdens: The Implications of Commitment
1. Obligation and Identity
Justice Blackmun, in his celebrated dissenting opinion in Bowers v.
Hardwick,286 places gay people squarely wvithin the cultural tradition
by which "individuals define themselves in a significant way through
281. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act], Act No. 372 § 3
(1989) (Den.), reprinted in Martin, supra note 279, at 430-31.
282. See Act of June 7, 1989, Act No. 373 (1989) (Den.) (amending the Danish
marriage, inheritance, tax, and penal laws to conform with registered partnership sys-
tern); Martin, supra note 279, at 430-33.
283. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act], Act No. 372
§ 4(4).
284. See Pedersen, supra note 279, at 290; Wilets, supra note 280, at 96. The state
church in Norway also has no duty to perform wedding ceremonies under that coun-
try's partner registration law. Id The Swedish law does contemplate an official wed-
ding service prior to partnership registration, but it cannot be a church wedding. Id.
285. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act], Act No. 372
§ 4(1)-(2); see Martin, supra note 279, at 432, 446; Wardle, supra note 3, at 7 n.8.
Iceland is the lone exception, authorizing registered partners to share legal custody of
each others' children. See Bjorgvinsson, supra note 280, at 225; Wockner, supra note
280.
286. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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their intimate sexual relationships with others. '287 It is the same tradi-
tion, he insists, as the one that constitutionally protects the decision to
marry "precisely because marriage 'is an association that promotes a
way of life,... a harmony in living,... a bilateral loyalty."' 288
The self-definition and loyalty to which Justice Blackmun refers is
most often spoken of in terms of the personal commitment that mar-
riage entails. It is less significant as a promise enforceable by law, says
Kenneth Karst, than as a "commitment [in] the sense that one is
pledged to care for another and intends to keep the pledge." '289 Each
party's sense of identity is indelibly affected, Karst believes: "the
cared-for partner gains in self-respect by seeing himself through his
caring partner's eyes as one who is worth being cared for; the caring
partner affirms her autonomy and her responsibility by choosing the
commitment. ' 2 °
In his perceptive volume, Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy,
Milton Regan contends that "marriage has moral significance as an
entity" primarily because "status as a spouse ... gives rise to obliga-
tion." '29 Being a spouse means committing "to honor [the] reliance
and to refrain from exploiting [the] vulnerability" that inhere in the
structure of marriage, he says.2" This responsibility is imposed on all
spouses "because of the interdependence that typically characterizes
marriage," according to Regan; and "[s]tatus is the embodiment of
that responsibility, a proclamation that certain intimate relationships
in themselves give rise to obligation because they shape each partner's
sense of self. '2 93
287. Id. at 205. Mary Anne Case argues that, from the context of his discussion,
Justice Blackmun must have meant something different by the term "intimate sexual
relationships" than the "sexually intimate... relationships" that Judge Kenneth Starr
wrote of disparagingly with respect to gay liaisons in Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d
1579, 1584 (D.C. Cir. 1984). "I believe Justice Blackmun is seeking to distinguish
intimate sexual relationships," she opines, "from those which, although every bit as
sexual, are less intimate, i.e., between pair bonding and copulating." Mary Anne Case,
Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Liti-
gating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1643, 1655-56 (1993); cf. Daniel R.
Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay
Identity, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1833, 1851-52 (1993) (criticizing the assimilationism of Black-
mun's approach for its "abstracting" and "sanitizing" of gay sex).
288. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965)).
289. Karst, supra note 10, at 632.
290. Id. at 633.
291. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 96 (1993).
292. Id.
293. Id. Regan concedes that "a marriage may be more fragile these days, given a
greater tendency to perceive it as but one option among many in a personal relations
market." Id. Nevertheless, he insists that the obligation involved in marital status "is
a way of acknowledging that individuals do not pass in and out of intimate relation-
ships untransformed, but rather create a shared life that provides an important source
of meaning for each." Id. at 96-97.
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To some of its most ardent gay supporters, it is these intangible obli-
gations of marriage, rather than tangible benefits, that are its most
salient feature. Marriage is the "highest public recognition of per-
sonal integrity," says Andrew Sullivan.2 94 By means of its "hard[ ]-to-
extract-yourself-from commitment to another human being," he
claims, gay marriage "would foster social cohesion, economic security,
and economic prudence. 2 95 In the same vein, William Eskridge ar-
gues that "the biggest cost of marriage provides the best reason why
gays and lesbians should seek legal recognition of their right to marry:
marriage is easy to enter but hard to exit."2 96 And it is that reality
that yields "the personal security that comes from knowing that one
can depend on someone else for better or for worse. '' 9
In pragmatic terms, spousal obligation finds expression during the
marriage in the doctrine of "necessaries" (which obligates one spouse
to pay as needed for the other's abode and sustenance), 98 and there-
after, either in community property or equitable distribution (when
both partners survive the relationship's demise),29 or in rights of in-
testate succession or elective spousal share (when one of them does
not survive). 3° Symbolically, as Kenneth Karst sagely observes, mari-
tal obligation is a phenomenon that "feeds on itself; if large numbers
of people equate marriage and commitment, then each successive
294. Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal 179 (1995).
295. Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groon: A (Conservative) Case for Gay
Marriage, New Republic, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20, 22.
296. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 71.
297. Id. at 72. Eskridge (who cites and subscribes to many of the views expressed
by Milton Regan, id. at 237 n.84 ) also believes that the commitment in marriage "pro-
vides an intense focal point for one to transcend the self and deepen one's identity
through intimate interaction with another being." Id. at 72.
298. The obligation (imposed by common law and occasionally by statute) is to
creditors, and is a limited exception to the general rule that one spouse is not liable
for the debts of the other. See 1 Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations
in the United States § 7.3, at 444-48 (2d ed. 1987); Bowman & Cornish, supra note
214, at 1167-68; Karol Williams, Note, The Doctrine of Necessaries: Contemporary
Application as a Support Remedy, 19 Stetson L. Rev. 661 (1990).
299. In most jurisdictions, spouses may own property separately or jointly as they
choose, but each may be entitled to a share of assets without regard to ownership
upon dissolution of the relationship (and possibly to receive ongoing financial sup-
port) in accord with flexible rules of "equitable distribution." In community property
jurisdictions, spouses jointly own property acquired during the relationship, and each
receives one-half upon dissolution. See Roger A. Cunningham et al., The Law of
Property §§ 5.14-5.15 (2d ed. 1993); Chambers, supra note 22, at 476-79; Elizabeth A.
Cheadle, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property
States, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1269 (1981).
300. Although the details vary widely, in every state a surviving spouse receives all
or part of the other spouse's assets if he or she dies intestate. Most states also permit
the surviving spouse to receive an "elective" (or "forced") share of assets if the part-
ner left a will that did not make due provision for the spouse. Community property
rules achieve much the same result in other jurisdictions. See Ralph C. Brashier, Dis-
inheritance and the Modern Family, 45 Case W. Res. L Rev. 83,97-104 (1994); Cham-
bers, supra note 22, at 455-56, 479; Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in
Transition, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 21, 27-29, 36-38 (1994).
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marriage is apt to seem to the marrying couple both the symbol of
commitment and the undertaking itself."' 1
By and large, domestic partner laws do not measure up to marriage
in the obligations they impose any more than in the benefits they pro-
vide. Although almost all the local ordinances purport to insist upon a
declaration that the partners are responsible for each other's wel-
fare,3" the promise is ephemeral. Each partner is free to unilaterally
end the relationship and abrogate the commitment without looking
back.303 Lest there be any doubt about the degree of obligation im-
posed, some of the ordinances expressly provide that they are not in-
tended to create contractual relationships between the parties, 3°4 or
that "the partners incur no further obligations to each other" after the
partnerships have ended.30 5
At first blush, the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary law appears to im-
pose a significant burden on registering partners by precluding them
from disinheriting one another. Surviving reciprocal beneficiaries are
entitled to elective shares of their deceased partners' estates to the
same extent as partners to a marriage.3 6 However, a crucial differ-
ence in the structure of the laws governing the two kinds of relation-
ships severely diminishes the force of an unmarried partner's
obligation. As in the case of the local domestic partner ordinances,
either reciprocal beneficiary may end the relationship-and all its ac-
companying obligations-by the mere filing of a declaration of termi-
nation.30 7 Of course, a spouse can also escape the elective share
301. Karst, supra note 10, at 670.
302. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
304. See, e.g., Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 117244, preamble (Aug. 5, 1994) ("[Tjhe
registration program provided for in this ordinance is not intended to create any new
or different legal rights or responsibilities, or to itself create or evidence any contrac-
tual relationship or obligations between the individuals who participate in the regis-
tration program."); cf. Sacramento, Cal., City Code, § 82.03 (1992) (providing that a
domestic partnership creates "no legal rights or duties from one of the parties to the
other" other than "[ljegal rights and duties which the partners agree in writing they
will owe to each other, provided the agreement is otherwise enforceable").
305. San Francisco, Cal., Admin. Code § 62.6(b) (1991), reprinted in Rubenstein,
supra note 3, at 765. The San Francisco law does provide that third parties who have
received notice of a domestic partnership and relied upon it may recover damages for
actual loss caused by the failure of a partner to provide notice of the relationship's
termination. Id. § 62.4(b); see also Robin Leonard, S.F.'s New Domestic Partner Law
is a Symbolic Start but State Law is Needed to Confer True Rights, Recorder (San
Francisco), Feb. 14, 1991, at 4 (discussing limited power of municipalities to alter con-
tractual rights).
306. Act Relating to Unmarried Couples, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383 §§ 11-12
(H.B. 118) (West) (to be codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 560:2-201 to -202). The right
of election for both varies from 3% to 50% of their deceased partners' estates, de-
pending on the duration of the marriage or reciprocal beneficiary relationship. Id.
§ 12.
307. Id. § 7(a). The relationship also terminates upon the issuance of a marriage
license or the entering into a legal marriage by either reciprocal beneficiary. Id. § 7(c).
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burden by ending the marriage, but that requires a divorce instead of
unilateral action, which in turn subjects both spouses' assets to the
scrutiny of equitable distribution.30 8
It is the crucial obligation to share material assets-not only in good
times during the course of a relationship, but in settling accounts when
it ends-that most distinguishes the burdens of marriage from those
imposed by domestic partnership laws in the United States. Although
many jurisdictions now enforce express agreements (and less often im-
plied ones) privately ordering the property rights of unmarried cohab-
itants,30 9 no state has statutory default rules to govern the
overwhelming majority of cases in which couples have not been so
prescient as to plan for the ending of their relationships. 1 Only in
the Scandinavian registered partnership model is a full statutory coun-
terpart to be found for the marital obligation regime, with a common
system of divorce and parallel provisions governing maintenance,
property, and inheritance.31'
2. Limited Partnerships and the Problem of Adverse Selection
When benefits fall short at the end of a campaign for a domestic
partner law, it is usually because lawmakers have concluded the new
status is less deserving of support than marriage. The absence of ex-
tended obligation, on the other hand, may be exactly what the propo-
nents of domestic partnership (or at least some of them312 ) have in
mind. Paula Ettelbrick's oft-quoted rallying cry against same-sex mar-
308. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 560:2-802 (1993); Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker,
Family Law in the Fifty States, 27 Fain. L.Q. 515, 660, 720, 724 (1994) (discussing the
Hawaii law regarding distribution of assets in divorce proceedings); see also supra
note 299.
309. Elsewhere, I have discussed the case law in this area as applied to same-sex
couples and the conceptual problems in adapting contract law to the intimate rela-
tionships of gay and lesbian families. Christensen, supra note 2, at 1327-48.
310. See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Marriage Contract: Spouses, Lovers, and the
Law 366-84 (1981); Chambers, supra note 22, at 480-81; Martha M. Ertman, Contrac-
tual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 Deny. U.
L. Rev. 1107, 1137-42 (1996); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Mar-
riage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 207 (1982).
311. Lov om registreret partnerskab [Registered Partnership Act], Act No. 372
§§ 3, 5 (1989) (Den.); see also Martin, supra note 279, at 430-32, 446; Pedersen, supra
note 279, at 289-92. For a discussion of the incidence of divorce under the Danish
registered partner system, see Wockner, supra note 280, at 26.
312. Of course, not all supporters of domestic partner laws favor diminished com-
mitment. For example, provisions in the model bill drafted by Thomas Coleman for
the Hawaii Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law (which the commission
recommended, but which the legislature did not enact) would have subjected domes-
tic partnership to the same divorce proceedings as marriage, as well as to the same
substantive rights and obligations upon dissolution. See State of Hawaii, supra note
264, at 142 (Appendix D-1, Uniform Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act § 7);
Coleman, supra note 5, at 573, 580; see also Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partner-
ship: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 San Diego L Rev. 163, 207-18 (1995) (advo-
cating the imposition of increased responsibility on domestic partners).
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riage-"I do not want to be known as 'Mrs. Attached-To-Somebody-
Else"' 313-is nothing if not a rejection of marital identity and commit-
ment.314 Gay author Fenton Johnson rejects the stick of marital obli-
gation in favor of the carrot of public benefits, which he would give
only to reward "couples who demonstrate stability" whether or not
they are married.315 In support of this unusual scheme, he cites the
experience of an attorney of his acquaintance who specializes in same-
sex partnerships. "Marriage as it exists imposes a legal partnership on
people that is seldom in sync with how they think about their relation-
ship," he quotes his lawyer friend as saying; "[t]he idea of supporting a
spouse for the rest of his or her life is totally contrary to the way most
people nowadays think. 316
While there is evidence to suggest that a higher proportion of same-
sex than of married opposite-sex couples may share this sentiment,317
it is equally clear that significant numbers of gays and lesbians-espe-
cially those already in established relationships-do not.318 The dif-
313. Ettelbrick, Since When, supra note 60, at 14; see supra notes 60-61 and accom-
panying text.
314. Ettelbrick certainly does not disparage all commitment. Her own definition of
family encompasses "commitment, caregiving, a shared journey, a guiding hand, com-
panionship, [and] economic security," Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 109
n.3; but she is also convinced that "personal autonomy within relationships [is] more
likely accomplished outside of the social strictures of marriage," id. at 120 (footnote
omitted). Frank Browning describes Ettelbrick's self-defined families as "find[ing]
their raison d'etre in ... radical individualism" and as being "created solely for the
maximum happiness of their individual members." Browning, supra note 64, at 154-
55. Nevertheless, he agrees with her that "[b]y rushing to embrace the standard mar-
riage contract, we could stifle one of the richest and most creative laboratories of
family experience." Frank Browning, Why Marry?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1996, at A23.
315. Fenton Johnson, Wedded to an Illusion, Harper's Mag., Nov. 1996, at 43, 49. In
Johnson's model, the most significant state-conferred familial benefits "would be re-
served for couples who had demonstrated the ability to sustain a household" over an
extended period of time; and "[t]he decision to assume the label 'marriage' would be
left to the individuals involved, who might or might not seek ratification of their deci-
sion by a priest or minister or rabbi." Id.
316. Id. at 48 (quoting Oakland, Cal., attorney Frederick Hertz).
317. The Blumstein and Schwartz comparative study of homosexual and heterosex-
ual couples explored the attitudes of partners about the pooling of income and other
assets. Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 95. Only 35% of gay men and 31%
of lesbians who had been in coupled relationships from zero to two years favored
pooling, as compared to 67% of husbands and 63% of wives who had been married
for the same period of time. Id. In relationships of two to ten years, 44% of gay men
and 40% of lesbians favored pooling, as compared to 74% of husbands and 66% of
wives. Id. In relationships of more than ten years duration, however, the gap had
narrowed to 68% of gay men and 59% of lesbians in favor, as compared to 77% of
husbands and 74% of wives. Id.; see also Chambers, supra note 22, at 471-72, 481
(discussing the Blumstein & Schwartz study and other anecdotal evidence of gay and
lesbian attitudes regarding financial obligations to their partners).
318. Blumstein and Schwartz explain the high level of support for the pooling of
assets among gays and lesbians in long-term relationships, see supra note 317, as
follows:
[G]ay men and lesbians must first get to know their partners and do not pool
until they are convinced of the durability of the relationship.... Initially
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ference between straight and gay couples, of course, is that the former
may choose the higher form of commitment that marriage entails,
while the latter have no such option. Even if marriage were equally
available, however, domestic partnership (or some comparable sta-
tus) 319 might well be seen as an appropriate second option for couples
in both categories who prefer a more modest level of obligation. 320
What is important to emphasize for present purposes is that, by reason
of its diminished commitments, the alternative status would not in any
real sense be a simulacrum of marriage. And the shortfall would be
significant both for its affects on the partners themselves and for its
broader implications for the gay community at large.
As to the first: The difference between a little obligation and a lot is
more than one of degree. It alters the entire character of the union.
In an era when relationships are easily cast off no matter the commit-
ments set aside, the status of marriage provides what Milton Regan
calls a "buffer" against the full force of transience.2 1 Although
"[fleelings may change, devotion may wane, and other alternatives
may come to seem more attractive," he points out, marital status "pro-
claims that some things can be taken for granted as long as a marriage
lasts, and that some obligations may remain even when a partner has
decided to leave. ' '3 1 Shorn of such extensive obligation, the status
they have only to decide whether to live together. But there is no institu-
tional understanding that it symbolizes a lifetime commitment.... The issue
of permanence is something many same-sex couples discuss and negotiate
over a period of time.
Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 170, at 105 (footnote omitted).
319. William Reppy has proposed the creation of a new legal status of -lawful co-
habitation" for opposite-sex couples whose relationships would benefit from the sta-
bility of defined legal rights and duties, but who wish to incur less extensive
obligations than those presently entailed in marriage. William A. Reppy, Jr., Property
and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal
Status, 44 La. L. Rev. 1677 (1984). Reppy's new status would recognize some marital
property rights and the possibility of limited financial support following dissolution,
but it would make dissolution (and the discharge of most obligations) as simple as the
filing of a declaration signed by both parties. Id. at 1719-21. While acknowledging
that same-sex couples might benefit from a comparable status, Reppy urges that it be
a separate one for fear that their inclusion in his proposal would undermine it in the
eyes of judges and government officials. Id. at 1723; see also Arthur H. Gottlieb, Note,
Living Together: The Need for a Uniform Nonmarital Cohabitation Act, 2 Adelphia
LI. 79 (1983) (arguing for a nonmarital cohabitation act in light of the increase in the
number of couples living together and the resulting tendency of such couples to turn
to the courts to resolve their disputes).
320. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 17, at 78-80 (suggesting that couples should have
"a menu of choices for their unions," including marriage, domestic partnership, and
contractual ordering); Wolfson, supra note 22, at 605-08 (arguing that domestic part-
nership is "second-class" as compared to marriage, but that it should be available to
those who want it); cf. Chambers, supra note 22, at 487-88 (contending that, although
the disdain that some have for marriage is understandable, most "same-sex couples
would probably find that domestic partnership legislation excluded benefits that they
would much like to have").
321. Regan, supra note 291, at 96.
322. Id.
1998] 1751
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
loses its capacity to "promote intimacy.. . by protecting those who are
willing to make intimate commitments."3
As to the second: The widespread availability of a status conferring
societal benefits on unmarried couples without corresponding burdens
would underscore what is already a vexing obstacle in the quest by gay
people for equal access to familial rights. Sometimes styled as the
problem of "adverse selection, ' 324 it is the widely-held concern that
domestic partnership may function as a ruse to confer status and privi-
lege on partners who bear little responsibility for the civic virtues as-
sociated with family life.
David Haddock and Daniel Polsby have recently challenged (on
public policy grounds utilizing economic analysis) what they see as the
underlying premise of domestic partnership.32 It is "specious," they
contend, to argue that "how a person chooses to live, and with whom,
is essentially a private matter into which the community intrudes as a
hostile and officious stranger. '326 Quite the contrary, they believe the
community has every reason to favor stable family relationships,
which are much more likely ("in the patois of modern policy wonk-
speak") to "generate positive externalities for society relative to other
living arrangements. '327 Chief among these, they claim, are that a
traditional family has much more incentive to "maximize [its] equity
in such reputational assets as honesty, virtue, trustworthiness, [and]
community-mindedness" 3  than do "[o]ther kinds of households
[which] are foreseeably unstable. 329
Far too little is known about stability in same-sex relationships to
make sound policy decisions regarding "homosexual quasi-marriage,"
323. Id.
324. Linda Laarman, editor-in-chief of the Benefits Law Journal, explains that
many employers fear that:
[E]mployees will abuse the option of domestic partner coverage by portray-
ing a sick friend to be a domestic partner, even though the relationship be-
tween the employee and the friend is not equivalent to that of spouses.
Concerns about such "adverse selection" . . . are considered unfounded by
domestic partner benefits advocates,... [who argue that] the social stigma
attached to homosexuality makes homosexual "marriages of convenience"
unlikely.
Laarman, supra note 233, at 569 (footnote omitted).
325. David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74
Wash. U. L.Q. 15 (1996).
326. Id. at 18; see, e.g., Browning, supra note 64, at 154 (quoting Paula Ettelbrick
during a presentation opposing gay marriage, Chicago, Ill., Oct. 1989: "[S]ociety
[should have] no authority to sanction, to reward, or even to approve one set of family
relations over another"); see also supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
327. Haddock & Polsby, supra note 325, at 18.
328. Id. at 19.
329. Id. at 34. The perception of instability is important, they point out, because
"[w]hat neighbors reasonably believe . . . is, of course, absolutely crucial to public
policy. Words are cheap: People can say anything and promise anything. Incentives
are what really matter" and "[h]ouseholds organized along kinship lines have a better
chance of overcoming ... atomistic incentives." Id.
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according to Haddock and Polsby.33° Nevertheless, they believe the
incentives for stability would have to be much closer to those in tradi-
tional marriage than in existing domestic partnership to justify attach-
ing significant social benefits to that status. Raising the specter of
adverse selection run amok, they ask what is to prevent "the develop-
ment of a market in domestic partnership, in which an employee might
retail the value of his fringe benefits to whomever most highly value[ ]
them?"33 The answer, they say, is that "[tlhere is no reason not to if
one can simply pick up and walk away at will and if there is no anchor-
ing set of legal obligations between the partners."3 Even short of
this worst-case scenario, they contend, homosexual households "can-
not for long be regarded as legitimately constituted or entirely re-
spectable in the eyes of the community" unless there is a "legal check
against casual household dissolution" that is comparable to the finan-
cial arrangements surrounding divorce in heterosexual marriage.333
These are not merely academically-conjured horribles, as witness
the arguments mounted in litigation and legislative battles against gay
family rights. Opposition to the provision of fringe benefits for do-
mestic partners often has been fueled by the image of feigned rela-
tionships that would bring expensive health care coverage and other
advantages to the casual acquaintances of gay and lesbian employ-
ees. 334 Ironically, the antidote sometimes has been to make eligibility
for domestic partnership far more restrictive than it is for marriage,
and in the process far more intrusive of the relational privacy that is
an historical pillar of family autonomy.335 Cohabitation require-
330. Id. at 44-46.
331. Id. at 43.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 44. "[L]egitimating homosexual marriage might cause no change at all,"
they speculate. Id at 45.
The more or less onerous termination provisions that legitimation would ...
have to entail, would change the ex ante calculation each quasi-spouse might
make concerning whether to quasi-marry in the first place. At the end of the
day, matters might well be left more or less as they are now-many quasi-
partners living together in quasi-sin, sometimes obtaining from cowed City
Halls a few of the benefits of being married ... without any of the legal
burdens.
Id.
334. See Laarman, supra note 233, at 569-71 (discussing adverse selection as a de-
terrent to decisions by employers to provide domestic partner coverage); Alice
Rickel, Extending Employee Benefits to Domestic Partners: Avoiding Legal Hurdles
While Staying in Tune with the Changing Definition of the Family, 16 Whittier L Rev.
737, 744-48 (1995) (discussing the potential for abuse in domestic partner benefit pro-
grams and employers' fear of the costs of AIDS treatment); Joseph Asher, Unmarried
House Partners Gain Benefits in Seattle, Nat'l Underwriter, Property & Casualty/Risk
& Benefits Management Edition, June 4, 1990, at 9 (describing the strict eligibility
rules imposed in domestic partner law to "prevent benefits being extended to those
with frequently changing partners and unstable life styles").
335. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
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ments,336 waiting periods,337 and other evidence of relational bona
fides338 are common features of domestic partnership that are not de-
manded of spouses as prerequisites to the marital benefits they
receive.
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.33 9-the New York Court of Ap-
peals decision which is the premier example of functional family juris-
prudence 34 0-even the historic finding that a gay couple might be
deemed to comprise a "family" for purposes of the state's rent control
laws was conditioned on "the exclusivity and longevity of the relation-
ship, the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in
which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held them-
selves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one another for
daily family services. "341 Such probing inquiry into the private terms
of a marriage relationship never would be tolerated as the price for
qualifying to receive some right reserved by the law for "families. '342
336. See supra note 224.
337. See supra note 227.
338. See, e.g., Cambridge, Mass., Code § 2.119.020(E) (1992) (providing that the
existence of a "family relationship" must be shown by evidence of: (1) "[t]he manner
in which the people live their daily lives"; (2) "[h]ow they hold their relationship out
to the world"; (3) "[t]heir emotional and financial commitment"; (4) "[tjheir reliance
on each other for daily family services"; and (5) "[tjhe longevity and exclusivity of
their relationship"); Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 2-152-072 (1997) (requiring domestic
partners to satisfy at least two of four conditions: (1) residing together for at least
twelve months before filing for status; (2) common or joint ownership of a residence;
(3) at least two of the following: joint ownership of a motor vehicle, joint credit ac-
count, joint checking account, or a lease identifying both partners as tenants; or (4)
city employee declares that partner is a primary beneficiary in his or her will).
339. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (plurality opinion).
340. See Arthur S. Leonard, Sexuality and the Law: An Encyclopedia of Major
Legal Cases 364-67 (1993) (discussing the background of the Braschi litigation); Chris-
tensen, supra note 2, at 1365-72 (discussing Braschi and other cases according rights
on the basis of functional family characteristics); Note, Looking for a Family Resem-
blance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 1640 (1991) (same).
341. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55 (Titone, J., plurality opinion) (citations ommitted).
Since Braschi (and a subsequent decision upholding a rigorous list of factors to be
utilized in determining "family" membership for rent stabilization eligibility, Rent Sta-
bilization Ass'n v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 629 (N.Y. 1993)), lower courts in New
York have made clear that these are not merely pro forma requirements, and have
strictly limited the circumstances in which same-sex couples may be treated as "fam-
ily." See, e.g., GSL Enters., Inc. v. Lopez, 656 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (App. Div. 1997)
(finding inadequate evidence of a family relationship where the couple lived together
for eleven years, sharing expenses and joint credit cards); 390 West End Assocs. v.
Wildfoerster, N.Y. L.J., May 30, 1996, at 27 (N.Y. App. Term. May 1996) (holding that
the surviving partner in a gay relationship was not a "family member," despite satisfy-
ing most of the criteria, because the deceased partner did not leave a will or name his
partner as an insurance policy beneficiary).
342. See Case, supra note 287, at 1664-66 (questioning the "unbounded enthusi-
asm" of gay and lesbian advocates for Braschi in light of "the rather conservative
things the Court of Appeals required of Braschi and his lover"); Vetter, supra note
233, at 4-5 (discussing invasions of privacy required to establish domestic partnership
as compared to non-intrusive marriage eligibility).
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Nor does the absence of suspected freeloaders eliminate the prob-
lem. In Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 3 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals found that the denial of health care benefits to the
partner of a state employee in a "committed lesbian relationship" was
not discriminatory.34 Even being "spouse equivalent[s]" does not
make domestic partners "similarly situated" to married couples, the
court held, because "[t]he law imposes no mutual duty of general sup-
port... on unmarried couples of any gender, as it does on married
persons." 3' Similarly, in City of Atlanta v. McKinney,3" the Georgia
Supreme Court held that city workers' domestic partners and their
children could not receive health benefits because their reliance upon
the employees for support and care was not a legal dependency.347
Of course, there are answers to these arguments and explanations
for the differing levels of commitment in marriage and domestic part-
nership.' " But one of the most common explanations-that dimin-
ished commitment is justified by the meager benefits conferred 349-
exactly begs the question whether domestic partnership merits socie-
tal support because of its functional similarity to marriage. Oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage complain that it would undermine
343. 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
344. Id at 123-24.
345. Id. at 126.
346. 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995).
347. Id. at 521.
348. For example, in Tumeo v. University of Alaska, No. 4FA-94-43 Civ., 1995 WL
238359 (Alaska Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1995), affd, 933 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1997), an
Alaska court dismissed as "tautological" the argument that the denial of employee
domestic partner benefits is nondiscriminatory because married and unmarried work-
ers are not "similarly situated" with respect to family support obligations. Id. at *7.
"The University's argument is based on ... logical error" said the court. "The Uni-
versity says it is not discriminating based on marital status but rather on the legal
obligation of mutual support. However, by the University's logic the only way to
have a legal obligation of mutual support is through marriage. Thus, this is a distinc-
tion without meaning . . . ." Id Under these circumstances, the court held that
enough equivalency was made out to maintain a marital discrimination complaint by
the fact that the plaintiff and his partner had executed an "Affidavit of Spousal
Equivalency" attesting that they were "jointly responsible for each other's common
welfare and financial obligations." Id. at *1, *8.
The adverse selection argument has not been borne out by the experience to date in
domestic partner benefit programs implemented by public and private employers.
The enrollment in such programs has been small (since both partners in most same-
sex couples are employed and eligible for their own employer benefit programs), and
the claims experience has not revealed a heightened level of risk. See Rickel, supra
note 334, at 741-50 (tracking private employer experiences); Juel, supra note 222, at
330-36 (discussing the impact of domestic partner initiative on municipalities); Louise
Kertesz, Gay Partner Benefits, Bus. Ins., Apr. 19, 1993, at 6 (finding domestic partner
costs to be "insignificant" because same-sex partners tend to be younger with fewer
medical problems and because both partners are employed); Domestic Partner Cover-
age Not Driving Up Employer Health Costs, Benefits Today, Apr. 17, 1992, at 121
(report on cost experience to risk and insurance managers).
349. See, e.g., Juel, supra note 222, at 342 (stating that "these initiatives provide
very limited benefits").
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domestic partner laws and scuttle litigation to secure family rights
without regard to marital status.350 They may well be correct on both
counts, but it is also clear that domestic partnership without significant
obligation weakens the case for equality of treatment. And for those
pursuing a status in lieu of marriage, there can be no doubt that the
domestic partner option is correspondingly less supportive of the com-
panionate cohabitation of same-sex couples.
IV. THE NURTURING OF CHILDREN
Among both proponents and detractors, same-sex marriage is seen
as relevant primarily to the relationships of the cohabiting partners. It
is assumed to have little bearing on issues related to the nurturing of
children. Supporters tend to be dismissive of the connections between
marriage and parenting.351 To gay marriage enthusiast Andrew Sulli-
van, "a difference that... is inherent between homosexual and heter-
osexual adults" is that "[t]he latter group is committed to the
procreation of a new generation. The former simply isn't. ' 352 William
Eskridge, while acknowledging the growing significance of gay and
lesbian parenting, asserts that same-sex marriage would not alter pa-
rental relationships because "[t]he legal benefits and obligations of
marriage .. .do not directly relate to children. ' 353 Marianne Hoj-
gaard Pedersen, head of section at the Denmark Ministry of Justice,
defends her country's decision to exclude parental rights from those
afforded to same-sex couples as "based on the assumption that regis-
tered partners can have children separately but not together. 354
Reflecting essentially the same points of view, opponents of legal-
ized same-sex unions contend that the institution of marriage is so
much about procreation and childrearing that it has little to do with
gay people. Judge Richard Posner bases his preference for a marriage
simulacrum over the genuine article in part on a belief that mar-
riage-"a status rich in entitlements"-was designed not only "with
350. See Ettelbrick, Since When, supra note 60, at 17; Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert,
supra note 61, at 122, 142-45; Polikoff, supra note 19, at 1549.
351. Of course, not all proponents do so. See, e.g., Strasser, supra note 18, at 75-99
(discussing custody and adoption issues in the context of advocating same-sex mar-
riage); Chambers, supra note 22, at 461-70 (analyzing the legal advantages afforded to
married couples in the parenting of children).
352. Sullivan, supra note 294, at 196. Sullivan admits that "there are major qualifi-
cations to this-gay men and lesbians are often biological fathers and mothers," but
he insists that "in general, the difference holds. The timeless, necessary, procreative
unity of a man and a women is inherently denied homosexuals; and the way in which
... parenthood transforms their relationship, is far less common among homosexuals
than among heterosexuals." Id.
353. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 117. Eskridge adds that, "[t]o the extent the law of
marriage focuses on children (by and large it does not), it is agnostic as to where the
children come from." Id. at 118. "All [parent-child] duties are as applicable to homo-
sexual parents as they are to heterosexual parents." Id. at 117.
354. Pedersen, supra note 279, at 290; see supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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heterosexual marriage in mind," but "more specifically heterosexual
marriages resulting in children. 3 5  From an entirely different per-
spective, Paula Ettelbrick worries that, because the "origins of mar-
riage are deeply imbedded in procreation and the two-parent family,"
lesbian and gay parents "will need more than marriage to address the
many issues of their family structures that will never fit the heterosex-
ual model." '356
The widespread denial (or at least de-emphasis) of the nexus be-
tween same-sex marriage and gay and lesbian parenting is perplexing.
Not only does it fail to take adequate account of the profound changes
in lesbian and gay family life that have been wrought by the increased
incidence of childbearing and childrearing,35 it also ignores issues that
are of paramount importance to a segment of the gay population that
may be among the most likely to want to marry (and to need the legal
protections that marriage can afford). The linkage between parenting
and marriage historically has been one of the essential attributes of
the value-laden and legally-favored nuclear family.358 However di-
minished that linkage may be today in demographic terms,359 it should
not be surprising that much of the legal tradition remains intact, still
favoring the support of married parents over those who do not or can-
not marry.3 °
In order to fully evaluate whether a simulacrum is just as good as
marriage,36 1 or to decide if non-marriage litigation strategies can ef-
fectively address the problems facing lesbian and gay families,' 2 it is
355. Posner, supra note 23, at 313; see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text; see
also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) ("[M arriage exists as
a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated with the
propagation of the human race; [therefore,] the refusal of the state to authorize same-
sex marriage[s] results from [the] impossibility of reproduction rather than from an
invidious discrimination.").
356. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 160. Ettelbrick concedes that
"marriage could provide some protection for [lesbian and gay family] relationships,"
but, she says, "even then, overattachment to marriage as the guidepost could equally
destroy the expectations of the parties." Id. at 156; see also Weston, supra note 62, at
35 (stating that many lesbians and gay men with "nonprocreative sexual identities"
reject the necessary linkage between "family ties" and "marriage, childbearing, or
childrearing").
357. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
359. According to the Census Bureau, the single-parent household is by far the
fastest growing family type in the United States, accounting for twenty-six percent of
children under eighteen in 1991, as compared to only twelve percent in 1970. Bureau
of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No.
461, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1991, at 8 tbl.F (1992). It is
estimated that more than half of today's children will live in a single-parent household
for some portion of their childhood. Coontz, supra note 187, at 182; see generally
Christensen, supra note 2, at 1311-16 (discussing the changing demographics of non-
traditional families in the United States).
360. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 461-63.
361. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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absolutely necessary to consider the affects of such alternatives on the
nurturing of children. A recurring series of real-life family issues-
some involving the creation of rights in same-sex parented families;
others concerned with extinguishing rights and the limits of parental
autonomy-offer contexts for comparison.
A. Creating Rights: Two-Mom and Two-Dad Families
To say that gay and lesbian relationships are inherently nonprocrea-
tive is true only as qualified by the biological reality that a same-sex
couple obviously cannot have children unaided by someone external
to their relationship. But that is true as well in many opposite-sex
relationships, and the law tends to be generous in support of such col-
laborative parenting when the couple who will raise the child is united
by marriage. The legal obstacles faced by same-sex couples in the
same situation vary depending upon whether the collaboration occurs
in the reproductive process or after the child's birth by the expedient
of adoption.
1. Children of Collaborative Reproduction
Although the procreative collaboration leading to a gay-lesbian
family can take the simple form of a cooperative arrangement be-
tween a same-sex couple and someone (or another couple) of the op-
posite gender having children and raising them in a common extended
family,363 such arrangements clearly are not the norm. For lesbians-
who have been the most prolific participants in the same-sex-parent-
ing baby boom 3 ---it is far more typical to make use of artificial in-
semination with the aid of a sperm donor external to the planned
family circle.365
Artificial insemination has become a more accessible reproductive
technique than in earlier times through the availability of sperm banks
and physician services established primarily to aid married couples in
overcoming male sterility as an obstacle to having children. For the
lesbian couple without a known donor (or simply preferring anonym-
ity), access to such services can be problematic. In a 1979 survey pub-
lished in the New England Journal of Medicine, ninety percent of
physicians reported that they did not perform artificial insemination
services for a single women. 66 Many lesbians have reported resist-
363. See Laura Benkov, Reinventing the Family: The Emerging Story of Lesbian
and Gay Parents 134-42 (1994); Weston, supra note 62, at 175-80; Fred A. Bernstein,
This Child Does Have Two Mothers... And a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 22 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1, 17-18 (1996).
364. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
366. Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Do-
nor in the United States, 300 New Eng. J. Med. 585 (1979).
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ance from physicians based upon both marital status and sexual
orientation.367
Even when insemination is successfully achieved and the child is
born, there remains a major obstacle to the formation of a societally-
accepted family: only the biological mother is recognized as having a
legal relationship to the child. No matter how much the birth of the
child was a collaborative effort that would not have taken place with-
out the involvement of both partners, no matter the financial, caregiv-
ing, and emotional support provided by the non-biological mother,
she is in the eyes of the law (and much of society generally) a "legal
stranger" to the child."6 Her authority to make health care decisions,
to have access to the child at school, to review educational records,
and to carry out countless other parental duties will be severely lim-
ited, if it exists at all. Conversely, the child may be deprived of rights
that are usually incident to the parental relationship, such as financial
support, governmental or employer-provided family benefits, and in-
heritance.369 In the event of the biological mother's death or incapac-
ity, the child's relationship with the only other parent he or she has
ever known may be severed at the discretion of an unsympathetic
judge.370
367. See Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nontnarital Mother-
hood-By-Choice, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 193, 196 (1982-83); Marc E.
Elovitz, Reforming the Law to Respect Families Created by Lesbian and Gay People, 3
J.L. & Pol'y 431, 443-44 (1995).
368. See generally Benkov, supra note 363, at 147-57 (discussing issues faced by
women who are not biological mothers); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The
Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 513,
516-21 (1993) (noting that laws fail to account for lesbian families); Polikoff, Two
Mothers, supra note 59, at 468-73 (discussing how the theories underlying the legal
definitions of parent and non-parent deny the existence of non-traditional families);
Sheila M. O'Rourke, Note, Family Law in a Brave New World: Private Ordering of
Parental Rights and Responsibilities for Donor Insemination, 1 Berkeley Women's LJ.
140 (1985) (advocating private ordering for donor insemination and the freedom to
create diverse family systems).
369. See, e.g., Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that an employer was not obligated to provide benefits to children raised jointly by an
employee and her lesbian partner); Chambers, supra note 22, at 463-65 (discussing
support obligations, workers' compensation, and Social Security benefits); Ralph C.
Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 Utah L Rev. 93,
95-103 (discussing the inheritance rights of children in alternative families).
370. Compare McGuffn v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(denying custody to a lesbian de facto coparent following the death of the child's
biological mother, despite power of attorney and a will purporting to transfer paren-
tal powers to petitioner), with In re Guardianship of Astonn H., 635 N.Y.S.2d 418,424
(N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1995) (awarding guardianship to the deceased mother's life partner in
the best interests of the child). See also Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note 59, at 527-
33 (discussing other cases in which "the surviving lesbian mother ultimately pre-
vailed," but only after the child has "face[d] lengthy litigation and the potential dis-
ruption of the only home he has known"); Amy L Brown, Note, Broadening
Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41
Hastings LJ. 1029, 1036-43 (1990) (noting the uncertain decisionmaking authority in
the event of a lesbian partner's incapacity).
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By contrast, the biologically unconnected husband whose wife gives
birth to a child by means of donor artificial insemination typically has
immediate parental rights and obligations. In more than thirty states,
he will acquire them automatically by statute.371 Section 5(a) of the
widely-adopted Uniform Parentage Act provides that if, "with the
[written] consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with
semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in
law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. 3 7
Under the more recently promulgated Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, the husband's parental status is even less
subject to doubt; he is conclusively deemed to be the father unless he
obtains a judicial determination that he did not consent to his wife's
artificial insemination.373
The same result is likely to be reached even in the absence of a
statute by reliance on the common law presumption of legitimacy-
that a husband is deemed to be the father of any child born during a
marriage-or by general equitable principles.374 The lesbian func-
tional coparent enjoys no such protected status, certainly not at com-
mon law and not by statute. Her recourse, if any, must come through
the tortuous process of adoption.
For a gay male couple seeking parenthood with a biological connec-
tion to the child, there is the possibility of a surrogacy arrangement by
which a woman agrees to conceive with donated sperm and then give
371. See Lori B. Andrews, Alternative Reproduction and the Law of Adoption, in
Adoption Law and Practice § 14.02[l], at 14-9 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1987 & Supp.
1998) (citing statutes and discussing variations in statutory patterns).
372. Unif. Parentage Act § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (1987). The act has been adopted
by eighteen jurisdictions. Id., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted
(West Supp. 1997). As construed, the husband's consent has been critical to the es-
tablishment of the parent-child relationship. Compare Lane v. Lane, 912 P.2d 290
(N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that substantial compliance with written consent re-
quirement is necessary to treat husband as a natural parent), with In re Marriage of
Witbek-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that a husband who
did not consent to his wife's artificial insemination owes no parental support
obligation).
373. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 3, 9B U.L.A. 199 (West
Supp. 1997). The action must be commenced within two years after the husband
learns of the child's birth. Id. The act has been adopted by two states, North Dakota
and Virginia. Id., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted (West Supp.
1997).
374. See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968) (finding the common
law presumption of husband's consent to be the legal father is enforceable); Strnad v.
Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (finding a child to be "semi-adopted" by
husband's consent to insemination); L.H. v D.H (In re D.L.H.), 419 N.W.2d 283 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that the defense of equitable estoppel may be used as a
defense to a mother's paternity suit); see also Andrews, supra note 371, § 14.02[1], at
14-7 to -11 (discussing rights of husbands when their wives are artificially insemi-
nated): Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Repro-
ductive Technologies, 96 Yale L.J. 187 (1986) (advocating a carefully designed legal
framework to safeguard the interests of all parties involved in complex reproductive
arrangements).
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up the child at birth to be raised by the donor and his partner." Ges-
tational surrogacy-the procedure whereby an egg from one woman is
fertilized and implanted in the womb of another for gestation-offers
a means which can be utilized by a lesbian couple so that both are
biological, though not genetic, parents of the child.376 There are ob-
stacles, however, that severely limit the use of these techniques by
both genders. Although, strictly speaking, neither involves the use of
"surrogate" mothers,3 " the procedures are sufficiently analogous to
the controversial practice of infertile couples contracting with paid
surrogates as to taint them with many of the same objections.-"" To
the extent that surrogate contracts are banned altogether, as they are
in many jurisdictions, 379 gay people have no cause to complain about
disparate treatment.
375. See Benkov, supra note 363, at 128-34; Martin, supra note 189, at 106, 166-67;
Bernstein, supra note 363, at 14-16; Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 199-201.
376. See Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood in the Context of
Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA Women's L.J. 329, 339-41, 357-58 (1995); John
A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 Hastings LU. 911,
923-25, 933 (1996).
377. The woman who gives birth to a child to be raised by a gay couple is not a
"surrogate" in the usual sense of the term, that is, she is a stand-in for the infertile
wife of the child's father. See Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 199-200. As a matter
of public policy, however, surrogacy is controversial largely because it entails the par-
ticipation in the birth of a child by a biological parent who does not intend to be the
social parent. In this sense, a gay male couple contracting with a woman to give up
her child for them to raise clearly is employing the services of a surrogate.
On the other hand, lesbian couples who make use of a procedure analogous to
gestational surrogacy would not meet this definition since the gestational mother
manifestly does intend to participate fully in the upbringing of her child. Neither is
the genetic mother an "ovum donor" in the sense that that role is also controversial,
because she too will function as a social parent. See King, supra note 376, at 341. In
spite of these policy differences, there has been no rush to embrace this form of les-
bian parenting as a logical extension of the widely accepted practice of sperm donor
artificial insemination.
378. Academic critics of surrogacy have tended to be more numerous and outspo-
ken than its supporters. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood (1990) (crit-
icizing surrogacy contracts); Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts-Gestational and
Traditiona" The Argument for Nonenforcement, 31 Washburn L. 1, 6 (1991) (same);
Herbert T. Krimmel, Can Surrogate Parenting Be Stopped? An Inspection of the Con-
stitutional and Pragmatic Aspects of Outlawing Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 27
Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (1992) (opposing the legalization of surrogate mother arrange-
ments); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1849, 1909-11
(1987) (arguing that coercion plays a role in selling "children"). But see John Law-
rence Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis
for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1991) (arguing that the claims of the in-
tended parents outweigh those of the surrogate); Robertson, supra note 376; Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportu-
nity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297 (arguing that technologically assisted
reproductive arrangements should be honored).
379. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 16-401 (1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.590 (Bald-
win 1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2713 (West 1991); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122 (Mc-
Kinney 1994). The various forms of statutory prohibition and regulation of surrogacy
arrangements are discussed in Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 206-07.
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In a small but growing number of states, however, surrogacy ar-
rangements are either explicitly authorized by statute or otherwise le-
gally permitted.380 As in the case of the basic artificial insemination
statutes, the legal sanctioning is crafted for the aid of married couples.
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, while
avoiding an outright endorsement of surrogacy contracts,38' proposes
an optional mechanism for legally validating the arrangements.382 For
those who qualify, the status reward is that "[ulpon birth of a child to
the surrogate, the intended parents are the parents of the child," and
the surrogate has no parental role.383 By definition, however, "in-
tended parents" are limited to "a man and woman, married to each
other, who enter into an agreement ... that they will be the parents of
a child born to a surrogate through assisted conception. ' '3 4 Several
jurisdictions have adopted statutes patterned by and large on the
model act;385 in only one state, Arkansas, does the right to contract
with a surrogate extend to an unmarried man.386
The use of gestational surrogacy has become more widespread since
the influential decision of the California Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Calvert3 87 approving such arrangements even without a surrogacy stat-
ute. Acknowledging that "both genetic consanguinity and giving
birth" are legitimate means of establishing parenthood, the court held
that the parties' agreement as to parental rights should be controlling
"when the two means do not coincide in one woman. ' 388 It is unlikely
that the precedent will be helpful to validate agreements between
380. See Andrews, supra note 371, § 14.04, at 14-19; Hollandsworth, supra note 189,
at 204-05, 209-13.
381. The act contains optional sections to be selected by each adopting jurisdiction,
either permitting surrogacy arrangements under regulated circumstances, or banning
them altogether. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act §§ 5-9 (Alt. A),
§ 5 (Alt. B), 9B U.L.A. 201-08 (West Supp. 1997). The drafting committee's preface
to the act explains that it "remains neutral neither opting for nor against surrogacy."
Id. prefatory note, at 197.
382. The procedure requires judicial approval of the surrogacy agreement following
a "home study" to demonstrate that the intended parents meet the same standard of
fitness as required for adoption. The surrogate mother may unilaterally terminate the
agreement for any reason within 180 days of insemination. Id. §§ 5-9.
383. Id. § 8(a)(1) (emphasis added).
384. Id. § 1(3).
385. See Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 742.15 to .16 (West 1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 126.045 (Michie 1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 168-b:1 to B:32 (1993); Va. Code
Ann. §§ 20-159 to -165 (1994); cf. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (West
1994) (not specifically limited to married couples); see also Hollandsworth, supra note
189, at 204-05 (describing statutory variations).
386. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-10-201 (1993); see Hollandsworth, supra note 189, at 205,
225-28.
387. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); see Robertson, supra note 376, at 923-24 (discussing
the impact of the Calvert decision).
388. Johnson. 851 P.2d at 782.
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would-be lesbian coparents, however, as the court expressly declined
to find that "the child has two mothers. 38 9
Assuming all other obstacles to the use of surrogacy by a gay or
lesbian couple can be overcome, the best that can be hoped for in the
present state of the law is that one partner will have parental status,
and that the outside collaborator's rights will have been effectively
relinquished. Again, the "other" same-sex parent's resort, if any,
must be to the uncertainties of the adoption process.
2. Forming and Ratifying Families by Coparent Adoption
Unknown to the common law, adoption has nevertheless been
firmly established as a statutory means of creating legal parent-child
relationships in the absence of biological connection since the mid-
nineteenth century. 9 Originally enacted more to legitimize existing
informal transfers of children to substitute parents than to form new
relationships. 9' adoption statutes have long been the principal means
whereby childless couples acquire parental roles. Both purposes con-
tinue in modem practice, but supplanted in recent times by the for-
malization of relationships between stepparents and their spouses'
children as the most common form of adoption. 9
Gay and lesbian couples also turn to the adoption laws to form new
parent-child families as well as to ratify existing ones. Sometimes
their circumstances are functionally equivalent to those of marital
partners; but often-especially in the case of children conceived by
new collaborative reproduction techniques-resort to adoption would
be unnecessary for similarly-situated married couples.- 93
Adoption by homosexuals is prohibited by statute in only two
states, Florida394 and New Hampshire. 95 In others, responses to gay
389. Id. at 781 n.8. The court was intent upon identifying which one of the two
women with biological ties to the child was the legal parent, holding only that, "where
a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of another woman
with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the natural mother."
Id. at 782 n.10; see King, supra note 376, at 357-58 (discussing implications of Johnson
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), for lesbian parents).
390. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and Practice, in
Adoption Law and Practice, supra note 371, § 1.02[2], at 1-18 to -24.
391. See id. § 1.02, at 1-20.
392. See id. § 1.05[21[a], at 1-54.
393. See supra notes 371-74, 383-84 and accompanying text.
394. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042(3) (West 1997). The Florida Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the statute in a challenge based on due process and privacy
grounds, but remanded an equal protection challenge for further consideration. Cox
v. Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
395. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 170-B:4,170-F:6 (1994). In an advisory opinion on the
then-pending legislative prohibition, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the
adoption ban (though not a ban on gay foster parenting) on the grounds that the
legislature might rationally conclude that a gay adoptive parent's -role model can
influence the child's developing sexual identity." Opinion of the Justices, 525 A.2d
1095, 1099 (N.H. 1987).
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and lesbian adoption range from overt hostility, to cautious neutrality,
to supportive acceptance-both from judges396 and administrators.397
Even when not formally precluded, approval is highly dependent on
the individualized discretion of social services personnel and judges
who must decide whether a given adoption meets the universal "best
interests of the child" standard.398 As compared to married couples-
who are always given the highest priority for placements-gay people
may find that they have access only to the most difficult-to-place chil-
dren, or that there simply are none available for them to adopt.3 99
Adoption petitions filed jointly by same-sex couples are surprisingly
uncommon. Most statutes provide that "any individual" is eligible to
adopt, but that married couples must petition jointly; typically they
are silent as to other joint adoptions.4° There are reported cases of
successful joint petitions by gay and lesbian parents, 40 1 and there is
396. Compare In re Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) ("It would be anomalous for the state on the one hand to declare
homosexual conduct unlawful and on the other create a parent after that proscribed
model .... "), with In re Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884, 888 (Ohio 1990)
(homosexual activity "must be shown to have a direct or probable adverse impact on
the welfare of the child" if it is to be a basis for denying adoption), and In re Adoption
of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1001 (Sur. Ct. 1992) ("[A] child's best interest is not predi-
cated or controlled by parental sexual orientation.").
397. In New York, for example, administrative regulations prohibit the rejection of
adoption petitions on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation. N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 421.16[h][2] (1996). By contrast, California Governor Pete
Wilson has sought to block gay and lesbian adoptions in that state by administrative
mandate to public and private adoption agencies. See Jane Gross, Gays, Singles Also
Targets of Adoption Rule, L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 1996, at A3. Legislation that would
legalize such adoptions has been opposed by the governor on the grounds that "all
children should be brought up in a home where parents have a long-term commitment
and the sanctity of marriage." Max Vanzi, Panel OKs Bill that Would Let Gay Couples
Adopt, L.A. Times, Apr. 3, 1997, at A3.
398. See Hollinger, supra note 390, §§ 1.01[2][b], 1.03[2]. The Uniform Adoption
Act provides that a "court shall grant a petition for adoption if it determines that the
adoption will be in the best interest of the minor," Unif. Adoption Act § 3-703(a), 9
U.L.A. 59 (West Supp. 1997), and that "the petitioner is a suitable adoptive parent for
the minor," id. § 3-703(a)(6), 9 U.L.A. 60. As to the latter, an evaluation must be
undertaken to ascertain suitability, taking account of a number of specific factors
(none of which could be construed to include sexual orientation), plus "any other fact
or circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether the individual is suited
to be an adoptive parent, including the quality of the environment in the individual's
home." Id. 2-203(d)(10), 9 U.L.A. 21.
399. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption and the Politics of Parent-
ing 70-72 (1993); Chambers, supra note 22, at 469-70; Hollandsworth, supra note 189,
at 197-98.
400. The Uniform Adoption Act, which is typical in this regard, provides that "any
individual may adopt or be adopted by another individual for the purpose of creating
the relationship of parent and child between them," Unif. Adoption Act § 1-102, 9
U.L.A. 7 (West Supp. 1997); and that "[t]he spouse of a petitioner must join in the
petition unless legally separated from the petitioner or judicially declared incompe-
tent," id. § 3-301(b), 9 U.L.A. 43.
401. In a widely-reported 1997 decision, the New Jersey Department of Human
Services entered into a consent decree in a class action suit, agreeing to permit gay
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language in a few appellate court decisions indicating that statutory
silence does not preclude joint adoption.10 2 Nevertheless, same-sex
couples desirous of parenting by adoption are more likely to do so by
the expedient of petitioning in the name of only one partner. Given
the uncertainties and resistance to parenting still faced by gay people,
lawyers often advise their clients not to disclose their sexual orienta-
tion unless specifically asked during the adoption process. 0 3 There
are serious risks in this approach if no steps are taken to protect the
"other" parent's interests. In one reported case, for example, a gay
male couple received a social service case worker's recommendation
for an adoption, but petitioned for court approval in the name of only
one partner. When the child remained with the non-adoptive parent
after the couple split up, the original adoption order was revoked.4"
In three factual contexts, then, gay and lesbian families may need
recourse to the adoption laws to legally ratify the status of one of the
existing de facto parents: (1) in the case of children born by means of
collaborative reproduction; (2) in the case of children legally adopted
by only one of two intended parents; and (3) in the case of children of
former opposite-sex relationships brought into newly-formed lesbian
or gay families. Only in the latter situation are their circumstances
genuinely comparable to those of heterosexual stepparents. In the
other two, they are forced to submit to the uncertainties of adoption
to ratify family relationships that would not have been formed at all
without the coparenting participation of both partners. And in all
three situations, they face a serious statutory obstacle that may pre-
clude all legal redress.
Because the historic purpose of adoption is to create a new legal
family entity, all parental rights and obligations of the child's biologi-
and lesbian couples to jointly adopt children on the same basis as married heterosex-
ual couples. Holden v. N.J. Dep't. of Human Services (NJ. Super. Ct. Bergen County
Dec. 17, 1997); see John J. Goldman, N.J. Settlement OKs Adoptions by Gay Couples,
L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 1997, at Al; John Cloud, A Different Fathers' Day- New Jersey
Couples Can Now Adopt Jointly, Time, Dec. 29, 1997, at 106; Arthur S. Leonard,
Successful Settlement of NJ. Adoption Suit, 1998 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 5.
Nancy Polikoff reports that in 1985 the California Department of Social Services
recommended judicial approval of "the first petition of a lesbian couple to adopt a
child together." Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note 59, at 466 n.19; see also National
Lawyers Guild, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Rights Committee, Sexual Orientation and
the Law § 1.04[2], at 1-81 (Roberta Achtenberg et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Sexual
Orientation & Law] (reporting additional instances of joint adoptions granted to les-
bian and gay couples).
402. See, eg., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993) (i[W]here ...
adoption of a child by two unmarried individuals accomplishes [the] goal [to promote
the best interests of the child], construing the term 'person' as 'persons' clearly en-
hances... the purpose of the statute."); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837,842-43
(D.C. 1995) ("[B]y applying a liberal, inclusionary reading of the statute ... adoption
by an unmarried couple can be in a child's best interests.").
403. See Sexual Orientation & Law, supra note 401, § 1.0412], at 1-83.
404. In re Edward M.G., N.Y. LJ., Oct. 15, 1987, at 17 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.), discussed in
Sexual Orientation & Law, supra note 401, § 1.04[2], at 1.83 n.151.
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cal (or other legally recognized) parents are terminated when they are
displaced by the new adoptive parents.40 5 Needless to say, no parent
is willing to give up her own parental rights to ratify her partner's de
facto parental status, and application of this principle would negate
the use of adoption in any of these situations. For married couples,
the law has a ready exception to the cut-off rule in the form of special
statutory provisions enabling stepparents to adopt their spouses' chil-
dren without altering the spouses' parental rights.4 6 The cumber-
some process of adoption is also streamlined for married stepparents
by waiver of home study requirements and lengthy waiting periods. 40 7
Except in Iceland,4 °s there are no domestic partner laws that pro-
vide comparable "stepparent" privileges to the partners of unmarried
cohabitants. There is a model simulacrum readily at hand, however,
and litigation successes have secured coparental adoption rights with-
out the need for marriage in a number of states. The simulacrum is to
be found in the modified version of the Uniform Adoption Act
promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1994. Although not exactly a model of legislative clarity, section 4-
102(b) of the act provides that "[f]or good cause shown, a court may
allow an individual who ... [is not a spouse], but has the consent of
the custodial parent," to petition for adoption and be "treated as if the
petitioner were a stepparent. '40 9 The drafters' official comment ex-
plains that it is intended to cover "the de facto stepparent or 'second
parent"' scenario in cases involving same-sex couples.410
405. See Hollinger, supra note 390, § 1.01[21[c], at 1-12. The Uniform Adoption
Act, for example, provides that "each adoptive parent and the adoptee have the legal
relationship of parent and child," Unif. Adoption Act § 1-104, 9 U.LA. 8 (West Supp.
1997), and "the legal relationship of parent and child between each of the adoptee's
former parents and the adoptee terminates." Id. § 1-105(1), 9 U.L.A. 8.
406. See Lawrence P. Hampton, The Aftermath of Adoption: The Economic Conse-
quences-Support, Inheritances and Taxes, in Adoption Law and Practice, supra note
371, § 12.03[1][a][iii]. The structure of the Uniform Adoption Act is typical in this
regard: "A stepparent has standing ... to adopt a minor stepchild who is the child of
the stepparent's spouse," Unif. Adoption Act § 4-102(a), 9 U.L.A. 67 (West Supp.
1997). if the spouse has either joint or sole legal custody of the child, and the child has
"resided primarily with the spouse and the stepparent" for a specified period of time.
Id. § 4-102(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. 67. "An adoption by a stepparent does not affect ... the
relationship between the adoptee and the adoptee's parent who is the adoptive step-
parent's spouse or deceased spouse." Id. § 4-103(b)(1), 9 U.L.A. 68.
407. See Hollinger, supra note 390, § 1.05[2][a], at 1-54.
408. See supra note 285.
409. Unif. Adoption Act § 4-102(b), 9 U.L.A. 67 (West Supp. 1997).
410. See id. § 4.102 cmt. 9 U.L.A. 67. The comment cites with approval court deci-
sions in Vermont and New York approving coparent (or "second parent") adoptions
by the same-sex partners of lesbian parents. See also Susan Chira, Law Proposed to
End Adoption Horror Stories, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1994, at A12 (quoting Joan
Heifetz Hollinger, the act's principal drafter, as saying that the Uniform Adoption
Act would make it easier for gay couples to adopt their partner's children).
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To date, the new model act has been adopted in only one state,
Vermont,411 which had previously approved same-sex coparent adop-
tions by decision of the state's supreme court.412 Indeed, one of the
most remarkable success stories in the quest for a body of gay-friendly
family law has been the judicial decisions authorizing such adoptions.
Since Vermont became the first state to do so in 1993, either the high-
est court or an intermediate appellate court in seven jurisdictions has
approved second-parent adoptions by the same-sex partners of biolog-
ical or adoptive parents.413 Statutory obstacles have been overcome
either by ignoring them in the name of public policy, 414 by reconceptu-
alizing petitions as applications for joint adoption by unmarried
couples,41 5 or by creative statutory construction whereby coparent
adoption is deemed functionally equivalent to stepparent adoption.16
By similar rationales, lower court judges in many other jurisdictions
have reached the same conclusions. 17
411. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A, §§ 1-101 to 7-105 (Supp. 1997); see Mark Hansen, Ver-
mont Enacts Model Adoption Act, 82 A.B.A. J. 36 (Sept. 1996).
412. Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
413. The jurisdictions are Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachu-
setts, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. All of the decisions are discussed in
Christensen, supra note 2, at 1406-14.
414. See, e.g., Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.LV.B., 628 A.2d at 1275 ("To deny the
children of same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized relation-
ship with their second parent serves no legitimate state interest."); In re Adoption of
Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Sur. Ct. 1992) (relying upon the court's inherent "equi-
table power" to waive a statutory cut-off to avoid "an absurd outcome which would
nullify the advantage sought by the proposed adoption"); In re Adoption of Minor
(T.), 17 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 1523 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1991) (stating that statu-
tory termination is "merely directory" and subject to waiver in order to avoid a "par-
ticularly counterproductive and even ludicrous result."
415. See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (holding that
a termination provision is "intended to apply only when the natural parents (or par-
ent) are not parties to the adoption petition"); In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837,
843 (D.C. 1995) ("The result should be the same whether members of an unmarried
couple living together in a committed personal relationship seek to adopt sequentially
or simultaneously."); In re K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995)
(liberally construing the statute to permit "an adoption brought by two unmarried
individuals" of the same sex, "including a parent of the child to be adopted" (quoting
In re E.S., 1994 WL 157949, at *6 (Ill. Cir.))).
416. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,405 (N.Y. 1995) (observing that the statu-
tory cut-off was "designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families, [and] was
never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by
second parents"); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.Rt, 666 A2d 535, 539 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (finding no evidence "that the legislature ever meant to
terminate the parental rights of a biological parent who intended to continue raising a
child with the help of a partner"); In re Adoption of Baby Z, 699 A.2d 1065, 1072
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that coparent adoption is "most analogous to a step-
parent adoption and, with liberal construction [of applicable statute], the biological
rights of the mother... need not be terminated").
417. See, e.g., Adoption of a Minor Child, No. 1JU-86-73 PIA (Alaska Super. Ct. 1st
Jud. Dist. Feb. 6, 1987); In re Adoption of N.L.D., No. 18086 (Cal. Super. Ct. San
Francisco County Sep. 4, 1987); In re Adoption of Hentgen-Moore, No. 91CO1-9405-
AD-009 (Ind. Cir. Ct. White County Mar. 24, 1995); In re Adoption of M.M.S.A., No.
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Impressive though these results have been, coparent adoption is still
foreclosed to same-sex partners in far more places than it is avail-
able.418 Even when theoretically accessible, petitioners face demand-
ing home studies and a lengthy approval process with no assurance of
ultimate success.41 9 And there is no counterpart to the expedited
adoption process420 or automatic parental status in cases of artificial
insemination 42' that smooths the way for married couples. Although
a marriage simulacrum of sorts may be available to some lesbian and
gay parents, it is, at best, decidedly non-nurturing and second-class.
B. Extinguishing Rights: The Limits of Family Autonomy
and Privacy
No attributes of the traditional nuclear family are more firmly en-
trenched or fiercely defended than the twin pillars of family privacy
and the autonomy to resist those who would encroach upon it.422
From the times of Coke and Blackstone, the common law has re-
flected that families, "having formed the first society, among them-
selves, ' ' 4 23 are entitled to autonomously govern their own affairs as a
matter of "lex naturae" and "the course of nature. '424 Although long
since understood to be neither absolute425 nor as much a unitary right
D8503-61930 (Or. Cir. Ct. Multnomah County Sep. 4, 1985); In re Adoptions of
E.O.G. & A.S.G., 14 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 125, Nos. 7518, 7519 (Pa. Ct. C.P. York County
Dec. 22, 1993); In re of E.B.G., No. 87-5-00137-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Thurston County
Mar. 29, 1989).
418. In about three-quarters of the states, there are no reported cases of same-sex
coparental adoptions being approved; and in some states appellate courts have held
that such adoptions are not permitted by state law. See In re Angel Lace M., 516
N.W.2d 678, 686 (Wis. 1994) (coparent adoption would result in termination of legal
adoptive parent's rights); In re Adoption of T.K.J. & K.A.K., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996) (adoption statute forecloses coparent adoption).
419. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 469-70; see also Burke, supra note 190, at 116-
32, 204-19 (describing a lesbian couple's efforts to demonstrate the "normality" of
their family life to a social worker as they become more radicalized in frustration at
the obstacles they encounter to co-parent adoption).
420. See supra note 407 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 371-74 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
423. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *47.
424. 1 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 11-12 (Charles Butler ed.,
1st American ed., Philadelphia 1853) (1628). The influence of Coke and Blackstone
in the common law "family integrity right" is explored in Joan C. Bohi, The "Unprece-
dented Intrusion": A Survey and Analysis of Selected Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49
Okla. L. Rev. 29, 36-41 (1996).
425. As early as 1852, for example, the leading treatise on domestic relations recog-
nized that "children are not born for the benefit of the parents alone, but for the
country; and ... the interest of the public in their morals and education should be
protected." Joel Prentiss Bishop, Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce
and Evidence in Matrimonial Suits 517-18 (1852). The erosion of family autonomy
and the rise of state regulation in nineteenth and twentieth century America is dis-
cussed in Teitelbaum, supra note 80, at 1147-63.
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as a group of individual rights of separate family members,426 the legal
vitality of the autonomy principle persists. It animates both family
law and much of the constitutional law of privacy, both in support of
companionate cohabitation4 27 and for the nurturing of children.4 "s
It is when the parent-child family becomes disjointed from the cou-
pled family-as so often happens in modern family life-that the most
serious tensions arise in claims based on parental autonomy. No-
where is that more true than in the case of two recurring dilemmas in
gay and lesbian family life. The first, involving coparent rights when
relationships come to an end, entails the application of the autonomy
principle with sometimes perverse results. The second, in which
sperm donors assert parental rights, often turns on traditional notions
of autonomy that simply do not address the real clash of interests at
stake.
1. The Functional Parent's Role at the End of a Relationship
The dissolution of a family with minor children is seldom a propi-
tious time for sorting out parental rights. When only one parent pos-
sesses any legally-acknowledged rights in relation to a child, it is a
recipe for even more than the usual measure of shattered expecta-
tions. Except in the atypical case of successful joint or second-parent
adoption, the nonbiological parent in a lesbian or gay family (or non-
adoptive parent, as the case may be) is unlikely to have any legal
claim for continued access to the child when the couple's relationship
has ended. The legal tradition of parental autonomy dictates that not
even visitation, much less a share in custody, should be awarded over
the opposition of the legal parent. Even the existence of an express
coparenting agreement-that two women will participate in artificially
inseminating one of them, and thereafter in supporting and raising the
child, each as equal coparents-usually has not been enough to limit
the biological mother's right to change her mind and eliminate all con-
tact between her estranged partner and the child she helped create.
426. Jana Singer contends that it was not until the Supreme Court's constitutional
privacy decisions of the 1970s involving marriage and parenting that family autonomy
was seen as extending from internal family governance to individual choices regarding
the formation and dissolution of families. Singer, supra note 198, at 1508-13. In ear-
lier times, she notes, family autonomy often was simply an instrument of patriarchal
domination. Id. at 1509; see also Teitelbaum, supra note 80, at 1174-80.
427. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (home privacy; pornography); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (marriage as a fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (right of privacy; birth control).
428. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (unmarried father rights);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (parental rights; mandatory school attend-
ance); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unmarried father parental rights);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (parental authority; private vs. public
schools).
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Typical is the decision of the California Court of Appeal in Nancy S.
v. Michele G.429 The court acknowledged "the intent of the natural
mother to create a parental relationship between [her partner] and
her children," and that failing to give effect to that intent "has resulted
in a tragic situation."43 Nevertheless, the court worried about the au-
tonomy of other parents if it expanded the definition of "parent"43 ' to
encompass the woman who had functioned as a second mother since
the child was born. To do so, the court reasoned, would make paren-
tal rights "turn on elusive factual determinations" and "could expose
other natural parents to litigation brought by child-care providers of
long standing, relatives, successive sets of stepparents or other close
friends of the family." '432
Similarly, in Alison D. v. Virginia M.,4 33 the New York Court of
Appeals rejected the visitation petition of a lesbian who had func-
tioned in all respects as coparent of the child born to her partner by
artificial insemination.434 Conceding that the petitioner had an "un-
derstandable.., expectation and desire that her contact with the child
would continue," the court nevertheless concluded that granting
standing to seek visitation to a "biological stranger" to the child would
inappropriately "limit or diminish the right of the concededly fit bio-
logical parent to choose with whom her child associates." '435
429. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
430. Id. at 219. After entering into a private "marriage" ceremony, the couple had
two children, both born to the same biological mother by means of artificial insemina-
tion. When the couple separated, they entered into a written separation agreement
providing that their son would live with his biological mother and that their daughter
would live with her de facto coparent. The court declined to enforce their agreement
when a dispute arose a few years later. Id. at 214.
431. The petitioning non-biological mother sought to be deemed a "parent" so as to
avoid the autonomy-inspired statutory requirement that "[b]efore the court makes
any order awarding custody to a person.., other than a parent, without the consent
of the parents, it shall make a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child." Id. at 214-15 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4600(c) (repealed
1992)).
432. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219; see also Sporleder v. Hermes (In re Z.J.H.),
471 N.W.2d 202, 208-09 (Wis. 1991) (expressing concern that "a child could have
multiple 'parents,' and could find himself or herself subject to multiple custody and
visitation arrangements" if de facto parenthood were to be recognized).
433. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
434. Id. at 28.
Together, [the lesbian partners] planned for the conception and birth of the
child and agreed to share jointly all rights and responsibilities of child-rear-
ing .... Petitioner shared in all birthing expenses and, after [the child's]
birth, continued to provide for his support. During [his] first two years, peti-
tioner and respondent jointly cared for and made decisions regarding the
child.
Id.
435. Id. at 28-29; see also Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a settlement agreement providing for shared custody was not enforcea-
ble because only the child's "natural mother" has standing to assert custody or visita-
tion rights); West v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160 (Ct. App. 1997) (reaffirming
the Curiale holding that a lesbian coparent lacks standing to seek custody or visita-
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Until relatively recent times, marriage would have made no differ-
ence to a functional parent's rights of access to a former spouse's chil-
dren; the autonomy principle would have precluded any claim to
custody or visitation over the legal parent's objection.436 Since the
1970s, however, more than a third of the states have adopted statutes
permitting stepparent visitation, either explicitly4 37 or by broad open-
ended grants of discretionary authority.43 The same result has been
achieved in still other states by judicial decision even in the absence of
clear statutory authorization.439 Custody, while more problematic for
stepparents, is authorized by statute in more than half the states.' A
statutory preference for biological parents usually limits stepparent
awards of either joint or exclusive custody to cases of parental consent
tion); Liston v. Pyles, 1997 WL 467327 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding that a
non-biological lesbian coparent was not entitled to visitation rights); Titchenal v. Dex-
ter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997) (following the general common law rule that parents have
the right to custody and control of their minor children free from governmental
interference).
436. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies and the Law 129-30 (1994); Frances
E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 835,
850-53 (1985).
437. See, eg., Cal. Fam. Code § 3101(a) (West 1994) ("IT]he court [in a marriage
dissolution proceeding] may grant reasonable visitation to a stepparent, if visitation
by the stepparent is determined to be in the best interest of the minor child."): Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 60-1616 (1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-303 (1996); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.245 (West 1993).
438. See, eg., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.240 (West 1997) ("'The court may or-
der visitation between the petitioner ... and the child between whom a significant
relationship exists upon a finding supported by the evidence that the visitation is in
the child's best interests."); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-59 (Vest 1995); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 571-46(7) (1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.051(B) (Anderson 1997) ("per-
son [who] has an interest in the welfare of the child"). For additional citations and
discussion of the various statutory forms, see Mahoney, supra note 436, at 130-31;
David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning From Social Sciences: A Model for Refor-
mation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 Dick. L. Rev. 49, 54 (1992).
439. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App.
1990) (relying upon the court's "inherent power... to promote best interests of a
child"); Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
common law authority to order visitation predates statute); Hickenbottom v. Hicken-
bottom, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Neb. 1991) (rejecting mother's objection to stepfather visi-
tation because "the wife [was] more interested in punishing the husband by denying
him access to her daughter than she [was] in doing what serves the girl's best inter-
ests"); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66-68 (Utah 1978) (holding that stepparent in
loco parentis relationship does not end with divorce from legal parent); see also Ma-
honey, supra note 436, at 131-37; Wendi Swinson Slechter, Note, The Visitation Rights
of Former Stepparents or the Visitation Rights of Former Stepchildren: Which is it Re-
ally?, 32 J. Fain. L. 901, 902-03 (1993-94) (stating that, unlike the traditional common
law rule, courts now afford former stepparents visitation rights in appropriate cases).
440. See e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993) ("A court may award
custody or visitation to any party with a legitimate interest therein, including...
stepparents [and] former stepparents."); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46B-57 (West 1986)
(granting jurisdiction in divorce proceedings to grant custody of "any minor child of
either or both parties"); see also Richard S. Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-
Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation, and Support, 25 Fam. LQ. 19, 20 (1991)
(citing and summarizing state statutory provisions).
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or demonstrated unfitness.441 However, there are numerous reported
cases in which stepparent custody has been held appropriate, even
over parental opposition, upon a mere balancing of equities in the
"best interests" of the affected children.442
Nancy Polikoff, one of the leading advocates of lesbian and gay pa-
rental interests, has proposed that the visitation and custody disputes
of same-sex couples be resolved by changing the way legal parenthood
is defined. She would expand the definition to include "anyone who
maintains a functional parental relationship with a child when a le-
gally recognized parent created that relationship with the intent that
the relationship be parental in nature." 3 Polikoff and other advo-
cates have been highly sensitive to the autonomy concerns of biologi-
cal and adoptive parents, emphasizing that they must actually have
intended that their partners' relationships with their children be not
merely close and psychologically bonding, but of a parental nature.444
While there are no jurisdictions that have adopted Polikoff's formu-
lation, some have come close to doing so. Oregon, for example, per-
mits anyone who has "established emotional ties creating a child-
parent relationship with a child" to seek either custody or visitation.445
Borrowing from the famous concept of "psychological parenthood"
developed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit,446 the
441. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 3040(a) (West 1994) (listing the order of preference
for custody: (1) to "both parents jointly" or "either parent"; (2) to "the person or
persons in whose home the child has been living"; and (3) to "any other person or
persons deemed by the court to be suitable"); see also Mahoney, supra note 436, at
137-47 (discussing the evidence necessary to overcome the parental preference in var-
ious jurisdictions); Jennifer Klein Mangnall, Note, Stepparent Custody Rights After
Divorce, 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 399 (1997) (arguing that custodial rights should be based
on the best interests of the child, not on biological connections, thereby giving step-
parents a greater opportunity to demonstrate their fitness as custodians).
442. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(finding a stepfather eligible for custody as an "equitable parent" if he "and the child
mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or if the mother of the child
has cooperated in the development of such a relationship"); Stanley D. v. Deborah
D., 467 A.2d 249 (N.H. 1983) (awarding joint legal custody to a mother and a stepfa-
ther based on the best interests of the child); In re Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 22-
23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding custody to stepmother over father's objection in
interests of deaf child's "future development").
Statutes in a few jurisdictions base custody awards exclusively on the child's best
interests, with no parental preference. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-57 (West
1995); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 571-46(2) (1993). But see In re Doe, 784 P.2d. 873, 879
(Haw. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that statutory best interests standard remains sub-
ject to a "priority in favor of the child's parents").
443. Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note 59, at 464.
444. See id. at 573; Paula L. Ettelbrick, supra note 368, at 548; Elizabeth A. Dela-
ney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing the Rela-
tionship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 Hastings L.J.
177, 212 (1991).
445. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.119 (1989).
446. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's highly-regarded work on child placement con-
tends that "continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are
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Oregon statute defines a "parent-child relationship" as one involving
day-to-day "interaction, companionship, interplay and mutuality, that
fulfill[s] the child's psychological needs for a parent as well as the
child's physical needs."" 7
A similar Minnesota statute"8 was not enough in Kulla v. Mc-
Nulty44 9 to provide visitation for a woman who had developed paren-
tal bonds with her partner's biological daughter during a three-year
lesbian relationship. The petitioner contended that the child's mother
had been given "virtual veto power" by the acceptance of her objec-
tion that visitation would interfere with her own parent-child relation-
ship.450 The court agreed that the petitioner's burden was a "heavy
one," but concluded that the statute was intended to permit non-par-
ent visitation only in extraordinary circumstances."'
In the last few years, there have been important victories for lesbian
functional coparents, but only in a very few jurisdictions. In Holtzman
v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.),452 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that a lesbian coparent might be awarded visitation if a
"biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the peti-
tioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with
the child."45 3 And in J.A.L. v. E.P.H.,454 a Pennsylvania court found
that a functional coparent had standing to seek partial custody and
essential for a child's normal development," and that children whose placement is
contested should be "placed with adults who are or are likely to become their psycho-
logical parents." Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 31-32
(1979). Such a parent is defined as someone "who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psy-
chological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." Id. at 98.
447. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 109.119(4) (1989). Polikoff objects that the Oregon stat-
ute goes too far in limiting parental autonomy because it "does not require any show-
ing of the biological parent's intent to create a parental relationship in the other
person." Polikoff, Two Mothers, supra note 59, at 488. For similar reasons, she has
also resisted the Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit "psychological parent" approach as one
that would "increase the likelihood that a lesbian mother will lose custody of her
children." Nancy D. Polikoff, Lesbians Choosing Children: The Personal Is Political
Revisited, in Politics of the Heart 48 (Sandra Pollack & Jeanne Vaugn eds., 1987).
448. The statute permitted visitation by a non-parent with whom a child has resided
for two years or more if: "(1) visitation rights would be in the best interests of the
child; (2) the petitioner and child had established emotional ties creating a parent and
child relationship; and (3) visitation rights would not interfere with the relationship
between the custodial parent and the child." Minn. Stat. § 257.022(2b) (1992).
449. 472 N.W.2d 175 (Minn Ct. App. 1991).
450. Il at 181.
451. Id at 181-82; see also Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (interpreting a third-party visitation statute for the benefit of grandpar-
ents and great-grandparents as conferring "no inherent authority to award visitation"
to a lesbian coparent).
452. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
453. Id at 421. Three criteria were specified for such relationships: the sharing of a
household; the assumption of parental obligations; and the establishment of a
"bonded, dependent [parental] relationship." Id.
454. 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
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visitation based on the doctrine of in loco parentis and the child's best
interests.455 In the vast majority of jurisdictions, however, a lesbian or
gay man still has no claim of access to a partner's child, no matter the
parent-child relationship that may have developed between them.
Not surprisingly, defenders of parental autonomy have resisted the
expansion of visitation and custody rules as well as other encroach-
ments on parents' decisionmaking authority.456 Joan Bohl, one of the
most forceful critics of open-ended visitation statutes, has argued that
the "family integrity right" properly belongs only to familial groups
that are "brought together by private commitments rather than by op-
eration of law" and with "the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association. '457 These limitations appear emi-
nently reasonable, especially as applied to the widespread phenome-
non of grandparent visitation, to which most of Bohl's concerns are
addressed.458 But it is perverse that a woman who complies fully with
these criteria, who was an indispensable participant in the decision to
bring a child into a family, and who has functioned as an equal
coparent in the child's support and rearing, would be excluded from
continuing access to the child in the name of "family autonomy." And
this while the law in most jurisdictions protects the far more remote
interests of grandparents, and often of stepparents with much less ex-
tensive parental involvement.
455. Id. at 1319-20; see also Fowler v. Jones, 949 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997) (concluding that same-sex partner had standing to seek visitation of partner's
child based on "care, control, and possession of the child"); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660
(N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a lesbian coparenting contract is enforceable to
the extent it is in best interests of the child).
456. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 424 (surveying grandfather visitation statutes); J.
Bohl, "Those Privileges Long Recognized": Termination of Parental Rights Law, the
Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 Cardozo Women's
L.J. 323 (1994) (reviewing determinations of parental unfitness); William J. Goode,
State Intervention and the Family: Problems of Policy, 1976 BYU L. Rev. 715 (discuss-
ing the general undermining of parental authority); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liber-
ation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to
Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. Rev. 605 (examining concepts of custody, children's
rights, and parental consent).
457. Bohl, supra note 424, at 40 (quoting in part Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)). Bohl also says that biologi-
cal relationships should link at least some members of the family group, id., although,
presumably, she would not eliminate couples with adopted children.
458. See id. at 29-36, 47-53; J.C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent Visitation
Statutes as Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State
Power, 3 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 271 (1993). Since the first grandparent visita-
tion statute was adopted in New York in 1966, two-thirds of the states have done the
same. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Chil-
dren to Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Md. L. Rev. 358, 387-
88 (1994) (providing history and statutory citations).
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2. Sperm Donors as Intruders from Outside the Family
The rights of sperm donors vis-,-vis artificially-inseminated lesbian
mothers and their partners is one of the most divisive family law
problems facing the gay and lesbian community. The problem, de-
pending on the critic's point of view, is either: one, that lesbian
mothers are inadequately protected against parental claims by donors
who change their minds about the limited roles they have agreed to
play in their genetic children's lives;45 9 or, tivo, that the interests of
male participants in the collaborative parenting process are not ade-
quately protected when they become involved in their offspring's lives
with the support and encouragement of the children's mothers.' 6°
Historic notions of parental autonomy-even augmented by modem
statutes-are seldom adequate to address the real clash of interests at
stake.
The concept of a father possessing parental rights independent of a
marriage-centered nuclear family was not generally understood to be
part of the common law autonomy tradition.46' Thus, when artificial
insemination with donated sperm became a widely-used form of col-
laborative reproduction, there were no easy models at hand to sort
out the respective parental interests. There are reported cases in
which artificial insemination within a marriage was held to be adulter-
ous,462 in which a child so conceived was deemed ilegitimate,4 63 and
in which a donor was held "no more responsible for the use made of
459. See, eg., King, supra note 376, at 343-55 (discussing litigation between lesbian
mothers and sperm donors); Nancy D. Polikoff, The Social Constnction of
Parenthood in One Planned Lesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 203
(1996) (discussing a paternity petition filed by the sperm donor to a lesbian mother);
O'Rourke, supra note 368, at 144-47 (reviewing the status of state laws regarding
donor insemination).
460. See, eg., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Beyond Lesbian and Gay "Families We
Choose," in Sex, Preference, and Family, supra note 47, at 277, 284-85 (arguing for the
parental rights of biological fathers); Bernstein, supra note 363, at 4 (exploring the
legal status "of a biological progenitor who has a limited involvement in his child's
life"); Brad Sears, Recent Development, Winning Arguments/Losing Themselves:
The (Dys)functional Approach in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev.
559 (1994) (exploring "how one family's struggle to define itself triggered a struggle
within the lesbian and gay community over how to redefine the family").
461. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. Rev. 637, 645 (1993) ("The father-child relationship, outside the larger con-
text of the family as a social institution, has been accorded little significance during
the last few hundred years.").
462. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct. Cook County, Ill., Dec.
13, 1954) (holding that insemination by a donor not married to the mother was con-
trary to public policy and should be considered adultery), appeal dismissed, 139
N.E.2d 844 (111. App. Ct. 1956).
463. Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that a child con-
ceived by donor sperm was illegitimate, but that mother's consenting husband was
financially responsible).
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his sperm than is the donor of blood or a kidney."4" In still another
case, however, a donor of sperm to an unmarried woman was held to
be the legal father of the child thereby conceived, and thus eligible for
visitation.465
Because such uncertainty about the participants' parental status
threatened to undermine the viability of artificial insemination, most
states adopted statutes foreclosing parental claims by sperm donors.466
The assumption, however, was that donor insemination was intended
only as a technique to be utilized by the wives of sterile men, and the
vast majority of statutes extended protection only to married
women.
467
Further compounding the vulnerability of lesbians and other un-
married women was the Supreme Court's newfound solicitude for the
parental autonomy of unmarried fathers, beginning with its 1972 deci-
sion in Stanley v. Illinois.468 If the Court's holding in Stanley-that
"[t]he private interest ... of a man in the children he has sired and
raised ... warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection"n69-did not fully spell out the extent of the pater-
nal due process right, a subsequent series of decisions did much to
clarify its scope. 47° It was to become apparent that the pattern of dis-
464. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 498 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a husband who
agreed to the artificial insemination of his wife was the legal father of the child).
465. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824-25 (N.J. Super. 1977) (holding that where a
woman was inseminated with her boyfriend's semen to avoid sexual intercourse
before marriage, the donor's parental rights were preserved because "he fully in-
tended to assume the responsibilities of parenthood").
466. See Sexual Orientation & Law, supra note 401, at § 1.04[1][c] (comprehensive
review of state legislation based on Uniform Parentage Act and other models).
467. Section 5(b) of the Uniform Parentage Act provides that "[t]he donor of se-
men provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived." Unif. Parentage Act § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 301
(1987). By contrast, section 4 of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Concep-
tion Act ("USCACA") provides without qualification that "[a] donor is not a parent
of a child conceived through assisted conception." Unif. Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act § 4, 9B U.L.A. 200 (West Supp. 1997). Thirty states have
adopted statutes patterned on the Uniform Parentage Act (half of them, however,
dispensing with the requirement of physician assistance); only one has adopted the
USCACA provision. See Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4
cmt., 9B U.L.A. 2001-01 (West Supp. 1997). Nine other states have extended protec-
tion against donor claims to unmarried women. See Sexual Orientation & Law, supra
note 401, § 1.04[1][d] at 1-79 n.140; O'Rourke, supra note 368, at 145-47 (discussing
variations in state statutory patterns).
468. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
469. Id. at 651. Stanley had lived intermittently with his three children and their
mother for eighteen years before her death. Because they had never married, how-
ever, he was presumed by state law to be an unfit parent. Id. at 646-47.
470. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (finding no due process right for a
father who had not "established a substantial relationship with his daughter"); Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (holding that an unmarried father who main-
tained a household with the mother and child for several years has a protected "rela-
tionship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother"); Quilloin v.
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interested anonymous sperm donation utilized by most married wo-
men was not vulnerable to donor claims. As Justice Stevens carefully
elaborated in Lehr v. Robertson,471 "[p]arental rights do not spring
full-blown from the biological connection between parent and
child."472 "The significance of the biological connection," he ex-
plained, "is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no
other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring"; but
his interest is protected only if "he grasps that opportunity and accepts
some measure of responsibility for the child's future.
' 473
The great fear of lesbian parents inseminated with sperm from
known donors (which is a common choice474) is of genetic fathers who
do decide to "grasp the opportunity" to assert paternal rights, despite
agreements that they will not do so. Mindful of the unwed father
cases, courts in a number of states have strictly construed artificial
insemination statutes to facilitate donor paternity claims against un-
married sperm recipients. In C.O. v. W.S.,475 for example, an Ohio
court held that it would be a "complete circumvention" of a statute
intended to "provide anonymity and protection to both the donor and
the mother" to permit its use "where an unmarried woman solicits the
participation of the donor, who was known to her. '476 The mother
conceded that she and her lesbian partner had agreed to the gay do-
nor serving as a "male role model" for the child, and the court con-
cluded that in the absence of "the critical element of anonymity," it
would be "contrary to due process safeguards" to hold that the statute
"extinguishes a father's efforts to assert the rights and responsibilities
of being a father., 477
Even statutes purporting to protect unmarried women have given
way to donor claims of paternal right. The California Court of Appeal
ruled in Jhordan C. v. Mary K.471 that a donor who had been "permit-
ted to develop a social relationship... as the child's father" was not
precluded from asserting a visitation claim, the lesbian mother having
failed to involve a physician in the insemination process as technically
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (holding that an unwed father who visited the child
only occasionally and provided irregular support was not entitled to veto the subse-
quent adoption by the stepfather, because such protection extends only to fathers who
"shoulder[ ] ... significant responsibility" for the child).
471. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
472. Id at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting)).
473. Id. at 262.
474. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
475. 639 N.E.2d 523 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1994).
476. Id. at 524-25.
477. Id at 525.
478. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). California had enacted § 5(b) of the Uni-
form Parentage Act, see supra note 467, but omitted the limitation that only a "mar-
ried woman" is protected from a donor's paternity claims. Cal. Civ. Code § 7005(b)
(repealed 1994).
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required by the statute that would have cut off his parental rights. 47 9
And in McIntyre v. Crouch,480 the Oregon Court of Appeal held that
it would violate due process to extinguish a donor's parental rights
after he "gave his semen... in reliance on an agreement ... that he
'would remain active' in the child's life."'481
Serious tensions between donors and lesbian parents are most likely
to arise when unanticipated parental attachments develop in the
course of contact with a child that had been planned as only limited.
The paradigmatic case is Thomas S. v. Robin y,482 a controversial set
of decisions involving just such a dispute. Robin and her lesbian part-
ner, Sandra, had each given birth to a child conceived with the aid of a
different gay male sperm donor. The couple's advance oral agreement
with Thomas was that they would raise the child as coparents and that
he would have no parental rights or obligations, but that he would
make himself known to the child if she inquired about her biological
origins.48 3 When the couple's two daughters were old enough to begin
asking about the "men who helped make them," Robin and Sandra
decided to establish contact between the children and their biological
fathers.4" Over the course of the next six years, Thomas visited sev-
eral times a year with his daughter, Ry, and her family, developing a
"warm and amicable relationship" in which Ry "express[ed] her love
for him" and called him "Dad. '485 When Thomas sought more exten-
sive involvement with his daughter, separate from the rest of her fam-
ily, Robin and Sandra resisted and eventually cut off all contact
between Ry and her biological father.486
Thomas' petition for an order of filiation and visitation was rebuffed
in a remarkable decision by New York Family Court Judge Edward
Kaufmann which stands as the high watermark of judicial deference to
lesbian coparental autonomy. Finding common law principles inade-
quate to "decide paternity proceedings for families whose reality is
more complex than a one mother, one father biological model," Judge
Kaufmann turned instead to what he saw as the dispute's most com-
pelling equitable considerations.4s  Although Ry "understands the
479. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534-36.
480. 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
481. Id. at 241. One of the few victories for a lesbian mother in cases such as these
also came in Oregon. In Leckie v. Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521 (Or. Ct. App. 1994), a donor
was unsuccessful in establishing paternity and visitation privileges because he had en-
tered into a written agreement with the sperm recipient and her lesbian partner fully
relinquishing all of his parental rights.
482. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
483. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (Fam. Ct. 1993) [hereinafter
Thomas S.-1].
484. Id. at 378-79.
485. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (App. Div. 1994) [hereinafter
Thomas S.-I1].
486. Id. at 358.
487. Thomas S.-I, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 382.
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underlying biological relationships" in her family, the judge observed,
"[t]he reality of her life is having two mothers ... working together to
raise her and her sister."'  "To Ry," he said, Thomas "is an outsider
attacking her family." 4 9 Invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
Judge Kaufmann faulted Thomas for having waited too long before
attempting to exercise his parental rights, and he ruled that it would
not be in Ry's best interest to grant paternity and visitation to some-
one who is no more than "an important man in her family's life." 49°
Reflecting the great divide in the gay community regarding the
clash of interests in the case, Judge Kaufmann's decision was both
praised and reviled.491 To activist Paula Ettelbrick, it was an "af-
firming victory for lesbian and gay families" because of its adherence
to "the original agreements made among the parties to the creation of
their family."4" To lesbian lawyer Tanya Neiman, on the other hand,
the decision represented a "failure to realize that a donor, once made
a part of a family, cannot simply 'turn off' the love and deep devotion
that comes xvith truly loving your child. '4 93
To the Appellate Division court that overturned Judge Kaufmann's
ruling, the issue was far more prosaic. "Having found that petitioner
is the father of Ry," the court reasoned, "Family Court was com-
manded by statutory direction to enter an order of filiation";4  "there
is no room for judicial interpretation."4 95 Although "the respective
rights of a gay life partner vis-A-vis a biological parent presents a
timely issue," the court observed, "[t]he notion that a lesbian mother
should enjoy a parental relationship wvith her daughter but a gay fa-
ther should not is so innately discriminatory as to be unworthy of
comment."496 In any event, the court concluded (wvith due citation to
the unwed father due process precedent), "[t]he asserted sanctity of
the [lesbian couple's] family unit is an uncompelling ground for the
drastic step of depriving petitioner" of his paternal rights."9
Paula Ettelbrick contends that it would not have altered the out-
come of the case if Robin and Sandra had been legally married,4 98 and
488. Id. at 380.
489. Id. at 382.
490. Id. at 380-82.
491. See, e.g., Letters to the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, Lesbian/Gay L Notes, May
1993, Summer 1993, Feb. 1995, Apr. 1995.
492. Paula Ettelbrick, Letters to the Lesbian/Gay Law Notes, Lesbian/Gay L Notes,
June 1993, at 1; see also Polikoff, supra note 459, at 203-05.
493. Tanya Neiman, Letters to die LesbianGay Law Notes, Lesbian/Gay L Notes,
June 1993, at 1; see also Sears, supra note 460, at 565-66.
494. Thomas S.-II, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358-59 (App. Div. 1994).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 361.
497. Id. at 359 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)).
498. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 161-62. "The absence of a marital
relationship was irrelevant to the events in Thomas," Ettelbrick claims; and she also
asks rhetorically: "If Robin and Sandra married, how would Thomas' relationship
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she is probably correct in her surmise. But the existence of a family
united by marriage ought to make a difference when an outsider, even
a child's father, seeks to intrude-that is, if the most recent Supreme
Court decision on the subject is to be believed. The one interest that
trumps an unwed father's paternal claim, according to the holding in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,'99 is that of an intact marriage-centered nu-
clear family. There the Court upheld a state court decision denying
visitation rights to the biological father of a child conceived while the
mother was married to another man. Even a developed relationship
between father and child was not enough to withstand what the lower
court described as "the state's interest in preserving the integrity of
the matrimonial family. ' ' "°
Justice Scalia, writing for a Supreme Court plurality of four, said
that the Court's earlier unwed father cases did not stand for the prop-
osition that "biological fatherhood plus an established parental rela-
tionship" without more were enough to invoke due process
protection. °' The real rationale of those cases, he insisted, rested
"upon the historic respect-indeed sanctity would not be too strong a
term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within
the unitary family." 5" Since state law, "like nature itself, makes no
provision for dual fatherhood,"5 °3 he reasoned, it was appropriate not
to "award substantive rights to the natural father of a child conceived
within, and born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace
the child."5"
But would the same rules apply to children born into dual-mother
marital unions? No one could seriously suppose that Justice Scalia-
whose crabbed insistence on measuring which traditions are worthy of
due process protection by reference to "the most specific level [of gen-
erality] at which a relevant tradition... can be identified" 5" 5-would
with Ry be defined?... Would Robin, Sandra and Thomas have to marry one an-
other in order to clarify the legal roles of the three adults to the child?" Id. at 162-63.
499. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
500. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 236 Cal. Rptr. 810, 818 (Ct. App. 1987), affd, 491
U.S. 110 (1989).
501. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Justice Scalia was
joined in whole by Chief Justice Rehnquist and in part by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy; Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.
502. Id. Janet Dolgin argues that implicit in the reasoning of all the Supreme
Court's unwed father cases, not only Michael H., is the requirement that due process
protection is contingent upon the biological father having formed either a marital or a
"marriage-like relationship" with the child's mother. Dolgin, supra note 461, at 649-
50; see also David V. Hadek, Comment, Why the Policy Behind the Irrebuttable Pre-
sumption of Paternity Will Never Die, 26 Sw. U. L. Rev. 359 (1997).
503. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 118.
504. Id. at 127.
505. Id. at 127-28 n.6. Justice Scalia's narrow formulation-by which he character-
ized the interests of Michael H. as being those of "an adulterous natural father,"
rather than simply as those of a "natural father," id.-led Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy to dissociate themselves from that portion of his opinion. Id. at 132 (O'Connor,
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find any "relevant tradition" favoring the parental autonomy of a
married lesbian couple raising a child together over the asserted inter-
ests of the child's biological father. Yet, by the logic of his analysis,
the couple's position ought to be as favored as that of any "unitary
family '506 formed by the saying of marriage vows.
The problem with all of this, and of trying to resolve parental dis-
putes such as Thomas S. by reference to traditional notions of paren-
tal autonomy, is that the historic models are out of sync with the
realities faced by gay sperm donors and lesbian mothers. The rules of
the unwed father cases, from Stanley to Michael H., serve to mediate
between the "good father" (who earns parental rights by developing a
relationship with his child in a unitary family) and the "bad father"
(who doesn't grasp parental opportunity, or who procreates with an-
other man's wife, and who now seeks to disrupt another unitary
family).
These are not the verities that produce the tensions in the Thomas
S.-type situation. The real unitary family in such a case is comprised
of the lesbian couple and their child, only partly united by biology.
But the donor (the absent biological parent) is not a "bad father" sim-
ply because he is not part of the unitary family. And he is not an
intruder, but rather an indispensable party who has played a crucial
role in the formation of the family. When unanticipated emotional
attachments are formed between father and child with the full knowl-
edge and participation of both mothers, it is no answer to his desire
for continuing involvement to say that he is estopped to assert any
rights because he kept his agreement and never became a real mem-
ber of the unitary family. But neither should he be allowed to inter-
fere on equal parental footing merely because he possesses genetic
links and has behaved himself.
Paula Ettelbrick argues that if Robin and Sandra had felt secure
that Thomas would not seek to become a "full-fledged parent," they
might have been more willing to acquiesce in his developing relation-
ship with Ry.517 Perhaps she is wrong to assume that marriage would
not have helped in that regard. If marital union had given them the
J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia's approach has received considerable academic
criticism. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstniction,
11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1617-18 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 1057, 1092-93
(1990).
506. Further defining the term, Justice Scalia wrote:
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have
referred to as the "unitary family," is typified, of course, by the marital fam-
ily, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children.
Perhaps the concept can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no
resemblance to traditionally respected relationships-and will thus cease to
have any constitutional significance-if it is stretched [too] far ....
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
507. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert, supra note 61, at 163-64.
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autonomy that Michael H. and the other unwed father cases seem to
contemplate for marriage-centered unitary families, Robin and San-
dra might well have felt the security of which Ettelbrick speaks. It
seems more likely, however, that this is one context in which the rules
governing marital relationships would fall short of resolving the clash
of interests at stake. It is a setting that cries out for a nuanced solu-
tion more thoughtfully attuned to the subtleties of the various paren-
tal roles.
V. CONCLUSION: THE DOMESTICATION OF SEXUAL OUTLAWS
Again the questions put at the outset as the matters to be examined
by this essay: Are gay and lesbian familial concerns likely to be better
served by uncoupling family life from marriage-as activist critics
claim-than by the pursuit of same-sex wedded union? And would
pragmatic compromise of the quest for marriage parity be of modest
consequence to gay people-as scholarly skeptics assume-because a
simulacrum of marriage would do just as well?
The answers, it would seem, depend on the definition chosen. One
dictionary tells us that a simulacrum is "an image; likeness"; or else it
is "a vague representation; semblance"; or perhaps it is "a mere pre-
tense; sham. ' 508 By no fair reckoning could it be said that any alterna-
tive status or combination of legal strategies now available or
contemplated in the foreseeable future would bring to gay families the
"image" or "likeness" of the bundle of rights and obligations that flow
from legal marriage. Short of that, there are some aspects of domestic
partnership that offer "vague representations" of marital status, and
there are rights won in hard-fought litigation that are at least a "sem-
blance" of those flowing automatically from marriage. In other re-
spects, however, the family options open to gay people, by and large,
are a "sham" or "pretense" compared to the marriage-centered fam-
ily's rights.
For the same-sex coupled family seeking support for companionate
cohabitation, a few domestic partnership laws provide important
rights. At best (as in the Scandinavian countries), or even well short
of best (as in Hawaii's first-in-the-nation statewide domestic partner
law), significant tangible benefits are available for the first time to
qualifying same-sex couples. Elsewhere, local ordinances offer little
more than token symbolism to most gay people, if such laws exist at
all. More importantly, there is no alternative status anywhere in this
country that affords gay and lesbian partners the opportunity to regis-
ter commitment and obligation to one another in the way that mar-
riage does. If that is a difference that is perfectly acceptable to some,
it is nevertheless a factor that deprives the domestic partner option of
508. Webster's New World Dictionary of American English 1251 (3d college ed.
1988).
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legitimacy in the eyes of many same-sex couples and of the broader
civic community at large.
For the lesbian or gay parent-child family seeking the state's aid (or
at least not its opposition) in the nurturing of children, not even the
pretense is held out of the favored treatment that the law affords for
married couples. Whether by adoption or collaborative reproduction,
children brought into same-sex-parent families will not as easily have
legal ties to both parents as will the similarly-situated children of mar-
ried couples. For most functional non-legal parents, neither steppar-
ent adoption nor automatic spousal rights will ease the way or assure
continuing access to a same-sex partner's child. Litigation victories
for lesbian and gay parents, while notable, are still far more the excep-
tion than the rule.
In the final analysis, however, and whatever the impact on day-to-
day gay family life, it is likely that the most far-reaching consequence
of legalized same-sex marriage would be symbolic. Ever since Justice
White decreed in Bowers v. Hardwick5' that there is "[n]o connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homo-
sexual activity on the other, 5 10 gay people have been denied all man-
ner of claims for equal treatment in the name of the Supreme Court's
depiction of their lives as beyond the pale of respectability. Gay rights
opponents have remained fixated on the sexual aspects of sexual ori-
entation. To many, including Justice White's successor in interest, Jus-
tice Scalia, criminal sodomy is "the conduct that defines the class" of
gay people,51' and "homosexual 'orientation' is an acceptable stand-in
for homosexual conduct ' 512 or for "those with a self-avowed tendency
or desire to engage in the conduct., 513
Conversely, gay rights supporters have stayed distant in recent
years from defending the intimate aspects of lesbian and gay life. Vic-
timization, status discrimination, and the same equality arguments
that have been the mainstay of other civil rights struggles have re-
placed most talk about the fundamental right to freely order one's
intimate affairs. Avoidance of the sexual outlaw image has been an
important political and litigation strategy.
It is hard to imagine any action more likely to lift the sexual outlaw
onus than the legalization of same-sex marriage. In one step, society
would confer, perforce, the symbolic legitimation of intimacy that is
always implicit in the celebration of a marriage. It would be a civic
recognition of shared humanity like no other that gay people have
509. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
510. I& at 191.
511. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
512. Id. at 625.
513. Id.
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ever experienced. But it could only come with marriage. There is no
simulacrum that would do the same.
